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ABSTRACT 
This research explores the nature of Japanese American cultural identity through 
an examination of the historical contexts of WWII, internment, and the 3/11 disasters in 
Japan. Interview data was analyzed using both interpretive and critical paradigms. I then 
utilized the Communication Theory of Identity (CTI), the corresponding concept of 
identity gaps, and critical-cultural hybridity. It was found that Japanese Americans 
construct, enact, and relate to their identities in markedly different ways despite 
belonging to the same cultural group. In turn, I am proposing further revision to CTI’s 
communal frame to exemplify the shared and contested elements of a collective. This 
research also suggests that the structural context of internment has impacted Japanese 
Americans even though they may not perceive much of an impact on their own identity 
conceptions. Moreover, this study argues that internm nt has profoundly shaped the lives 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
During World War II (WWII), over 120,000 Japanese Americans were unjustly 
imprisoned by the United States government in internment camps for three and half years. 
Regrettably, no distinction was made between U.S. citizens and non-citizens (or 
immigrants), and no legal proceedings were employed to determine probable cause for 
criminality before their imprisonment (Hayashi, 2004; Kashima, 2003; Nakagawa, 
1990b; Robinson, 2001). Pearl Harbor has been regard d, for many, as a key historical 
event that provoked the U.S. government to intern Japanese Americans. As it will be 
discussed, racial discrimination against Japanese Am ricans has been traced back to their 
emigration to the U.S. in the late 19th century whereby alien land laws, labor restrictions, 
and quotas on immigration were imposed on them (Ichioka, 1988; Miksch & Ghere, 
2004; Robinson, 2001).  
Many scholars have denounced the U.S. government for unjustly incarcerating 
Japanese Americans largely because of racial prejudic , political and economic interests, 
and wartime hysteria (Hayashi, 2004; Luther, 2003; Muller, 2001; Nakagawa, 1990b; 
Robinson, 2001). Accordingly, scholars have also produced an exhaustive amount of 
literature in order to understand and critique the immediate impact and long term 
implications of the camps across generations of Japanese Americans. In that literature, 






talk about internment camps and WWII in shaping views toward both the Japanese and 
American aspects of the dual identity of the Japanese American citizen. In this study, I 
consider both how Japanese American identities havebeen constructed as informed by 
the historical contexts of internment and WWII, and how Japanese Americans related to 
the events of March 11, 2011 (also called the 3/11 disasters) when a massive earthquake, 
tsunami, and a nuclear accident occurred in Japan. I believe that exploring both current 
and older reference points are important in order to understand how Japanese Americans 
connect to their ethnic identities today. Persons of Japanese descent or ethnic Japanese 
living outside of Japan, also called Nikkei, have settled throughout North and South 
America since the late 19th century (Asakawa, 2004; Nakagawa, 1990a; Shimabukuro, 
2011; Takenaka, 2009). This study, however, focuses on Nikkei who have settled in 
North America, and in particular, the U.S. Thus, I use the term “Japanese American” to 
refer to Nikkei in the U.S., and in this study, I focus on how Japanese Americans 
incorporate both recent events along with the formative experience of internment into 
their sense of identity. 
I have investigated the nature of Japanese American identities by the following 
criteria: (1) How has internment and the personal experiences of Japanese Americans 
shaped their identities; and (2) How has historical racism and discrimination shaped 
Japanese Americans’ identities; and (3) How did Japanese Americans relate to the 3/11 
disasters in Japan and to others who were affected by it. Consequently, I employed a 
dualistic paradigmatic approach that combined an interactional level of analysis with a 






interpretive approach as a means to understand how Japanese Americans have 
constructed their identities, which allowed narratives on culture and identity to emerge. I 
then used the critical perspective—in particular, the concepts of power, ideology, and 
hegemony—in order to examine and critique how their id ntities have been shaped and 
informed by the broader contexts of internment, WWII, racism, and discrimination. After 
identifying some common themes in participants’ narratives—e.g., many claimed that 
their parents (more or less) did not talk about inter ment with them, many experienced 
dissonance or were reluctant to accept themselves as Japanese Americans, the majority 
does not speak Japanese, etc.—it became clear to me that the interpretive approach alone 
was ineffective in explaining why this might have been the case. Not only that, but there 
was something problematic about my analysis that seemed to overlook power struggles 
and the role of the historical context that Japanese Americans have been profoundly 
shaped by. Therefore, my theoretical framework incorporated both the interpretive and 
critical approaches. 
Rationale for this Study  
Although Japanese Americans of similar generations and/or ages may share a 
common historical memory (e.g., racism, discrimination, internment), Japanese American 
identities are complex, multidimensional, contested, and constantly evolving. Therefore, 
this study considered how Japanese Americans’ identities have been shaped by the 







Japanese Americans are unique in that they have long been viewed as “the Other” 
with an appearance that is not “white,” they have be n the target of racism since the first 
arrivals in the U.S., and they have a historical experience of internment. Internment has 
been conceptualized as a paramount experience for Japanese Americans that has 
generated compounding, cross-generational effects upon members of this ethnic and 
cultural group, albeit, with varying degrees among individual members (Asakawa, 2004; 
Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Nakano, 1990; Takezawa, 1991). Needless to say, Japanese 
Americans connect to their ethnic and cultural identities in various ways. For some 
Japanese Americans, the historical experience of internment continues to inform their 
sense of self whereas being Japanese American for others pertains more to richness of 
their cultural traditions and interacting with other Japanese Americans, as I will discuss.    
As ethnic Japanese (albeit, generations removed), this study also explored how 
participants have conceptualized the 3/11 disasters in Japan in order to understand 
another dimension of Japanese American identity. It goes without saying that because we 
live in an era that is saturated by media, news media coverage informs how local and 
global audiences have come to learn about disasters in addition to other events that are 
taking place in the world. Hence, global interest in the 3/11 disasters was fueled by 
extensive mass media and social media coverage. Givn the rise of global instantaneous 
media during the present times, the media may have played a larger role in informing the 
public—and therefore, Japanese Americans—about the 3/11 disasters compared with 
WWII. However, that is not to imply that the U.S. government did not utilize the media 






rationalize the “need” for internment and war with Japan among the U.S. public. Rather, 
the present times are marked by a greater degree of media in that media corporations 
play an important role in the public’s understanding of the crises through the way in 
which reporting is conducted, and that in turn can influence how people integrate their 
understandings of the crises into their identities.  
 While natural disasters are rather frequent in Japan due to the country’s prime 
location between four major tectonic plates along the Pacific Ring of Fire—the North 
American Plate, Pacific Plate, Philippine Plate, and the Eurasian Plate—the 3/11 disasters 
were unprecedented because they were both natural and human-made disasters (Matanle, 
2011; Rajendran, Andrade, Thulasiraman, & Rajendran, 2011). That is, the first two parts 
of the disaster were characterized as natural disasters (i.e., the earthquake and the tsunami 
were caused by nature) whereas the third part was human-made (i.e., the nuclear accident 
involved the errors of human agents). Although 3/11 as an event is salient for numerous 
reasons (e.g., natural and human-made disaster, the construction of nuclear power plants 
on the coast of a seismically active country, the danger of nuclear power and radioactivity, 
the use of mass/social media in a global context), this study focused on how Japanese 
Americans connected to Japan’s 3/11 disasters by situating these disasters within the 
larger context of their identities.  
March 11, 2011 
At 2:46pm on March 11, 2011, an earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 devastated 
the northeastern Tohoku region of Japan with its epicenter located near the city of Sendai, 






& Arora, 2011). Shortly thereafter, the earthquake then triggered a massive tsunami with 
wave heights up to 15-17 m destroying virtually everything in its path along the shore 
and inland (Hommerich, 2012; Luke & Karashima, 2012; Matanle, 2011; Sharma & 
Arora, 2011). Consequently, the tsunami also triggered a human-made disaster at the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, namely, an accident that released radioactive 
materials into the environment that has endangered the health of thousands of people, if 
not more (see Appendix 1). This unprecedented triple disaster (also called 3/11, the 
Tohoku disasters, or the Great East Japan Earthquake) h s resulted in over 20,000 people 
dead or missing, nearly five to eight thousand more injured, and an estimated 150,000-
330,000 people displaced from their homes—either homeless or temporarily housed at 
evacuation centers (Hasegawa, 2012; Herod, 2011; Hommerich, 2012; Ishii, 2012; 
Matanle, 2011; Sharma & Arora, 2011).  
The aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami severely damaged or destroyed 
infrastructure, including power for communications services and devices, public 
transportation, roads, land, buildings, businesses, houses, belongings, etc. As a result of 
this, immediate communication from the Japanese govrnment to its citizens about 
evacuation procedures and precautionary measures wer  delayed as well as for those 
attempting to contact friends, family, and coworkers for a confirmation of their survival 
and well-being (Herod, 2011; Kanayama, 2012; Sugimoto, 2011; The Quakebook 
Community, 2011).1 
                                                           
1     Intact community radio stations, however, provided specific, up-to-date, local information for disaster victims who 






While recovering from these natural disasters is undo btedly a long and 
complicated process of political, social, and economic considerations, what is perhaps 
more problematic is rebuilding society after the nuclear accident. Located on the coast of 
the Tohoku region in the Fukushima prefecture, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plant withstood the massive earthquake, but then failed to hold up with the strength of the 
tsunami as waves crashed over its relatively small 5.7 m protective wall (Hasegawa, 
2012; “Japan nuclear: UN says tsunami risk was underestimated,” 2011; Matanle, 2011). 
At the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, damaged infrastructure systems, power 
outages, and failed backup generators meant that nuclear reactors lost their cooling 
functions,—essential for preventing nuclear accidents—which consequently led to 
damaged reactors and fuel rods, radioactive water flooding the complex,  meltdowns, 
explosions, and the release of radioactive materials into the atmosphere (Funabashi, 
2012; Hasegawa, 2012; Ikegami, 2012; Ishii, 2011; “Japan reactor leak ‘serious 
setback,’” 2011;  Matanle, 2011; Sharma & Arora, 2011). Within the duration of four 
days, unit reactors 1, 2, and 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant suffered 
meltdowns whereas hydrogen explosions occurred at unit reactors 1, 3, and 4 with 
uncontrollable radioactive leaks into the air from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plant (Funabashi, 2012; Hasegawa, 2012; Ishii, 2011; Matanle, 2011).2  
                                                           
2     Japanese officials and representatives of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) sprayed water from helicopters 








Four days after the initial earthquake and tsunami, the Japanese government 
ordered a mandatory evacuation zone with a 20 km radius to ensure safe distances from 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (i.e., failure to adhere resulted in fines) and 
those living within the 20-30 km radius were told to remain indoors (see Appendix 2; 
Ikegami, 2012; Ishii, 2011; Matanle, 2011; Sharma & Arora, 2011). However, many 
Japanese and critics outside of Japan contested this supposedly “safe zone” for not being 
safe enough, which sparked several demonstrations and protests as early as the first few 
weeks since 3/11 occurred (Ishii, 2011; “Japan nuclear: UN says tsunami risk was 
underestimated,” 2011;  Sharma & Arora, 2011).3 Case in point, the severity of the 
Fukushima crisis was rated a number seven on the Inernational Nuclear Event Scale 
(INES) to denote a major accident, which is the highest on the scale and is the same 
rating as that for the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear meltdown. By implication, this suggests 
that the Fukushima crisis should not have been underestimated (Hasegawa, 2012; 
Hommerich, 2012; Matanle, 2011; Sharma & Arora, 2011).  
By May 5, 2012, all 54 nuclear reactors in Japan (see Appendix 3) were 
decommissioned to be thoroughly inspected, yet on July 1, 2012 two reactors at the Ohi 
nuclear power plant were restarted, fostering even more dissent (Asakawa, 2004; “Japan 
shuts down last nuclear reactor,” 2012; “Protests in Japan as nuclear reactor restarts,” 
2012). Recent updates about the Fukushima crisis dur ng August and September of 2013 
                                                           
3     The United Nations, the United States, and other countries had recommended a wider evacuation zone of 80 km 






have found that the plant continues to leak massive amounts of radioactive water 
(“Fukushima Plant Operator Reports New Leak,” 2013). 
Seismologists and critics of nuclear energy had warned against the dangers of 
nuclear power plants, their construction near the coastline of Japan, their inadequate 
protective walls given the historical records of tsunamis in Japan, previous nuclear 
accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, and most notably the deadly effects of 
radiation when the U.S. military dropped atomic boms on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
(Hirose, 2011; Scalise, 2012; “Seismologists warn Jpan against nuclear restart,” 2012). 
Consequently, many Japanese citizens criticized or felt that they could no longer 
trust the Japanese government for a variety of reasons. The Japanese government and 
TEPCO’s claims that the radiation posed “no immediat  threats” to their health was 
doubted by many, especially those with young children (Hommerich, 2012; “‘Invisible 
enemy’ stalks Fukushima,” 2012; Matanle, 2011). Suspicions about radiation are further 
exacerbated with known radiation levels that have be n detected in the soil, oceans, food, 
and other products used for consumption (e.g., spinach, milk, and fish) whereby many 
fear both immediate and potential long-term risks. Accordingly, several people have 
become self-taught experts about radiation, learned how to measure one’s radioactive 
exposure, engaged in anti-nuclear demonstrations, and h ve denounced the nuclear 
complex.4 Other reasons for citizens’ distrust pertain to the government’s slowness to 
                                                           
4     The nuclear complex (also called the “nuclear village” and the “atomic c rcle”) is comprised of close relationships 
between electric power companies, nuclear industries, political parties, government officials, mass media, and 
academics. They use power, politics, bureaucracy, and money to push their agenda for nuclear energy (Funabashi, 







respond to the disasters, placing short-term concerns over the long-term effects, 
downplaying the harm of and exposure to radiation, insisting upon a relatively small 
evacuation zone from the nuclear power plant despit the explosions and meltdowns that 
released more radioactive materials into the atmosphere, not taking adequate 
responsibility or holding TEPCO to more responsibility, and the continued promotion of 
nuclear power as an economic interest (i.e., cost-efficient electricity). Certainly, some 
Japanese claim to trust expert opinions about healthy exposure to radiation and may not 
have participated in such overt forms of dissent (Hommerich, 2012).  
Media coverage of 3/11. 
Many people across the world learned about the 3/11 disasters through media 
coverage, including Japanese Americans who would have learned, gathered (more) 
information, and formed interpretations about the disasters. In addition to traditional 
media sources, Slater, Keiko, and Kindstrand (2012) maintained that social media 
“directly mediated our experience of the quake more than any other disaster” because 
some of the content and sources (e.g., videos, pictures, commentaries that individual 
users generated) were used in initial reports of the disaster by traditional media (p. 94).5 
In the same way, individuals also posted news media articles on their social networking 
sites (SNS) (e.g., Facebook, blogs), which indicated n interpenetration of social media 
and news media (Slater et al., 2012).  
                                                           
5     Traditional mass media refers to a single, centralized source of information (such as print, radio, TV, etc.) 
produced by corporations that has the capacity to reach a mass audience whereas social media refers to a “many-to-
many” production, consumption, and user generated source of information (mainly online networks such as Facebook, 






To determine how social media were used by the Japanese during 3/11, Hjorth 
and Kim (2011) found that cell phones (which include normal cell phone features plus the 
internet) were an important device for making immediate contact with others, capturing 
footage of the earthquake and tsunami, gathering important information, and for some to 
avoid the bombarding messages about the disasters by playing games. However, cell 
phone usage was not accessible for everyone due to power outages and severely damaged 
technological infrastructure systems that were caused by the disasters.  
Nevertheless, journalists captured extensive media coverage—mostly during the 
first few months—of 3/11 that documented the political and economic power of Japan 
(Tkach-Kawasaki, 2012). Tkach-Kawasaki (2012) contended that global media have 
focused on comparing Fukushima to the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island nuclear 
accidents whereas local Japanese media have focused on the immediate situation at hand 
(i.e., loss of life, scarce resources, temporary housing, nuclear power plant updates, etc.). 
Nearly three years later, local and global media still report on 3/11 as new developments 
happen and updates occur, mostly pertaining to the nuclear power plant(s), radioactivity, 
and the economic sector. Certainly, coverage of anti-nuclear demonstrations and criticism 
of the Japanese government appears more frequently and in more overt ways in global 
media; however, local media have given some attention to these issues (“Anti-nuclear 
protestors put heat on Noda,” 2012; Ito, 2012; Mie, 2012). Turning now to how trauma 
may have factored into people’s experiences of 3/11, internment, WWII, and the atomic 







Japanese survivors of 3/11 who witnessed the horrendous black wave (i.e., the 
tsunami) that swallowed up thousands or those whose family members, friends, etc. were 
lost because of it may be grappling with trauma and the “fairness” of who survived, 
otherwise known as “survivor’s guilt” (Grammaticas, 2012; Luke & Karashima, 2012; 
The Quakebook Community, 2011). According to LaCapra (2001), trauma is a 
“disruptive experience that disarticulates the selfand creates holes in [the] existence; it 
has belated effects that are controlled only with dfficulty and perhaps never fully 
mastered” (p. 41). To complicate the process of working through the trauma, the mind 
can become metaphorically possessed by the past in which it unconsciously and/or 
consciously reenacts the trauma—in the form of flashb cks, nightmares, anxiety attacks, 
intrusive thoughts, etc.—through precise images and actual scenes of the trauma, which 
is known as retraumatization (Caruth, 1995; LaCapra, 2001).  
 An essential frame of reference for how the Japanese have experienced trauma 
and how some people have conceptualized 3/11, specifically the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear accident, pertains to the historical context of WWII. Grey (2002) contended that 
the Japanese were devastatingly humiliated when the U.S. military dropped atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which psychologically eliminated Japan’s will to 
fight and killed, wounded, and severely traumatized millions. Historic memory and the 
long-term impact of the atomic bombs are noteworthy for many Japanese and serves as 
evidence for several protesters that nuclear power is not safe (Barker, 1985; Igarashi, 






Americans may have experienced trauma from being interned. However, the amount of 
trauma suffered from the internment camps varies depending on each person, their 
experiences, age, generation, cultural values, citizenship status, marital status, 
interpersonal networks, socio-economic status, and other factors (Fugita & Fernandez; 
2004). 
 In summary, this introduction has served to familiarize the reader with the some 
of the key developments of the 3/11 disasters and me ia coverage of 3/11, which is an 
essential contextualization in framing the situation in order to examine how Japanese 
Americans interpreted the 3/11 disasters. This study utilized 3/11 as a means to identify 
how Japanese Americans have expressed their identites by analyzing how they have 
responded to the disasters in relation to, or in contrast to, the stories they told about 
internment, WWII, and their own personal experiences as Japanese Americans. In other 
words, 3/11 is the initial point of conversation to explore personal experiences of how 




CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is two-fold: First, it makes a case for how scholars have 
written about the ways that Japanese Americans have constructed their identities. In 
doing so, it considers the historical background of Japanese Americans in order to 
understand what experiences have shaped the identites of some Japanese Americans. 
Secondly, it explores the impact of natural disasters in general, the role of media 
coverage, and how members of different cultural groups have responded in different 
ways to natural disasters. This broader contextualization of the impact and sense-making 
structures of how other cultures have handled various natural disasters is a necessary, 
preliminary step for analyzing how Japanese Americans in this study have interpreted the 
3/11 disasters.  
Japanese American Identities and Internment 
As the overall objective examines how Japanese Americans have conceptualized 
their identities and how they related to the 3/11 disasters, it is first necessary to consider 
the history of Japanese Americans in the U.S.  
While the Japanese began emigrating to the U.S. by the thousands starting in the 
19th century, they encountered suspicion, bans on immigration, alien land laws that 
allowed the seizure of Japanese agricultural land, labor restrictions, discrimination, and 






1988; Miksch & Ghere, 2004; Robinson, 2001). This long-standing racism before 
internment simultaneously “cut deep into…psyche[s]” of Japanese Americans and served 
the interests of the U.S. government in forming the “perfect enemy” to hate in a time of 
war, especially as the war in the Pacific worsened (Nakano, 1990, p. xv). Following 
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese Americans were deemed to be enemies of the 
U.S., which culminated in the massive forced internme t of Japanese Americans. 
However, this masked U.S. political and economic interests in Japanese Americans’ 
agricultural land and served as a “justification” for the U.S. entry into WWII—
specifically, war with Japan (Nakano, 1990). Likewise, the “justification” to end the war 
with Japan by using nuclear weapons, the atomic bombs (of which the U.S. and Japan 
still remain divided over), devastated large segments of Japanese society, especially for 
those who lived in or near Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
These experiences have drastically changed the lives of some Japanese Americans 
across generations due to the ways that they were treated and perceived by the U.S. 
American public, but it is necessary to make a distinction between collective guilt and 
collective shame in order to understand how Japanese Americans might be positioned 
within these histories. Collective guilt pertains to the guilt, remorse, and/or regret that 
members of an in-group may feel on behalf of their in-group’s misdeeds, harm, and/or 
immoral actions done to others even though individual members may not have been 
personally responsible or involved in committing such acts (Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, 
Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008; Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Imhoff, Wohl, & Erb, 2013; Piff, 






Rothschild, & Cronin, 2013). In turn, members of an in-group may feel some sense of 
obligation (arising from their guilt) to make amends, restitution, and/or offer reparations 
to those who were wronged (Brown et al., 2008; Reid et al., 2005; Sullivan et al., 2013). 
For example, some Japanese Americans may feel a sense of collective guilt for the acts 
committed by the Japanese imperial military during WWII (e.g., for the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor, invading other Asian countries, etc.) even though they were not directly involved 
or personally connected with that subgroup.  
On the other hand, collective shame refers to the perception of a negative or 
tarnished group image due to some wrongdoing committed by their in-group and/or some 
flawed attribute(s) of their group (Brown et al., 2008; Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Piff et al., 
2012). These negative perceptions supposedly “implicate something about the very 
nature of who they are” (Lickel et al. cited in Brown et al., 2008, p. 671). Examples of 
collective shame are illustrated by the following statements: “If only I wasn’t” and “My 
group is bad” (Imhoff et al., 2013; Piff et al., 2012). Although it is contested among 
scholars whether collective shame may lead individual members to seek restitution with 
groups who were wronged by their in-group, it is more commonly held that collective 
shame involves avoidance or distancing behaviors in esponse to the negative and/or 
threatening perceptions associated with their group (Brown et al., 2008; Brown & Cehjic, 
2008; Piff et al., 2012). In light of negative rhetoric and public perceptions of Japanese 
Americans (e.g., “foreign savages”), some Japanese Am ricans may have felt collective 
shame for belonging to this “inferior” and “threatening” group. While some Japanese 






gone to great lengths to prove their U.S. American loyalty by enlisting in (or were drafted 
into) the U.S. military in an attempt to dispel such myths (Asakawa, 2004; Fugita & 
Fernandez, 2004; Kuramitsu, 1995; Murray, 2000; Takez wa, 1991). Hence, collective 
shame—along with social and political pressures for being imprisoned in camp—may 
offer insight into why some Japanese Americans might have severed their ties with the 
cultural values of their ethnic heritage—such as lerning and speaking Japanese, sharing 
family histories with their children, talking about in ernment, practicing Buddhism and/or 
Shintoism, and so on. Throughout this study, I invoke the concept of collective shame—
rather than collective guilt—as more of a factor into how and why many Japanese 
Americans might have constructed their identities in the ways they do.  
Nevertheless, there are a number of differences among each generation, which 
will be the focus of the following section.  
Nikkei in the U.S. 
The name, Japanese American, is at best a symbolic representation of cultural 
hybridity that both unites and divides. There is a need for the constant negotiation and re-
negotiation of the multiple cultural identities of Japanese Americans due to their “dual 
personality…an inner mental conflict—a conflict of l yalties” that came to a head in 
WWII and in particular, the U.S. war with Japan (Hayashi, 2004, p. 21). However, this 
conflict of loyalties is best explained as a conflict of cultural loyalties—the mixing, 
blending, and conflicting of cultures—rather than a conflict of national loyalties (being 
loyal to the U.S. or Japan) that tends to serve the interests of the U.S. government in 






American” invokes an implied juxtaposition: Japanese and American—two ethnic 
identities that Japanese Americans were not able to s parately embrace (i.e., being solely 
Japanese or American) partly because of the appearance of their“foreign” bodies, yet 
many were not granted the rights to embrace both/and parts of their identities (Luther, 
2003; Nakagawa, 1997; Ono, 1997; Uchida, 1982). Furthermore, Ono (1997) noted that 
many bicultural and multicultural individuals typically exist in non-spaces and non-
locations whereby they “squeeze between spaces, yet nev r fully inhabit [their] own 
space” (p. 118). It is possible that some Japanese Americans may not feel that they have a 
proper place within U.S. American society (despite a U.S. citizenship status) because of 
racism before, during, and after internment. However, they may not feel a sense of 
belonging to Japanese society either as many are generations removed, may not speak 
Japanese, and have not necessarily lived in Japan, nor in some cases even visited the 
country. Certainly, some Japanese Americans fit in quite well with U.S. American culture 
and may regard themselves as more American than Japanese. As such, while “Japanese 
American” appeals to and unites a common ethnic ident ty, the term is also divisive in 
that it implies homogeneity by masking individual differences (Nakagawa, 1990a).  
Nevertheless, this research cautions against privileging “authenticity,” which 
implicitly suggests an ideal identity for Japanese Americans, thereby de-valuing those 
who might have differing connections to their Japanese and American identities (Hao, 
2012). The complexities of Japanese immigration and identity issues across generations 
are illustrated by the terms that had implications with internment during WWII: Issei 






Japanese), Kibei (second generation, yet were educated in Japan), S sei (third 
generation), and Shin Issei (new first generation immigrants after 1965).  
Isseis are the first-generation Japanese who emigrated from Japan during the late 
19th to early 20th centuries, and may be the generation “most connected” to Japanese 
customs and cultural traditions due in part because they grew up in Japan, and were thus 
more likely to internalize Japanese values (Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Hayashi, 2004; 
Nakano, 1990; Uchida, 1982). Isseis were more likely to value transmitting Japanese 
culture to their children in that they often encouraged learning Japanese, eating Japanese 
food, and partaking in Japanese cultural traditions. Isseis mainly emigrated—mostly 
young men at first and in larger numbers with women and children settling later—to the 
U.S., Canada, and South American countries for economic reasons; namely, for work in 
the agrarian and business sectors (Asakawa, 2004; Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Nakano, 
1990; Smith, 2008). According to Smith (2008), many Isseis intended to stay in the U.S. 
only temporarily and planned to return to Japan once they had earned enough money, 
received an education, and/or started a business.  
However, Isseis also had the least access to rights in the U.S. due to their “enemy 
alien” status in which they were prohibited, at the ime of internment, from becoming 
naturalized U.S. citizens and owning land in some state  (e.g., California) (Kurashige, 
2000; Saito, 2005; Smith, 2008; Wilson, 2011). Isseis were finally granted the right to 
become naturalized U.S. citizens with the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 
(Asakawa, 2004). Younger Isseis tended to be more active in the community as well as in 






organizations, like the Japanese American Citizens L ague (JACL)—a civil rights 
organization formed during the 1930s (Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Uchida, 1982).  
Niseis are the second-generation Japanese who were born in the U.S. and were 
therefore citizens at the time of internment (Uchida, 1982). Many Niseis have 
encountered tensions between their Japanese or American identities, learned minimal or 
no Japanese, and mostly had not travelled or lived in Japan (Harada, 1998; Kuramitsu, 
1995; Ono, 1997; Uchida, 1982). Although many Niseis tried to reject their 
“Japaneseness” and the Japanese ways of their parents that made them stand out from 
mainstream white U.S. American culture, others were more conscious of the 
discrimination they faced and verbalized their dissent (Asakawa, 2004; Harada, 1998; 
Nakagawa, 1990b; Takezawa, 1991; Uchida, 1982). The desire to be accepted as an 
American is exemplified in the following account: 
I thought of my prizewinning essay that I had written for my English class titled, 
“Why I Am Proud to Be an American.” As tears streamd down from my face, an 
awful realization slowly dawned on me—I am an American with the face of the 
enemy. The added trauma of being uprooted from my friends and home left me 
confused and with a deep sense of loss. (2-I quoted in Nakagawa, 1990b, p. 398) 
 
The pain and trauma of being in internment camps prevented many older Isseis and 
Niseis from talking to their children about it because talking implied that wounds could 
be re-opened for them while their children may have felt vulnerable at the expense of a 
good childhood (Nagata & Chen, 2003). Accordingly, some older Niseis were more 
likely to experience internment with greater shock and trauma whereas some younger 
Niseis adapted somewhat more easily and could possibly st ll obtain a college education 






their aging Issei parents and siblings, and younger Nisei women tended to be more 
negatively impacted by internment due to scare financial resources (Fugita & Fernandez, 
2004). Furthermore, some Niseis also feared revealing their true feelings as the U.S. 
government heavily documented and monitored camp activities, a feeling that continued 
for some throughout their lives (Kuramitsu, 1995; Shimabukuro, 2011; Takezawa, 1991; 
Uchida, 1982).  
However, some younger Niseis and Sanseis fought against internment, and for 
reparations (Takezawa, 1991).  A few Niseis—namely, Fred Korematsu, Gordon 
Hirabayashi, and Minoru Yasui—defiantly stood up for their rights by refusing to go to 
the internment camps and by breaking curfews in which their cases were then taken to the 
U.S. Supreme Court (Asakawa, 2004). For nearly forty years, their unjust convictions 
were upheld, yet were eventually overturned during the mid- to late-1980s (Asakawa, 
2004; Saito, 2005; Smith, 2008).  
Kibeis were American-born Japanese (technically Niseis) who ent to Japan for a 
“minimum of three years in Japan between the ages 13 and 20” to become educated and 
acculturated as Japanese (Hayashi, 2004, p. 34). According to Asakawa (2004), Kibeis 
were encouraged by their Issei parents to “soak up their traditional culture” by going to 
Japan for a few years (p. 10). The U.S. military, however, viewed Kibeis with particular 
suspicion and questioned their U.S. loyalty (Hayashi, 2004). However, it was eventually 
proven that these fears did not have any legitimacy, except for serving U.S. interests in 






Sanseis comprise the third-generation Japanese who were primarily born in the 
U.S. at the time of internment when they were very young or shortly after internment. 
While it certainly was not the norm, some Niseis did tell their Sansei children about 
internment. However, many Sanseis typically learned about internment from books, 
articles, films, college courses, from others, and some not even at all (Takezawa, 1991). 
Many Sanseis were not taught or were (only) minimally t ught about internment in 
schools. Since most Sanseis did not grow up in camps, did not experience trauma, or who 
were too young to remember the experience, they were able to critique internment (that is, 
after internment was over) in completely different ways that most internees could not, 
such as the freedom to express one’s feelings without being monitored by guards, a 
further removed ethnic status (as third-generation) that allowed for more overt critiques, a 
U.S. citizenship status that was recognized by authorities, and minimal or no recollection 
of trauma. In fact, some Sanseis even contended that they had never experienced racial 
discrimination (Takezawa, 1991). 
Shin-Isseis are the newest, first generation emigrants from Japan since 1965 
(Asakawa, 2004; Smith, 2008). Shin-Isseis typically speak Japanese and may have 
varying levels of English as many have spent several y ars of their childhood and/or 
adulthood in Japan (Smith, 2008). 
Likewise, Yonsei (fourth generation), Gosei (fifth generation), Rokusei (sixth 
generation), Han or Hapa (half or of a mixed Asian race; e.g., Hapa Nisei), also capture 







Expanding beyond generational differences among Japanese Americans, Fugita 
and Fernandez’s (2004) survey of the Seattle Japanese American community (i.e., as it 
has one of the highest concentrations of Japanese Americans on the West Coast) provides 
some insight into how different age groups of Japanese Americans have interpreted 
internment. For instance, the study showed that the eld rly were more likely to have more 
negative and traumatic, rather than positive experiences. Many women, depending on 
their stage in life, viewed the social and occupational activities more positively and the 
living conditions more negatively. Men who were college-aged at the time typically 
interpreted internment more negatively due to disturbances in their educational and/or 
occupational plans. Those who were children or adolescents were more likely to think 
that internment was fun as they were able to continue being children (Fugita & Fernandez, 
2004). Notwithstanding, it was often younger Isseis, Ni eis, and Sanseis who were highly 
critical of the U.S. government field and some even supported Supreme Court cases (e.g., 
Hirabayashi v. United States, Korematsu v. United States) that fought for Japanese 
Americans’ civil rights as “guaranteed” by the U.S. Constitution (Kuramitsu, 1995; 
Shimabukuro, 2011; Takezawa, 1991; Uchida, 1982). Hence, Japanese Americans may 
have conflicting interpretations of internment depending on their life experiences, 
generation, age, socioeconomic status, and so on. In sum, the above section considered a 
few key differences among generations of Japanese Am ricans. The next section 
considers how organizations and community involvement also takes part in forming 







Japanese American organizations—civic, cultural, religious, athletic leagues, 
language-based, etc.—were and still remain an essential mechanism for forming and 
shaping Japanese American identities. Through such organizations, Japanese Americans 
were/are able to collectively embrace aspects of their identities and maintain the social 
fabric of their culture.  
Within several Japanese American communities along the West Coast were ethnic 
enclaves called Little Toykos and Nihonmachi, or Japantowns, that were areas of several 
blocks full of businesses, retail shops, restaurants, grocery stores, churches, services, 
recreational facilities, barbershops, bathhouses, etc. (Fugita & Fernandez, 2004). Fugita 
and Fernandez (2004) suggested that Japantowns were the “heart of Japanese American 
life in the Pacific Northwest” where many communal and social activities took place (p. 
19). One festival, Nisei Week—held at Little Tokyo during the 1930s and early 1940s—
served as a means to rekindle the small businesses, revive Japanese culture among Niseis, 
and to celebrate their bicultural identities with folk dances, music, parades, beauty 
pageants, cultural, and martial arts (Kurashige, 2000).  
While more densely populated Japanese American communities along the West 
Coast have more vibrant “Little Tokyos” or “Japantowns,” Denver’s ethnic enclave is 
somewhat of a “Tiny Tokyo” called Sakura Square (Asakawa, 2004). Located in 
downtown Denver, it is centered in one square block with a high rise apartment for 
seniors, a grocery store, a restaurant, a Buddhist temple, a resource center, and a few 






metro area include two (Japanese) Christian churches, t  JACL, the Japan America 
Society of Colorado, the General Consulate of Japan, the Cherry Blossom Festival, the 
Colorado for Japan Relief Fund, and a few others.  
The JACL has been instrumental in fighting for the rights of Japanese Americans 
(Fugita & Fernandez, 2004). It was mainly comprised of young Issei leaders, primarily 
men who were more educated and/or professionals, and who sought to combat 
discrimination against Japanese Americans (Hayashi, 2004). In particular, the JACL 
Seattle chapter took social and political leadership on numerous controversial issues; 
namely, redress for internment (Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Takezawa, 1995).  
However, some JACL chapters have been criticized for supposedly siding with 
the U.S. government (e.g., expressions of their patriotism to the U.S., some administered 
an oath of allegiance to the U.S. upon entrance into JACL chapters after Pearl Harbor) or 
not denouncing internment as strongly as some suggeted, taking hostile positions against 
the Kibei, and challenging Japan’s relations and invasion into China in 1937 (Asakawa, 
2004; Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Hayashi, 2004). According to some scholars, Japanese 
American organizations and their prominent Issei leaders were viewed with particular 
suspicion by authorities (Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Muller, 2001; Robinson, 2001). 
Consequently, the government targeted and arrested more Isseis who were active in civil 
affairs immediately after Pearl Harbor, including: “business leaders, farmers, travel 
agents, Shinto and Buddhist priests, judo instructos, editors of the vernacular press, and 
the like” (Muller, 2001, p. 18). Hence, young Niseis were soon thrown into the leadership 






Additionally, religious organizations—namely, Buddhist temples and Christian 
churches—were also prominent in Japanese Americans communities, which were often 
located in Japantowns or Little Toyko locations (Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Izumi, 2010; 
Smith, 2008). Buddhism, as one of the main ethnic rel gions of the Japanese, served to 
keep some Japanese Americans connected to their cultu al heritage (Izumi, 2010). For 
instance, Buddhist temples were typically established in conjunction with Japanese 
language schools, which allowed Japanese Americans to express their ethnic, cultural, 
religious, spiritual, and linguistic values (Izumi, 2010). Buddhist temples (or churches) 
were not only spaces for individuals to express their religious identities, but they also 
allowed Japanese Americans to socially interact with others and participate in festivals 
such as the Obon—including bon odori dances, ikebana flower arrangements, taiko 
traditional Japanese drumming, etc. (Izumi, 2010).6 Whereas many considered Buddhism 
to be the socially acceptable faith of the Japanese and Japanese Americans, there were 
also several followers of Christianity, but they were often accused of becoming 
“Americanized” (Smith, 2008). After internment, several Buddhist temples, Christian-
based organizations, and churches—e.g., Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), 
Federal Council of Churches, Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians—helped to resettle 
Japanese Americans (Bangarth, 2004; Izumi, 2010; Smith, 2008). 
Another way to express the cultural and/or ethnic identities of Japanese 
Americans was through learning one’s “native tongue” in Japanese language schools 
                                                           
6     It should be noted that the term, “Buddhist chur ” has been used interchangeably for “Buddhist temple” so as to 







(Doerr & Lee, 2009; Fugita & Fernandez, 2004). For instance, some Japanese Americans 
attended Japanese Language Schools in the U.S., called Nihon gakko (literal meaning, 
“Japan school”) in addition to their public education because some parents (particularly, 
Isseis) wanted their children to learn cultural andmoral values implicit within the 
Japanese language (Fugita & Fernandez, 2004). Moreover, the desire to learn Japanese 
varies among each individual and family, their interest level, the type of Japanese taught 
at Japanese Language Schools (standard Japanese as taught in Japan or a Japanese 
curriculum tailored to non-native speakers who plan on living in the U.S.), the difficulty 
level in actually learning the language, time available compared to the time commitment, 
and many more reasons (Doerr & Lee, 2009). 
In this elaboration about generational and age differences in addition to 
organizational and community involvement, I have sought to explore a few facets of how 
Japanese Americans have constructed their cultural and ethnic identities. Although I have 
referred to the experience of internment in earlier sections of this thesis, below I present a 
more detailed description of internment and its consequences in order to then consider 
how Japanese Americans’ sense of identity may have been informed by this historical 
experience.   
The Internment of Japanese Americans. 
Over 70 years ago, Japanese Americans encountered one of the most devastating 
experiences that impacted not only Japanese Americans at the time, but also generations 
born thereafter. On February 19, 1942, United States Pr sident Franklin D. Roosevelt 






Harbor—which legally gave the U.S. government and military permission to exclude (i.e., 
imprison) any and/or all persons for any reason as a means to “protect” against espionage 
and sabotage under the conditions of war (Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Inada, 2000; 
Nakano, 1990). Although Executive Order 9066 did not explicitly pertain to the 
“Japanese,”—which can be arguably more dangerous as the U.S. government gave itself 
full permission to exclude any racial, ethnic, or other kinds of groups as its “enemy”—
many scholars have suggested that this order served to l gally authorize the imprisonment 
of Japanese Americans (Hayashi, 2004; Kashima, 2003; Muller, 2001; Nakagawa, 1990b; 
Nakano, 1990; Robinson, 2001; Uchida, 1982).  
In a context of WWII warfare, discrimination, and racism, Japanese Americans 
were unjustly imprisoned in 10 internment or concentration camps away from the West 
Coast (see Appendix 4) in designated, desert-like, swamp-like, or in high plains areas for 
nearly three and a half years from 1942-1945 (or 1946 for those imprisoned at the Tule 
Lake camp). Japanese Americans predominately lived along the West Coast of the U.S. 
(then regarded as a “sensitive” military zone) due to its proximity and similar climate to 
the Pacific, yet this was—in addition to economic interests in their agricultural land—
precisely why the U.S. government “relocated” Japanese Americans away from the West 
Coast (Asakawa, 2004; Nakano, 1990). Niseis made up about two-thirds or 70,000 of 
Japanese Americans interned and were technically U.S. citizens. Isseis were the 
remaining one-third of Japanese Americans interned.  
In the two-month period before President Roosevelt issued the order to intern 






Defense Command—announced a curfew that required Japanese Americans to remain in 
their homes from eight o’clock at night until six o’cl ck in the morning, in addition to a 
mandatory military approval for traveling more than five miles from their homes (Miksch 
& Ghere, 2004; Muller, 2001). DeWitt also requested that Japanese Americans 
“voluntarily”  move away from the West Coast, but numerous bank accounts of Japanese 
Americans were frozen, which further complicated the ability to relocate (see Appendix 
5). In rearticulating military orders, DeWitt rhetorically shifted the evacuation request 
“from voluntary to mandatory [as] the military was to empty the West Coast of all 
ethnically Japanese people, aliens and citizens alike” (Muller, 2001, p. 23). However, 
evacuation was portrayed positively by U.S. officials to Japanese Americans in that 
evacuation was for their own “protection” (Uchida, 1982). 
Kashima’s (2003) critique of various terminologies used to frame internment 
underscores the need to distinguish between various terminologies to capture the reality 
of the situation: 
At the time, the U.S. government used its own euphemisms to identify its wartime 
camps and actions. Terms such as “assembly centers,” “relocation camps,” and 
“evacuation” mask the unpleasantness of people remov d involuntarily from their 
homes and forced to live in flea-infested stables, dusty fairgrounds, and hastily 
and shoddibly built barracks in desolate places. Internment designates the 
imprisonment of civilian enemy nationals… Incarceration, as a concept, applies 
to those imprisoned by the W.R.A. [War Relocation Authority] and to the 
assembly camps created by the War Department. Imprisonment encompasses the 
overall process that includes both internment and incarceration. (Kashima, 2003, 
p. 8-9, emphasis in original) 
 
Moreover, several Japanese Americans believe that the most accurate term was 






interned or incarcerated under armed guard,” but others were conflicted as the term 
typically refers to the Nazi concentration camps during the Holocaust (Kashima, 2003, p. 
8).  
In order to allocate time for “proper” set-up and arrangements of permanent 
relocation centers (meaning, internment or concentration camps), the U.S. Army’s 
Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA) detained Japanese Americans in 15 to 16 
assembly centers (Kashima, 2003; Mizuno, 2003). Mizuno (2003) indicated that the 
average length of stay within assembly centers was around 100 days, which served as the 
“prologue to mass encampment” (p. 99). Although the typical family was given several 
weeks to abandon their homes, others were given only a few days to resettle in temporary 
camps or assembly centers. Personal possessions, livestock, and property were 
unfortunately lost, sold quickly for extremely low prices, or illegally seized as Japanese 
Americans could bring “only what they could carry” to assembly centers (Muller, 2001, p. 
27). They were forced to leave their belongings, livelihoods, occupations, and dignity to 
embark upon a new “journey” called internment. However, there were some good-willed 
(white) Americans and churches that were hospitable to Japanese Americans, opposed the 
evacuation order, and offered storage for some of their possessions (Bangarth, 2004; 
Uchida, 1982). That is not to suggest that all chures held the same opinions about 
Japanese Americans and internment as many succumbed to hypocrisy and racism.  
Accordingly, there was even one governor who politically opposed internment 
and who allowed Japanese Americans to settle in the stat  of Colorado so as to evade 






Governor Ralph Carr. 
Most of the Japanese Americans who lived in Colorad before internment 
consisted of males who primarily engaged in agrarian occupations (C. Takeshita, 
personal communication, July 6, 2012). Ralph Carr, then Governor of Colorado, was 
immensely significant for some Japanese Americans because he encouraged the 
reunification of families, women, and children to come to the state of Colorado. In effect, 
a couple thousand Japanese Americans came to Colorad  during the voluntary evacuation 
away from the West Coast (Harvey, 2004; Schrager, 2008). However, Carr’s “invitation” 
of Japanese Americans into Colorado sparked intense resentment and outrage from 
(white) Colorado residents as well as from others (Harvey, 2004; Schrager, 2008). Indeed, 
Carr was the only governor to publically oppose intr ing U.S. citizens, yet he 
supposedly supported the construction of the internm nt camp in southeastern Colorado 
(called the Granada relocation center or Amache). However, other governors “adamantly 
refused to allow large numbers of [Japanese] Americans to relocate within their borders 
unless they were confined within concentration camps” (Harvey, 2004, p. 36). Carr 
shielded those Japanese Americans who voluntarily moved away from the West Coast to 
Colorado from being interned before the mandatory evacuation order was put into effect. 
Moreover, Carr stood with Japanese Americans in fightin  for their civil rights and 
opposed the internment of American citizens, thus becoming a hero in the eyes of many 
Japanese Americans within Colorado, which was indeed a rare move on behalf of 






Those who did not or could not evacuate away from the West Coast, however, 
were interned. While the term “camp” carries a positive connotation, the following 
portion explores how daily life panned out for some int rnees.      
Daily Life in Camp. 
Internees’ lives were heavily monitored and confined to the camp; as such, they 
were surrounded by barbed wire and were watched by armed guards in towers, further 
preventing escape from the camps (Luther, 2003; Nakag wa, 1990b; Uchida, 1982). 
However, some individuals or families were re-assigned to different camps after their 
initial arrangements, which caused disruption and a lack of consistency in the lives of 
some in the camps (Uchida, 1982). 
All camps and all but one assembly center had theirown newspapers that were 
written and published by some internees, yet the War Relocation Authority (WRA) 
exercised oversight (including strict censorship in some cases) over the newspapers 
(Luther, 2003; Mizuno, 2003; Uchida, 1982). Although many newspapers had small 
Japanese language sections and some were prohibited from writing in Japanese (albeit, a 
point of contention among scholars), scholars have suggested that controversial subject 
matter was often censored whereby some articles were deleted while others had blotches 
covering the content making it illegible (Luther, 2003; Mizuno, 2003). Depending on the 
stages of internment and how comfortable internees were in expressing their identities, 
internees sometimes depicted camp in the newspapers s enjoyable, strongly affirming 
their American identity and dissociating from Japaneseness, indirectly commenting on 






impact and their true feelings, to bold assertions f being Japanese and American as well 
as their critiques of internment (Luther, 2003). 
The living conditions in the camps included: extreme heat or cold, dust of desert 
climates, long hours of waiting in lines, insufficient and unhealthy food rations, open 
showers and toilets without dividers, small living areas depending on the size of one’s 
family (i.e., larger families did not necessarily have to share one room together or with 
those who were unrelated to them), limited privacy, unsanitary living conditions, limited 
extracurricular activities, and insufficient educational activities etc., all of which were 
terribly shameful and humiliating for Japanese Americans—even resulting in minor 
ailments, major illnesses, and the deaths of some (Muller, 2001; Saito, 2005; Uchida, 
1982). As if the harsh living conditions in camp were not rough enough, the U.S. 
government interrogated Japanese Americans’ loyalty as they distributed questionnaires 
to internees.  
Loyalty Oath Questionnaires.  
While thousands of Japanese and Japanese Americans languished in the 
internment camps, in 1943 the U.S. distributed loyalty oath questionnaires to Japanese 
Americans primarily to recruit “loyal” Nisei into the U.S. military (Hayashi, 2004; 
Nakagawa, 1990b). Japanese Americans aged 17 and older as well as those who were 
U.S. citizens were expected to answer either a “Yes” or “No” to two specific questions, 
among several other questions that asked if they would serve in the U.S. military, and if 
they would swear their allegiance to the U.S. while forswearing allegiance to the 






1990a, b; Saito, 2005). The questionnaire was unjustly framed as a dichotomy (i.e., loyal 
Americans or disloyal Japanese), which implicitly assumed loyalty to Japan, hence the 
invocation of “foreswearing” their allegiance (Nakagawa, 1990b; Saito, 2005). According 
to Inouye (2011), the loyalty oath questionnaires wre “supposed to reveal which 
Japanese Americans could be trusted to be released for military service, employment, or 
educational opportunities outside of the camps” (p. 35)  Nakagawa (1990b) contended 
that Japanese Americans did not have a real choice in answering such questions (not even 
a space to write their own answers) as each answer had a set of implications in addition to 
feeling betrayed by their own country. Those who answered “No” to both questions (i.e., 
the “No-No Boys”) or those who failed to register fo the military were deemed to be 
“disloyal” Japanese and pro-Japan supporters, and therefore “troublemakers” who were 
sent to the Tule Lake camp for stricter supervision along with 18,000+ others (Asakawa, 
2004; Hayashi, 2003; Kurashige, 2002; Nakano, 1990; Saito, 2005). On the other hand, 
those who were initially imprisoned at Tule Lake who answered “Yes, Yes” on the 
questionnaire were transferred to different camps (Uchida, 1982). Many Japanese 
Americans feared answering “No, No” on the loyalty questionnaire or in such a way that 
could lead to separation from their family, or make th ir own or their family’s 
imprisonment worse—in addition to possibly being ostracized from the Japanese 
American community, while others took pride in demonstrating their loyalty to the U.S. 
by registering for the military (Asakawa, 2004; Saito, 2005).  
By 1943, several thousand Japanese Americans eithervolunteered to join or were 






segregated units, which included the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, the 100th Infantry 
Battalion, Military Intelligence Service (trained linguists fluent in Japanese and English), 
and the Women’s Army Corps (Asakawa, 2004; Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Inouye, 
2011; Kuramitsu, 1995; Murray, 2000). Moreover, the qu stionnaire infuriated many and 
divided the Japanese American community so drastically that the rifts continue even 
today.  
Internment Ends. 
Internment ended in the mid-1940s, but sources and scholars have contested a 
clear end date to internment. C. Takeshita (personal communication, July 6, 2012) drew 
attention to the notion that the War Department declar d a revocation of their exclusion 
order against Japanese Americans on December 17, 1944 which was a strategic move to 
avoid the likely negative ruling by the Supreme Court the very next day. The War 
Department claimed that they would close camps beginning in January of 1945 with the 
revocation of the exclusion order (C. Takeshita, personal communication, July 6, 2012). 
According to Ina (1999), the first internment camp (Jerome) to officially close occurred 
on June 30, 1944 whereas the last camp (Tule Lake) closed on March 20, 1946. On the 
other hand, Hayashi (2004) noted that the Supreme Court overturned the justification of 
“military necessity” in December of 1944 while the closure of camps started in 1945 and 
ended in 1946.  From this, it can be inferred that internment was tied up with political 
issues.  
The War Department later “admitted that their search for…spies among Japanese 






accusations were entirely false and unfounded (Hayashi, 2004, p. 212). During the 1980s, 
Japanese Americans and the general public became more critical of the internment period 
in which it was revealed that racial prejudice, propaganda, greed by which whites were 
able to seize the rich agricultural land on the West Coast through the alien land laws, 
wartime hysteria, and failure of political leadership were the more accurate justifications 
for the imprisonment of Japanese Americans. It was not until 1988, with the passage of 
the Civil Liberties Act, that the U.S. government publically apologized to Japanese 
Americans and provided $20,000 in reparations to surviving Japanese Americans (i.e., 
mostly Niseis and Sanseis). This offer further divied the Japanese American community 
because some harsher critics who refused to accept th  money argued that it was an insult 
since it was hardly enough to compensate for the massive losses, damages incurred, 
trauma experienced, and no “real” life to return to from internment (Shimabukuro, 2011; 
Takezawa, 1991). Others chose to accept and were grat ful for the reparations (Takezawa, 
1991).  
Internment also contributed to the breakdown of some Japanese American 
families as women were more likely to work and develop more hobbies as opposed to 
their primary role of holding their (own) family together (Asakawa, 2004). Working in 
the camps gave many internees something productive to do despite the low wages that 
they typically earned (Howard, 2008; Nakano, 1990; Uchida, 1982). In fact, there were 
thousands of Japanese Americans who were allowed to l ave the camp with work and/or 
school permits provided that it was away from the Wst Coast (Asakawa, 2004). 






families as they tried to make the best of the situation, and even started new families 
(Asakawa, 2004; Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Howard, 2008; Uchida, 1982). Likewise, 
living under such harsh collective conditions, children had few (or none in some cases) 
role models to learn parenting skills and what a helt y family consisted of (C. Takeshita, 
personal communication, July 6, 2012). Family cohesion disintegrated for many as camp 
activities were segregated by age and gender as opposed to families, there were limited 
choices for daily activities (school activities were offered, but not in the same way as 
before internment), children played card games, base all, and idly sat around while 
others got into trouble with drugs, gambling, prostitution, and alcohol (Fugita & 
Fernandez, 2004; Muller, 2001). Consequently, while some people lost touch with their 
families, others began new families, restarted their careers, and lives (Fugita & Fernandez, 
2004).  
Pilgrimages to the memorial sites of the internment camps, which began in 1974 
with the Tule Lake camp in central California, have provided many Japanese Americans 
the opportunity to (re)visit the camps, to process what exactly happened, what the 
conditions of camp were like, how they felt, and to feel (more) connected to the Japanese 
American community (Takezawa, 1991). However, even today many Japanese 
Americans remain divided on the overall issues of internment and may not agree with 
interpretations of the historical context, various criticisms, or outcomes.  
Depending on various perspectives, ideologies, and socio-historical constructions 
of scholars and critics, some people may point to slightly different events leading up to 






across Asia including: Manchuria, Korea, Sakhalin, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indochina, 
etc. (Iyenga, 1912; Pollard, 1934; Jing Sun, 2007; Sussman & Yafew, 2000). Although 
contested by some critics, Japanese imperialism, colonialism, and militarism were viewed 
as threats to the U.S. and other countries (Hayashi, 2004; Iyenaga, 1912; Pollard, 1934; 
Robinson, 2001; Jing Sun, 2007; Sussman & Yafeh, 2000). The U.S., then, strategically 
built off of the idea that Japan was a “threat,” which later served the purpose to intern 
“enemy aliens.” The possibility of war with Japan triggered U.S. concerns over security 
resulting in more defensive planning and the establishment of racist policies (Kashima, 
2003). Additionally, Nardo (2003) indicated that U.S. officials ignored warning signs of a 
possible Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and instead used the attack as a declaration for 
war on Japan. Thus, when the attack on Pearl Harbor came on December 7, 1941, “it was 
relatively easy for the [U.S.] army command… [to carry out its orders] since it had 
already planned for the removal and the internment of thousands of enemy nationals” 
(Kashima, 2003, p. 7). Therefore, the U.S. now had t eir reason to justify the internment 
of Japanese Americans: it was a “military necessity” that the U.S. should be protected 
against the “enemy race.” This rationale was a masking of long-standing racial prejudices 
against Japanese Americans. That is, military necessity was used as a means to gain 
popular support with a majority of (mainly white) U.S. civilians who already 
discriminated against Japanese Americans (as well as other ethnic groups)—a strategic 
appropriation advanced in the aftermath of Pearl Habor by the U.S. as a nation against 






Although the internment of Japanese Americans occurred over 70 years ago, 
internment (may) continue to inform Japanese Americans’ sense of identity. Even though 
Japanese Americans did not all experience internment, their self-perceptions and identity 
formations may still in fact be influenced by a cultural residue of those who lived through 
internment, yet it is also possible that there may be no resonance of the experience among 
other Japanese Americans. Nevertheless, Bhabha (1994) argued for a constant relation of 
the past upon the present. That is, the past does not necessarily become erased from one’s 
memory, but rather gets filtered through the present in umerous ways. Therefore, a 
constant reflection upon the positive, negative, and traumatic aspects of internment is 
necessary because it has the potential to frame how Japanese Americans might interpret 
present circumstances.  
Once again, the purpose of this study explores the nature of Japanese American 
identities by examining how participants reveal their identities in relation to their 
personal experiences, internment, WWII, and to the 3/11 disasters.  
An Overview of Natural Disasters 
 Before exploring how some cultures have responded to and interpreted natural 
disasters, it is important to examine the impact of natural disasters in general. Although 
humans can engage in preparedness and preventative strategies for a decreased impact, 
natural disasters are characterized as events that humans have no contr l ver whereby 
nature causes it—including floods, fires, earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, hurricanes, 
tornadoes, etc. (Freitag, Grimm, & Schmidt, 2011). The uncontrollable, unpreventable, 






hundreds, thousands, or even millions killed, injured, and/or missing—is a devastation 
capable of dramatically altering people’s lives and surrounding circumstances. While 
Condry (2011) framed natural disasters to be social dis sters, Mutter (2008) provided a 
more exhaustive understanding in that landlocked, poor countries with extreme poverty 
and infectious diseases, certain geographic locations (coasts, hillsides, etc.), slums around 
large cities and places with the least developed infrastructure systems, as well as groups 
such as the poor, elderly, women, and the very young who often experience natural 
disasters with the most intensity and vulnerability. In reality, it may take several years, 
decades, and if not longer for countries to recover from disasters.  
Grief, amazement, shock, awe, indignation, trauma, anxiety, Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD), depression, hope, and countless other feelings and/or symptoms 
have been experienced by survivors of natural disasters (Carlin & Park-Fuller, 2011; 
Freitag et al., 2011; Joye, 2010; Perera, 2010). Treatment may take a variety of 
approaches ranging from seeking counseling from a variety of professionals, medication, 
aesthetic healing, and the continued engagement within one’s community. While a 
majority of Western medical and psychological experts have identified a need for victims 
to share their personal narratives using storytelling to make sense of the event and to gain 
greater health benefits, other psychological experts have contested this due to the 
disregard of social and cultural differences in framing and thereby handling natural 






The Role of Media in Covering Natural Disasters. 
For those who have not personally experienced a natural disaster, the public can 
still learn about such “heart-wrenching stories of urvival and loss” through media 
coverage, social networks, and other avenues (Motter, 2005, p. 507). Global mainstream 
corporate media reveals a distressing depiction of global divides for disasters that occur 
in the non-Western world: How and what is reported through the news media depends on 
who was affected, geographic location, political importance, economic, and cultural 
relevance—that is to say, how it affects the Western world (Joye, 2010; Mutter 2008; 
Perera, 2010). In what is sometimes referred to as he “coup and earthquake syndrome,” 
media coverage in the developing world tends to gravitate toward widespread death and 
destruction: that is, wars and natural disasters (Mutter, 2008). In the case of Japan as a 
more developed country, the 3/11 disasters were extensively covered by the media (most 
notably, during the first couple of months) perhaps in part because Japan is (now) a 
strong ally of the U.S. and due to the potential spread of radiation internationally 
(Igarashi, 2000; Tkach-Kawasaki, 2012). As scholars h ve indicated, natural disasters are 
news worthy events because of the threat posed to human life, health, and subsistence, 
which can result in hundreds of thousands of deaths nd immense damage to the 
surrounding environment—a shocking event indeed (Joye, 2010; Mutter 2008). However, 
media coverage of disasters does not necessarily impl that an honest interest is directed 
towards the most afflicted, but rather global media coverage—most notably U.S. 
mainstream corporate media—ethnocentrically reports on how it affects one’s own 






economic, and social interests of selected governments (Grandien, Stromback, Ottestig, 
& Nord, 2006; Joye, 2010).  
In turn, media coverage can trigger varying levels of trauma in viewers, including 
secondary or vicarious trauma—an emotional, empathetic over-arousal of the traumatic 
event; empty empathy—an arousal that dissipates upon viewing a succession of traumatic 
images resulting in fleeting empathy that does not m ve the viewer to action; and 
witnessing—an arousal, which may include vicarious trauma, tht leads to positive and 
pro-social action (Kaplan, 2008). Therefore, the media can contribute to varying 
outcomes as the interpretation of events through media are filtered by individuals in 
relation to their own personal experiences and their cultural, political, and economic 
contexts. 
Hollings (2005) examined ethical dilemmas of journalists in determining their 
role and how to report about natural disasters, focusing in particular on New Zealand 
journalists who had travelled to Asia, specifically pertaining to the 2004 Boxing Day 
Tsunami that hit Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. For instance, should 
journalists become participants, help the afflicted, or remain as outside observers to fulfill 
their journalistic role? Additionally, do the New Zealand code of ethics for media 
reporting (i.e., national and corporations’ broadcasting codes) and/or one’s own ethical 
principles guide their decisions? Such questions underscore the crucial consideration of 
how people are affected by the journalists’ choices and the media’s influence on them in 
writing news stories. Although some dilemmas do not always present clear-cut answers 






as “norms of decency and good taste, while not distort ng the news by omission” and to 
“remember you are still human, with normal human responses…that may surprise the 
journalist within” (Hollings, 2005, p. 154; McMahon, 2010, p. 43 respectively). Some 
reporting can in fact produce a greater impact and/or consequences (e.g., producing or 
prolonging trauma) in the devastated community, the global audience viewing or reading 
the coverage, and for the journalist him/herself.  
In summary, natural disasters can have profound effects on a country and the 
media have been shown to influence people’s conceptualizations of natural disasters. 
Regardless of the notion that disasters occur everywhere, the ways in which different 
cultures have responded to natural disasters are relat d to the cultural norms already set in 
place prior to the disaster. For that reason, differing cultural values should be recognized 
in conjunction with a culture’s response and the handling of a given disaster. The 
following section addresses how a few cultures have interpreted natural disasters 
throughout the course of history, but only a few disasters are considered in this review 
(thus, it is not comprehensive). The disasters are presented in chronological order along 
with a general explanation of what happened, its impact, and how members of such 
cultures have interpreted the disasters.  
Cultural Responses to a few Natural Disasters throughout History. 
The Lisbon earthquake and tsunami of 1755 in the Kingdom of Portugal killed 
nearly a quarter of a million people. Survivors characteristically detailed what happened 
during the disaster by commenting on its abrupt, violent, dreadful force that devastated 






facts,” n.d.). Nonetheless, the Enlightenment provided a possible rationale for such 
immense and incomprehensible suffering. For instance, people started to ask 
“fundamental questions of good and evil, the nature of the universe and the existence of 
god; of belief in providence and the possibility of progress” (Perera, 2010, p. 36). 
Enlightenment discourses, however, were divided betwe n those who believed that 
natural disasters were “acts of god,” thereby punishment for a country’s or community’s 
sins, and people who believed that natural disasters w e unpreventable and not easily 
described as the result of people’s actions. Importantly, with the Enlightenment, people 
contemplated the possible meaning of disasters and suffering.   
The 1978 Batticaloa cyclone in Sri Lanka killed thousands and affected more than 
one million people (“Country Report 2003: Sri Lanka,” n.d.). The Batticaloa cyclone 
demonstrates that massive natural disasters also have t e potential to fuel (more) conflicts 
and war amongst civilians, including different cultural, ethnic, and political groups. For 
instance, Sri Lanka had been a war-torn country for 25 years between the territory of the 
Liberation Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sinhala majoritarian state 
(Perera, 2010). Divisions among the Tamil and Muslim communities were further 
exacerbated with the destruction of the cyclone. Although non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) intended to administer non-politica  aid to disaster victims, they 
were prevented from doing so because of Sri Lanka’s political and military agendas 
(Perera, 2010). Sri Lankan survivors have felt the ne d to discuss both the terrors of war 
and details of the disasters, which can arguably be a first step towards social 






always invoke a “search for meaning,” but can in fact intensify and complicate existing 
problems (Perera, 2010).  
The 1994 Northridge Earthquake in Los Angeles result d in 57 deaths, over 9,000 
injuries, more than 20,000 displaced from their homes, and millions of dollars in 
structural damages (U.S. Geological Survey, 1996). Amy Murakami, a child at the time, 
was literally trapped by the earthquake: “My bedroom ceiling had fallen down around my 
bed…Everything was dark and quiet…It was hard to breathe. I couldn’t move” (Our 
“Girl’s World” Story, n.d.).  
On a smaller scale than survivors who were trapped in buildings, scholars Iwasaki 
and Horie (1998) conducted cross-cultural, anthropological research on the 
conversational patterns of Japanese and Thai international students in the context of this 
disaster. Researchers found that both cultures talked about the Northridge earthquake in 
ways that were reflective of their cultural norms, such that Japanese participants were 
sensitive to maintaining mutual dependency or interdependence whereas Thais exhibited 
self-assertiveness and independence (Iwasaki & Horie, 1998). For example, Japanese 
participants displayed mutual dependency in their attempts to build empathy and engage 
in cooperative conversational patterns by refraining from interrupting the other (i.e., 
letting the person talk, refraining from topic changers, or asking clarifying questions), 
showed continued attention with short backchannels (i. ., reactive expressions that 
confirm one’s attention, such as “yeah,” “mmm,” etc.), and used overlapping utterances 
of similar thought processes. In contrast, Thais demonstrated self-assertiveness and their 






changing questions), using fewer backchannels, yet also using overlapping utterances of 
agreement. While both cultures have similar group-oriented roots, Iwasaki and Horie 
(1998) noted that conversation styles can reflect broader cultural values, thus suggesting 
that cultural values have an important relationship with how various cultures talk about 
disasters.  
In the case of 3/11, scholars, media, and the general public have directed much 
attention towards the Japanese (understandably so) given that the disasters occurred in 
Japan and primarily affected the Japanese people. However, significantly less attention 
has been given to Japanese Americans, who may not have physically experienced the 
3/11 disasters, yet may in fact be invested in the events due to their various identity 
associations (e.g., ethnic, cultural, personal, relational). This study, then, considers how 
Japanese Americans have discussed the 3/11 disasters by placing the events within the 
larger context of their identities.  
 In 1995, the Great Hanshin earthquake (also called th  Awaji-Hanshin 
earthquake) struck Kobe, Japan resulting in nearly 6,000 deaths, over 41,000 injuries, and 
massive structural damages (Elliott, 1997). Yoshiko Negita, a survivor interviewed by 
Otake, mentioned that the earthquake affected her worldview more than anything else in 
her life (Otake, 2011). Upon the realization that Negita herself had survived when she 
could have been burned to death, she concluded that “I don’t believe in fatalism, but I 
can’t help but think about fate” (Negita quoted in Otake, 2011). Naoko Miyatake, another 
survivor, related her story by inviting people to imagine how they would respond if he or 






physical belongings/assets), yet had to start again despite his or her decreased mobility, 
physical health, and monetary means (Miyatake, n.d.). 
Despite several offers of humanitarian aid from various countries following the 
Great Hanshin earthquake, the Japanese government declined most initial offers and only 
accepted portions of aid offered from selected countries (Elliott, 1997). While there was 
widespread criticism of these decisions outside Japan, Elliott (1997) called for greater 
cultural understanding before criticizing Japan for its selectivity because: (1) damage 
assessments must first come from the Japanese local g vernments who then make 
requests for assistance to the national government; and (2) not all of the aid received was 
culturally appropriate—e.g., used items and clothing, higher dosages of medicine than 
what is typically prescribed; and (3) the Japanese Constitution of 1947 places constraints 
upon an instant mobilization of its military forces in administering internal and external 
disaster relief. Therefore, knowledge about Japanese governmental functions and a 
consideration of its cultural norms is pivotal to understanding how some Japanese might 
react and expect others to respond to their disasters. In spite of this, there was an 
awakening of the non-profit sector and volunteerism in Japan in 1995, which was later 
declared the “Year of the Volunteer” (Haddad, 2007).  
In 2004, the Boxing Day Tsunami (also called the 2004 Asian Tsunami, 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami, South Asian Tsunami) hit the coastlines of Sri Lanka, India, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, killing nearly 300,000 people, and leaving several 
hundreds of thousands missing, and millions vulnerabl  to diseases (Hollings, 2005; 






tsunami, but were grateful that NGOs aided them in rebuilding their houses and taught 
them how to respond to a tsunami drill—something of which the Indonesian government 
failed to do (Beaumont, Doherty, Ramesh, & Chung, 2009; Carter, 2009; Lichtblau, 
2005; Ramesh, 2009). Consequently, survivors of natural disasters often discuss the 
disaster in terms of the damage incurred to their homes and belongings, loved one’s lost, 
devastation to the local community and cities as well as what steps to take in order to 
prevent or lessen the impact of future disasters. One man from Indonesia, who was 
seriously injured from the tsunami, noted that “I don’t have the power to do anything…I 
just pray to Allah. There is nothing else to do” (man quoted in Lichtblau, 2005). As it can 
be concluded, one’s religious identity may manifest in interpretations about a given 
disaster, which can be suggestive of how a given person within a cultural context handles 
adversity.  
In a subversion of ethics according to Motter (2010), the U.S. in its “moral 
superiority” reportedly pledged a $950 million donation in response to the Boxing Day 
Tsunami—which drastically exceeded other countries’ donations—along with food, 
clothing, and other such supplies (Motter, 2010). In what was guised as an honest, 
compassionate act in the “best interests of foreign v ctims,” U.S. humanitarian aid was 
ultimately accompanied by military troops—a suspicious act in the eyes of the Indonesian 
government who demanded, two weeks after the tsunami, for their withdrawal within 
three months, to which the U.S. refused (Motter, 2010, p. 514). While Indonesia saw a 
distinction between aid workers and military personnel, the U.S. continued with its 






Indonesian government was attuned to how countries—specifically, the U.S.—in their 
strategies of global dominance, offered humanitarian aid. Thus, accepting disaster aid 
might at times be caught up in political and militaristic agendas. 
In an examination of public trust in the Swedish government, Grandien et al. 
(2006) concluded that citizens want their own governments to make a sound assessment 
of the crisis, provide quick and consistent information, and actively rather than silently 
express their sympathy to victims—especially during crises. Accordingly, many Swedes 
became extremely frustrated at their own government’s lack of response when the Boxing 
Day Tsunami struck because, of the 20,000 to 30,000 Swedish tourists, 543 were killed or 
missing in the affected countries (Grandien et al., 2006). Although the tsunami hit over 
Christmas holiday celebrations, it took over 24 hours for Swedish officials to arrange a 
press conference and rescue teams were sent nearly two days after the fact, which 
subsequently led many Swedish people to distrust their own government’s lack of 
attention, care, and slowness to respond (Grandien et al., 2006). While it was mentioned 
earlier that global media coverage tends to ethnocentri ally focus on its own country’s 
victims, a lack of media coverage about certain affected persons or about the disaster in 
general may lead to a decreased level of the public’s trust in one’s government. Hence, 
one’s national and/or political identities can be partially influenced by how governments 
approach and handle a given crisis.  
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans leaving approximately 5,000 






resident of New Orleans, was rightfully outraged when 911 refused to take any more calls 
from people who needed their help (Spike Lee, 2006).  
Kaplan (2008) maintained that several news media images about Katrina exposed 
the reality of pervasive racism whereby public viewers could see members of mass 
groups abandoned and left to die. Specific populations—namely, blacks, the poor, and the 
elderly—were rendered invisible and disposable by the inaction of the U.S. government, 
which evoked shame and outrage in the American public. While New Orleans’ residents 
were told to evacuate the area the day before Katrina hit, many did not have monetary or 
physical means or in a few cases did not want to leave their homes on such short notice. 
As such, thousands of people drowned, were left stranded on rooftops and expressways, 
waited for buses that never came, and packed into an unprepared Superdome in the 
aftermath of Katrina (Giroux, 2006; Kaplan, 2008). Spike Lee’s When the Levees Broke 
documentary critically analyzed the Katrina damage, th  obviously failed engineering 
techniques of the levees, and the blatant disregard of U.S. government officials and 
“rescue” organizations such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 
Consequently, many New Orleans’ residents felt utterly helpless, abandoned, were 
treated like animals, and were called “thugs” and “looters” by government officials and 
the mainstream media in their search for available food and water in convenient stores as 
opposed to an act of survival (Spike Lee, 2006).  
In witnessing the abysmal failure of governmental assistance to Hurricane Katrina 
victims, several hundred U.S. citizens volunteered to help and expressed harsh criticisms 






with its people neglected in a life or death situation). In assessing the numerous problems, 
Andrulls, Siddiqui, and Gantner (2007) suggested that emergency disaster preparedness 
strategies should be culturally sensitive, communicated in multiple languages, and made 
accessible through a wide variety of sources in order to prevent further marginalization of 
racial, ethnic, and minority groups. Katrina was an American tragedy because of the 
widespread neglect of its citizens in a supposedly democratic country that professes equal 
rights for all (Spike Lee, 2006). Consequently, much of the American public became 
more critical of the overt forms of racism that was manifested in Katrina’s aftermath, yet 
also the covert forms of racism—the unconscious, sytematic, and deep-rooted racism.  
In summary, the second half of this literature review has explored some selected 
cultural responses to natural disasters. The devastation of natural disasters have led many 
people to consider the nature of good vs. evil in determining the value of suffering, 
political and ethnic strife, cultural norms, governmental procedures, volunteerism, ethics, 
morality, neglect, and racism. In general, while several scholars (Elliot, 1997; Giroux, 
2006; Grandien et al., 2006; Kaplan, 2008; Spike Le, 2006; Motter, 2010; Perera, 2010) 
analyzed the broader economic, political, and social context of disasters (i.e., religion, 
war, conflicts, politics, etc.), Iwasaki and Horie (1998) considered the interpersonal and 
intercultural levels of the disaster (i.e., conversational patterns, cultural norms of people), 
all of which capture a few dimensions of identity, albeit implicitly. As it is discussed in 
more detail in the theoretical framework of this thesis proposal, I define identity in terms 
of an individual’s self-conception that is made up of several complex, dynamic, 






culture, nationality, social class, gender, etc.). Moreover, the above cultural responses to 
natural disasters still fall short of one objective intended for this research study, namely, 
that it is not clear how natural disasters have impacted the identities of cultural groups 




CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This study of Japanese American identity uses a dualistic paradigmatic approach 
that integrates both interpretive and critical paradigms as a theoretical framework. The 
interpretive paradigm studies culture as it emerges on an individual and interpersonal 
level whereas the critical paradigm critiques what is revealed by examining the larger 
power structures within its given sociopolitical and historical contexts. In particular, I 
used the concepts of power, ideology, and hegemony within the critical paradigm.  
The interpretative paradigm maintains the following assumptions: that the “(1) human 
experience is subjective, (2) human behavior is creativ  rather than determined or easily 
predicted, and (3) culture is created and maintained through communication” (Martin & 
Nakayama, 2010, p. 59). Essentially, the interpretative paradigm seeks to describe how 
individual behavior is socially constructed or shaped by a given culture’s beliefs, values, 
norms, traditions, and customs (Martin & Nakayama, 2010). The interpretive approach is 
valuable as it seeks to understand (not predict or overtly critique), in a general manner, 
how cultural values emerge on an individual level and through social interactions within 
a certain context. Given the background of Japanese Americans, one may have 
preconceived notions about the ways in which individual members of this collective 
identifies, cultural values and beliefs held, and customs practiced. However, an 






emerge and to avoid a further perpetuation of stereotypical knowledge about Japanese 
Americans.  
While a significant portion of intercultural communication research is conducted 
from social scientific and interpretive approaches, these approaches have been criticized 
by some scholars for being grossly apolitical, ahistor cal, and reductive in omitting the 
complex power structures that cultural groups are positioned by (Halualani, Mendoza, & 
Drzewiecka, 2009; Martin & Nakayama, 2010). Instead, Halualani et al. (2009) suggested 
that intercultural communication research should illuminate the “interplay between social 
structures and concrete interactions,” thereby juxtaposing a critical approach with an 
interpretive approach (p. 25).  
Based on the assumption that culture and culture identity is a contested terrain, a 
critical perspective accounts for the role of power in identity formation and identity 
negotiation (Mendoza, Halualani, & Drzewiecka, 2002). Hence, the critical approach was 
applied in this study in order to critically examine how broader social, political, and 
historical contexts have influenced what it means to be a Japanese American for 
participants in this study. Although the critical approach has a rich body of literature, it is 
beyond the scope of this study to present an exhaustive review, but a brief overview is 
explored below. 
The critical perspective (also referred to as critical theory or the critical approach) 
is an interdisciplinary perspective that was first developed in the 1930s as Nazism was on 






but not limited to) Gramsci, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas (Foust, 2010; Madikiza 
& Bornman, 2007; Ono, 2011).  
The critical approach takes on the assumptions that reali y is subjective albeit 
material in which “large power structures guide everyday life,” human behavior is 
dynamic rather than deterministic and predictive, and culture is a site of power struggles 
(Martin & Nakayama, 2010, p. 52). In this research, power is defined as the “opportunity 
to force the behavior of others to one’s own will,” but it remains to be an ambiguous 
concept among some scholars (Weber cited in Siefkes, 2010, p. 227). Thus, critical 
analyses hone in on “issues of macro contexts (historical, social, and political levels), 
power, relevance, and the hidden and destabilizing aspects of culture” (Halualani et al., 
2009, p. 18). The value in the critical approach, according to Splichal (2008), resides not 
merely in the revelation of power structures or power relations, but rather in its 
questioning of power relations and “common sense” cultural values as it “cannot live 
with what is or was empirically existing, prevalent, or ‘normal’” (p. 20). 
In general, the critical approach critiques how the dominant group(s) is/are able to 
simultaneously maintain power over subordinate groups while gaining their active 
consent—albeit, not without some degree of contestation—thereby evoking the ways in 
which power, ideology, and hegemony function in society (Dutta & de Souza, 2008; 
Halualani et al., 2009; Madikiza & Bornman, 2007; Mumby, 1997). Ideology, in its basic 
configuration, refers to socially constructed sets of ideas, beliefs, and values that are 
embedded within institutional, political, social, and cultural aspects of society and are 






perceptions of situations and events” (Deetz & Kersten cited in Dutta & de Souza, 2008, 
p. 330). Ideology that is configured through a system of dominance, or becomes 
normalized to the extent that power relations and agendas are concealed, then becomes 
hegemonic. 
Hegemony can refer to a “process of domination where one set of ideas subverts, 
co-opts or dominates another” (Madikiza & Bornman, 2007, p. 29). However, definitions 
of this kind remain contested among several scholars as they maintain that hegemony is 
not necessarily synonymous with ideological domination, class-based oppression, 
coercion, or physical force, but extends into moral, intellectual, ideological, and the 
cultural realms of society that is a process of “manuf cturing consent” among collectives 
(Crenshaw & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1999; Dutta & de Souza, 2008; Foust, 2010; Hoerl, 
2008; Madikiza & Bornman, 2007; Mumby, 1997; Zompetti, 1997). Similarly, Marxist 
interpretations of ideology and hegemony—i.e., ideology substituted for “false 
consciousness” and hegemony for “ideological dominatio ”—are charged with being 
deterministic and reductionist as they assume the passivity of social agents, an uncritical 
mass acceptance of an ideology and/or hegemony, and the noteworthy absence of 
resistance from subordinate groups (Crenshaw & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1999; Foust, 2010; 
Mumby, 1997).7  
                                                           
7     Stemming from prevalent functionalist and reductive conceptualizations of hegemony as ideological domination 
within critical theory, another field within communication studies was developed—cultural studies—to address the role 
of active audiences in interpreting hegemonic media texts and the multiple ways (i.e., polysemy) that tex s can be read, 






Hegemony, in this view, is defined as the “attainment of a ‘cultural-social’ unity 
through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded 
together with a single aim…on the basis of an equal and common conception of the 
world” (Gramsci cited in Foust, 2010, p. 36). Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, for 
example, there was a prevalent racist attitude toward J panese Americans and other 
Asian Americans (Luther, 2003). In particular, Asian Americans were viewed as “yellow 
perils” in that they were perceived to be “potential cultural and economic threat[s]…to 
the White population” (Balaji & Worawongs, 2010, p. 226). The host of negative images 
that came from the yellow peril stereotype suggested that Asian immigrants were 
uncivilized, threatening, foreign, deceitful, depraved, treacherous, and number of others 
negative stereotypes, which essentially bred xenophobia against Asian Americans—
especially as the war in the Pacific worsened (Balaji & Worawongs, 2010; Paek & Shah, 
2003; Shim, 1998; Yu, 2006; Zhang, 2010). When Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, it was not 
too much of a leap for much of the U.S. public to deepen their fear of the Japanese and to 
frame the Japanese as diametric “enemies” of the U.S. The attack on Pearl Harbor, then, 
functioned to culturally and socially unite the general U.S. public against Japan and 
anyone who was racially Japanese. 8  With these hegemonic views, the U.S. rationalized 
that they should take necessary action against the Japanese primarily in two forms: war 
                                                           
8     A paralleled and contemporary example of the int rnment of Japanese Americans after Pearl Harbor is the 
detention of certain Muslims, Arabs, Iraqis, Afghanis, Yeminis, Southeast Asians, and others allegedly connected with 
Al-Qaida after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Maira & Shihade, 2006; Verinakis, 2007). Since their detention in 2002, over a 
hundred detainees are still being held at Guantanamo Bay (over a decade later) in which many are severely tortured, 







with Japan and the containment of “enemies within” in assembly centers and internment 
camps.  
Furthermore, the dominant group(s) is/are able to “control not only the economy 
but also the political and cultural elements of a society… [yet] align[s] itself with other 
groups to establish a unified and subtle hegemony of cultural thought” (Zompetti, 1997, p. 
72-73). In other words, hegemony is intricately interwoven throughout society—
becoming somewhat indistinguishable—whereby dominant groups are able to maintain 
their power through a cohesive integration of their interests with the “common sense” 
norms that subordinate groups (or other collectives) have consented to and taken-for-
granted. 
 Preceding Pearl Harbor, as far back to the first wave of Japanese immigrants to 
the U.S. in the late 18th century, was a context rife with racial discriminat on against 
Japanese and Japanese Americans—which is to say nothing f the racism against Native 
Americans, blacks, Latinos, Chinese Americans, and other racial groups who were/are 
not white (Eguchi, 2013; Ichioka, 1988; Miksch & Ghere, 2004; Robinson, 2001). Thus, 
U.S. society has been historically permeated with its racist ideology whereby racial 
inferiority was regarded as an indisputable “scientific fact” by many (Hayashi, 2004; 
Inada, 2000; Robinson, 2001).9  Building upon the fear and outrage that much of the U.S. 
public felt in response to Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government and media were able to 
skillfully project—particularly through the use of propaganda—Japan and the Japanese as 
                                                           







“enemies” (Inada, 2000). In an attempt to establish connections in the public mind 
between the supposed racial inferiority and savagery of the Japanese, Japanese 
(Americans) were commonly referred to as “Japs” (i.e., a derogatory racial slur) on the 
radio and press, and were demonized in propaganda cartoons and posters to be 
“monkeys…[who] were a crazy subhuman race running wild” (Shim, 1998, p. 392). 
Insofar as the use of propaganda aimed to frame the Japanese as “enemies,” it essentially 
served the interests of the U.S. in creating a ration le to declare war on Japan, and thus, 
and entry into WWII. Hence, “common sense” assumed that if someone resembled the 
enemy, then they must be the enemy—a misguided hegemonic ideology that still has its 
reigns on U.S. American culture.   
Hegemonic ideologies, however, do not necessarily serve the interests of 
subordinate groups, but can in fact enable the dominant group to “manipulate the 
discourse in an attempt to maintain power” (Zompetti, 1997, p. 75). In this case, the U.S. 
government manipulated discourse after Pearl Harbor by appealing to a common sense, 
enemy dialectic. That is, the U.S. government was able to shape public opinion about the 
Japanese by framing the discourse around “America’s enemies” and further “threats” to 
national security, which concealed other motivations for the hegemonic pursuit, arrest, 
and imprisonment of Japanese Americans—namely, racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, 
envy and greed to seize their rich agricultural land, etc. (Verinakis, 2007).  
In Gramscian thought, the potency of hegemony endures—but is not entirely 
impenetrable—in a “cultural formation” within a given historical period in which 






with one another (Foust, 2010; Hoerl, 2008; Zompetti, 1997). Profoundly situated in a 
worldwide context of rampant militarism, imperialism, expansionism, and racism from 
the late 18th century throughout the mid 19th century, “justifications” for the internment of 
Japanese Americans were intertwined with political, mi itaristic, economic, and 
ideological interests of the U.S.  
The pervasiveness of hegemony is particularly problematic for subordinate groups 
who do not hold equal positions of power with those f dominant groups. Nevertheless, 
hegemony is not a unilateral system of domination resulting in indoctrination or 
oppression per se; but is rather an ongoing process and negotiation—or as Mumby 
termed it, “a process of struggle”—between the dominant and subordinate groups in 
defining, consenting to, challenging, and resisting he dominant social order that ebbs and 
flows throughout history (Crenshaw & Roskow-Ewoldsen, 1999; Foust, 2010; Mumby, 
1997; Zompetti, 1997). While many Japanese Americans avoided and/or feared possible 
consequences for directly opposing or criticizing the U.S. government for their 
imprisonment, there were a number of people who resisted in the following ways: 
Defying military designated curfews in camp, refusing to sign up for the draft or to 
pledge one’s loyalty to the U.S., refusing to remain silent, exerting concerted legal action 
on Congress for an official apology, and other such strategies of resistance. Needless to 
say, conflict arose among Japanese American groups and individuals over these very 
different reactions. A critical approach is therefo a necessary contribution to existing 






“objectively neutral”—how dominance, power, ideology, and hegemony functioned to 
create and sustain internment.  
In summary, the interpretive approach is utilized in this study in order to 
understand the different ways in which Japanese American identities emerge whereas the 
critical approach examines how the nature of Japanese American identity has been 
shaped by sociopolitical and historical contexts, and in particular, internment. Likewise, 
the interpretive approach is also useful in demonstrating the diverse reactions to the 3/11 
disasters. The following sections briefly review the concepts of culture, disapora, and 
identity as they relate to and situate the discussion for the theoretical concepts used in the 
analysis (i.e., the Communication Theory of Identity, identity gaps, and critical-cultural 
hybridity). 
Culture 
According to Halualani et al. (2009), intercultural communication research in the 
1970s conceptualized culture and cultural identity in relation to the complex intersections 
between race, class, gender, and nationality in specific communicative contexts. In the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, however, intercultural communication research was 
dominated by positivist (i.e., social scientific) conceptions of culture in which culture was 
treated as homogenous, static, ahistorical, and commonly thought of in terms of the 
nation-state (Halualani et al., 2009). In its traditional definition, culture has been 
conceptualized as a group of people who share (some degree of) a common nationality, 
race, ethnicity, history, language, value and belief systems, social norms, and so on 






alone is problematic because it can “obscure the political, historical, and economic 
interests” of dominate groups within a culture (Halualani et al., 2009, p. 26). 
Culture and cultural identity, then, is better conceptualized as a contested terrain, 
an ongoing ideological struggle, and a politicized system of signification that is a 
“process of negotiation around meaning that can never not be about politics” (Halualani 
et al., 2009, p. 22). Although several commonalities may exist within a given culture, 
culture is not necessarily uniform because differences exist among its members 
(Gudykunst, Lee, Nishida, & Ogawa, 2005). It is therefore problematic to assume that 
members of a given culture readily hold certain or presumed orientations.  
For this research, culture refers to both the shared nd contested elements of a 
collective. Likewise, culture is conceptualized as a complex phenomenon that is abstract, 
ubiquitous, all-pervasive, multidimensional, malleable, fluid, constantly changing, and 
emergent within communicative interactions (Hecht et al., 2003; Pensoneau-Conway, 
2012; Samovar & Porter, 1997). Another example of the shifting and contested site of 
culture pertains to diasporic communities, which is detailed below.  
Diaspora 
 Diaspora has been employed to describe the mass dispers on, expulsion, 
movement, or migration of a large community (e.g., ethnic, cultural, religious groups) to 
a different country (or countries) within a specific historical, social, political, and 
economic context (Bardhan, 2011; Halualani, 2008; Jianhua Sun, 2012). Diaspora 
includes those who willingly migrate (e.g., for economic, educational reasons) as well as 






and/or life-threatening circumstances in one’s (home) country based on a well-founded 
fear of persecution, including but not limited to: war, political, ethnic, religious, and 
social conflict (Bardhan, 2011; Halualani, 2008; Kinefuchi, 2010; Jianhua Sun, 2012). 
“Home” or “homeland” has been theorized primarily in terms of the nation-state in which 
people of the same ethnicity live in a particular ter i ory together (Karim, 2006). 
Likewise, nationality, geographic territory, ethnicity, race, culture, and language have 
traditionally implied the existence of a common people who share such ties together, yet 
fails to address the shifting, conflicting, heterogeneous, globalization, multiculturalism, 
and transnationalism of the present times (Halualani, 2008; Karim, 2006). 
As technology continues to improve, identity formation is no longer limited to a 
particular place (Karim, 2006; Halualani, 2008; Hao, 2012). Hence, identity formation 
also involves the spaces through which one can imagine communities and their cultural, 
ethnic, nationalistic, etc. identities through relational connections, media consumption 
(i.e., internet web sites, online chats, social media, news media, books, magazines, 
journals, music, movies, ect.), cultural artifacts, and so on (Bardhan, 2011; Halualani, 
2008; Karim, 2006; Kinefuchi, 2010). 
Diasporic communities and/or individuals—much like those with hybrid 
identities—often find themselves entangled in the multiple tensions of “being ‘here’ and 
‘there’ simultaneously” in relation to their cultural identities, concept of home, and their 
sense of belonging (Bardhan, 2011, p. 43). Hall (1990) characterized diasporic 
consciousness as the “recognition of heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of 






emphasis in original). Moreover, diasporic communities often form fluid, dynamic, and 
multiple conceptions of “home” whereby old and new homes are sometimes combined 
into a third space, a different kind of home (Bardhan, 2011; Bhaba, 1994; Halualani, 
2008; Hao, 2012; Karim, 2006; Kim, 2011; Kinefuchi. 2010).  
As it has been previously elaborated, the Japanese dia poric community expands 
mostly to North and South America (i.e.., the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, 
Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Peru) who emigrated to these 
countries primarily for economic reasons during the lat  19th to early 20th centuries 
(Tanenaka, 2009). While this study pertains to the Japanese diasporic community in the 
U.S.—in particular, the Japanese American community i  Denver—generations of 
Japanese Americans have been living in the U.S. for decades now. Next, an overview of 
identity research is explored, which then lays out the theoretical concepts used in the 
analysis. 
Identity(ies) 
Identity research has been conducted since the 1960s among social psychologists, 
sociologists, and anthropologists in which identity has been analyzed from emphases on 
the individual, role, social, and communal aspects (Chen, 2009; Hecht, 1993). From the 
social psychology field, Hogg, Terry, and White (1995) detailed two prominent theories 
of the time: identity theory and social identity theory. Identity theory focused on how 
individuals understood and negotiated identity salience in relation to their various role-
related behaviors in a particular social context, which was based on the assumption that 






contrast, social identity theory sought to understand individuals within group processes 
and intergroup relations—particularly, as members of various social groups such as one’s 
nationality, political affiliation, etc.—and the self- nhancement that individuals felt as a 
result of their membership in the group (Hogg et al., 1995). Since the 1980s, 
communication scholars have added the notion that identity is necessarily a 
communicative process (Hecht, 1993; Pensoneau-Conway, 2012).  
For this research, identity is defined as “self-conception—one’s theory of 
oneself…[that] gives one a sense of one’s own ontolgical status and serves as an 
interpretive frame for experience…personal motivations and expectations for social 
behavior” that is constantly shifting and changing (Cupach & Imahori, 1993, p. 113). 
One’s identity is dynamically made up of abstract, complex, multiple, fragmented, 
fractured, overlapping, not unified, and sometimes conflicting identities (Cupach & 
Imahori, 1993; Hao, 2012; Hecht et al., 2003; Hogg et al., 1995; Moriizumi, 2011; Yep 
2002). Identities, then, refer to the “names we give to the different ways we are [fluidly] 
positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past” and present (Hall, 
1990, p. 225). A few examples of this include one’s race, ethnicity, culture, nationality, 
social class, gender, sexuality, political and religious affiliations, and many more.  
Likewise, the notion of intersectionality or thick intersectionalities suggests that a 
given aspect of one’s identity (e.g., race) is never understood alone, but is more fully 
understood when one examines how it intersects and is simultaneously intertwined with 
other dimensions of one’s identity—i.e., ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, nationality, 






“always based on excluding something,” which is to ay that identity is necessarily 
contextual whereby the nature of one’s role and situational context may result in 
temporarily excluding or lodging certain aspects of one’s identity into contingency 
(Laclau cited in Hall, 1996, p. 5). In other words, the dimensions of one’s identity that are 
not readily apparent in social interactions do not necessarily equate to a loss of identity as 
they may be hidden (Hall, 1996).  
Another distinction within identity research pertains to avowed and ascribed 
identities. Avowal refers to the characteristics that individual members of a collective 
gives to themselves, their group based identities, and how they portray themselves to 
others whereas ascription refers to the characteristics, representations, and sometimes 
stereotypes that other people assign to members of a c llective (Chen & Collier, 2012; 
Hecht et al., 2003; Moss & Faux, 2006). Through an individual’s multiple positionalities 
of identity that they and others assign to them, individuals constantly negotiate their sense 
of self within social interactions, otherwise known as identity negotiation (Cupach & 
Imahori, 1993; Hao, 2012; Hecht et al., 2003; Hogg et al., 1995; Moriizumi, 2011; Yep 
2002). Identity negotiation is an important daily and lifelong process that aids individuals 
in determining who oneself is, who others are, how one will interact and coordinate 
relationships with others, and how one makes sense of the world (Hecht et al., 2003).   
Due to the fact that personal experiences, interpretations, situational contexts, and 
cultures are constantly changing, identity is also constantly transforming and adapting in 
a state of becoming (Luther, 2003). Hence, identity should be viewed as a fluid entity that 






Thus, identities are in-transit identifications, productions, and acts of performativity in 
the state of becoming—i.e., always in the process of change and transformation, and is 
never completed—that are co-created with others, in interactions, and in situational 
contexts (Bhahba, 1990; du Gay, 1996; Hall, 1990, 196; Hao, 2012; Hecht et al., 2003; 
Orbe, 2012; Pensoneau-Conway, 2012). As a means to expand on a few key components 
of identity, the Communication Theory of Identity (CTI) is detailed next and is used for 
the analysis. 
Communication Theory of Identity.  
First developed by Hecht and his colleagues in 1993, CTI was created in order to 
create strategies for effective communication among interethnic cultural groups. In 
particular, Hecht, Collier, and Ribeau (1993) and Hecht et al. (2003) studied African 
American identity and communication as a means to gain insight into how members of 
this cultural group have defined themselves, perceived their group membership, and how 
they have communicated their sense of self to others. CTI involves four interrelated 
frames of identity—personal, enacted, relational, and communal frames. One can embody 
multiple frames at a time and/or juxtapose its dialectical tensions as “identity frames are 
not isolated from each other,” but are layered within any given interaction or context 
(Hecht, 1993, p. 80). First, the personal frame pertains to how one defines oneself in 
general as well as in particular contexts (i.e., one’s self-concept or self-definition). 
Second, the nactment frame notes how identities are represented, emergent, or are 
enacted within social interactions through communicative practices. Third, the 






relationships (Hecht, 1993). And fourth, the communal frame characterizes a group, of 
which individuals are a part of, to have a particular identity. While Hecht and other 
scholars have maintained that the communal frame has a collective level of analysis 
given that the group ascribes meaning and takes precedence over the individual (Jung & 
Hecht, 2004; Kam & Hecht, 2009; Kim & Hecht, 2009; Wadsworth, Hecht, & Jung, 
2008), I treated the communal frame as an individual’s membership within a larger group 
or collective in which members share some commonality together, yet meaning remains 
to be contested among its members.  
I operationalized the identities of Japanese Americans in relation to statements of 
self-perception (the personal frame), statements of how they represented themselves or 
performed their identity to others (the enactment frame), how they discussed their sense 
of self in terms of others and their relationships (the relationship frame), and how they 
discussed their sense of self in terms of their membership within the Japanese American 
and/or Japanese communities (the communal frame). 
Identity Gaps. 
The theoretical concept of an identity gap—considere  in relation to CTI’s 
identity frames as its theoretical counterpart—acknowledges that dissonance is present 
(and is perhaps unavoidable) in social interactions (Urban & Orbe, 2010). An identity gap 
is defined as a discrepancy felt among and/or between constituent parts of one’s identity 
(Urban & Orbe, 2010). Identity gaps provide a glimpse into the complex tensions and 
contradictions that are present within an individual, but they are not necessarily specific 






interpretation of participants’ seemingly contradictory experiences and were 
operationalized in relation to the tensions they alluded to among two (or more) of their 
identity frames (i.e., personal, enacted, relational, and communal identities). 
As an interpretive theory, CTI and the corresponding concept of identity gaps do 
not explicitly address the role of power in identity construction as they focus more on 
individual and interactional levels of analysis. To account for the ways that broader 
sociopolitical and historical contexts might shape some identity gaps on an individual 
level, a critical perspective offers an additional means of analysis to explore how the role 
of power factors into this process.  
In sum, CTI and identity gaps were chosen for the theoretical framework and the 
coding of interview data because it accomplishes th task of presenting the multiple 
dimensions of a person’s identity as well as the discrepancies one encounters when 
interacting with others. While CTI addresses the qustion of communal relations, it does 
not deal directly with the specific issues emergent among those living in diasporic 
communities or those who embody several cultural backgrounds. For that, scholars have 
developed the concept of hybridity.  
Critical-Cultural Hybridity. 
The term “hybridity” was originally advanced as a form of racial purity and 
hierarchy during 19th century European colonization (Bardhan, 2012; Bhabha, 1994; 
Jianhua Sun, 2012). However, the term has since been reconfigured by postcolonial 
scholars and has abandoned the negative racist connotatio s it had of contamination and 






contested term that can pertain to cultural mixing, multiculturalism, the shifting, blurring, 
or contingency of boundaries that are constantly in flux, the blending and/or multiplicity 
of identities, and a state of in-betweenness (Bardhan, 2012; Bhaba, 1996; Kraidy, 2002, 
2004; Moreman, 2005; Pieterse, 2001; Spencer, 2011; Shugart, 2007). Following an 
interpretive and critical research design, this research adopted “critical-cultural 
hybridity,” which incorporates elements of hybridity from both theoretical perspectives.10  
Cultural hybridity is one version of hybridity that examines the intersections 
between one’s racial, ethnic, and cultural identities to emphasize the simultaneous 
presence of multiple, seemingly contradictory, or paradoxical cultural identifications that 
coexist within oneself (Kraidy, 2004; Sobre-Denton, 2012; Young, 2009). As such, 
hybrid identities fluidly exist within in-between spaces—i.e., interracial, interethnic, and 
international contexts—and are in transit where one can construct, reconstruct, 
collaborate, and contest one’s identity (Bhabha, 1994; Hao, 2012; Kinefuchi, 2010; 
Moreman, 2005). Particularly relevant to immigrant communities, cultural hybridity 
“allows them to make sense of their identity…whose culture is a mix of their native and 
host cultures” (Kraidy, 2004, p. 11). Moreman (2005) contended that cultural “hybridity 
is a both/and existence in which we operate within co trasts trying to hold these 
differences together” through the performativity of one’s identity in everyday cultural 
                                                           
10     I use the term “critical-cultural hybridity” to refer to a dualistic, critical and interpretive application of the term, 
but “hybridity” (without signifiers) is more commonly used. In light of Pieterse’s (2001) proposal of “critical 
hybridity” that conceptualizes hybridity from a critical perspective, I use the term “cultural hybridity” to refer to an 







practices (p. 74). Thus, cultural hybridity “retain[s] a sense of difference and tension 
between two [or more] cultures without assuming hierarchy” (Young, 2009).  
Additionally, cultural hybridity is sometimes referr d to as a “third space” of 
identity that can pertain to individuals who are relatively comfortable straddling multiple 
cultures, those who readily identify as “both/and,” and who fuse their cultural identities 
together (Bhaba, 1990; Moreman, 2005; Sobre-Denton, 2012; Young, 2009). However, 
the idea of a “third space” can also refer to the tensions that individuals may feel among 
their cultural identities (e.g., a “neither/nor” type of identification) as they may not fit 
into clear-cut categorizations and can become margin lized into spaces of “non-
belongingness” (Bardhan, 2012; Moreman, 2005).  
Cultural hybridity, however, is not radically different than the assumptions and 
conceptualizations that identity theories follow; but it directs more attention to the 
complexity of cultures, and how individuals sometimes straddle multiple spaces. 
Consequently, scholars and critics of hybridity remain divided as to whether the 
increased emphasis on the mixing of cultures is necessary or rather commonsense 
(Bardhan, 2012). Nonetheless, cultural hybridity is a useful conceptual tool that draws 
attention to the various multiple cultural identifications that bicultural and multicultural 
individuals regularly have to negotiate in the face of racism and discrimination (Bardhan, 
2012; Moreman, 2005; Orbe, 2012; Young, 2009). 
As with identity gaps, cultural hybridity also examines the tensions between 
constituent aspects of one’s identity on an individual level, yet cultural hybridity is 






immigrants, and those who have mixed ethnic and/or cultural backgrounds. While 
identity gaps can refer to similar types of tensions as in cultural hybridity (i.e., cultural, 
racial, ethnic, etc., but are instead categorized within CTI as communal identities), 
identity gaps seek to analyze the intersecting discrepancies among the various 
components within one’s identity (e.g., relational-communal identity gap), yet both 
theories suggest that individuals constantly negotiate the discrepancies or tensions they 
feel among their identities. Nevertheless, negotiating tensions, contradictions, and other 
discrepancies are not necessarily suggestive of their eradication. Rather, cultural 
hybridity addresses how individuals “continuously perform balancing acts between two 
[or more] cultures” (Young, 2009, p. 142).   
However, many scholars remain critical of hasty applications of hybridity that 
essentially reinforce (perhaps unintentionally) its pa t connotations of racial purity and 
colonization—most notably, in cases where hybridity is applied to examine the 
acceleration of globalization, yet can (mistakenly) conceal hegemonic domination, 
cultural imperialism, or cultural homogenization (Bardhan, 2012; Bhabha, 1994; Kraidy, 
2002, 2004; Moreman, 2005; Shugart, 2007; Jianhua Sun, 2012; Wang, 2006). Kraidy 
(2002) warned that mere descriptive applications of hybridity—in particular, global/local 
dissemination of cultural artifacts via transnational capitalism—absent from its 
sociopolitical, economic, and historical context undermines the power struggles, cultural 
domination, and class exploitation that are still present in today’s society. Other 
criticisms of hybridity include that it merely critiques essentialism in a hybrid manner 






level, it is wishful thinking of the new postcolonial privileged class rather than those less 
privileged at the borders, it supports neoliberal globalization that exploits differences, and 
it is under theorized (Bardhan, 2012). Hence, some scholars prefer to apply hybridity, or 
as Pieterse (2001) termed it, “critical hybridity,” through the lens of critical theory in 
which ideology, hegemony, power, and equality are cr fully considered in their 
respective sociopolitical and historical contexts (Kraidy, 2002, 2004; Pieterse, 2001; 
Jianhua Sun, 2012).  
Therefore, this research adopted critical-cultural hybridity (i.e., cultural hybridity 
and critical hybridity) in order to validate insights gained from both versions. That is to 
say, cultural hybridity is useful to articulate how some Japanese Americans identified as 
both Japanese and American without privileging either ethnic or cultural identity above 
the other, thus negotiating seemingly contrasting identities. In a similar vein, cultural 
hybridity also gave a means of interpretation to participants who encountered tensions 
among their racial, ethnic, and cultural identities and who struggled to fit in with some of 
their peers, yet nevertheless deeply identified as Japanese, American, and/or Japanese 
American. On the other hand, critical hybridity was particularly effective to examine how 
the sociopolitical and historical context of internment contributed to such racial, ethnic, 
cultural, and social tension felt by participants. Thus, critical hybridity supplements the 
narratives of tension, struggle, conflict, and the lik in cultural hybridity by establishing 
connections between individual experiences with the broader social, political, and 
historical contexts. Critical-cultural hybridity was operationalized through conversational 






identity over the other or modulating between identification with one and then the other 
cultural community (as what one might expect in CTI’s communal frame). Critical-
cultural hybridity is therefore distinct from the communal frame due to its emphasis on 
one’s simultaneously multiple identifications with two (or perhaps more) cultural 
communities. 
Summary  
The first part of the literature review was devoted to examining Japanese 
Americans’ identities and experiences that have been influenced by racism, 
discrimination, and internment as well as cultural, ethnic, civic, and religious 
organizations. The latter half of the literature review analyzed how other cultures have 
responded to natural disasters. The research goal is to understand how Japanese 
Americans have constructed their identities in light of the historical context of WWII and 
internment, and how they have interpreted to the 3/11 disasters within the larger context 
of their identities. In light of Halualani et al.’s (2009) recommendation, this research 
treats the interpretive and critical paradigms as complementary perspectives that join 
individual and interactional levels of analysis with the sociopolitical and the historical. 
The theoretical framework for this study is based on the theoretical concepts of CTI, 
identity gaps, and critical-cultural hybridity—all of which draw attention to the 
complexities of one’s identities. 
CTI was particularly relevant for understanding how Japanese Americans defined 
her/his self, enacted their sense of self, how theyinteracted with other people and defined 






Japanese American and/or Japanese communities. Japanese Americans are somewhat 
distinct from other ethnic groups in that they are commonly thought of in relation to the 
historical experience of internment, yet not all Japanese Americans have directly 
experienced it and may, in turn, relate to their identities in different ways (Takezawa, 
1991). Some of these differences were observed in how t ey have interpreted their 
personal experiences, the historical context of WWII and internment as well as how they 
have interpreted the 3/11 disasters in Japan. Hence, Japanese American identity 
conceptions are not the same for everyone, for which conversations during the research 
interviews helped to illuminate how participants have constructed their identities. On the 
other hand, identity gaps accounted for some the discrepancies that Japanese Americans 
have encountered among their identities (with respect to the identity frames in CTI). 
Given that Japanese Americans have been described as a hybrid mix between being 
Japanese and American, critical-cultural hybridity was employed as a means to explore 
how participants have perceived their multiple and paradoxical cultural identities (Luther, 
2003; Nakagawa, 1997; Ono, 1997; Uchida, 1982).  
In particular, these concepts acknowledge that a given individual is multifaceted 
in the ways he/she regularly enacts, interacts, and negotiates the tensions of one’s identity 
individually, relationally, communally, and communicatively within different roles and 
contexts. Hence, these theoretical concepts were app aling for research purposes in order 
to examine how Japanese Americans have constructed their identities in different ways. 






Americans to understand the nature of their identity, and how they have, in particular, 
interpreted WWII, internment, and the 3/11 disasters.  
Accordingly, this study seeks to answer the following research questions:  
1) How has internment and the personal experiences of Japanese Americans 
shaped their identities? 
2) How has historical racism and discrimination shaped Japanese Americans’ 
identities?    
3) How did Japanese Americans relate to the 3/11 disasters in Japan and to 
others who were affected by it? How were their experiences of 3/11 shaped by 
memories of internment, racism, and discrimination? 
However, it should be noted that while I intended to explore how internment, racism, and 
discrimination might have shaped participant’s interpr tations of 3/11 in the latter half of 
research question three—in particular, how participants may have been more critical of 
the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in light of internment and the atomic 
bombs—the data did not reveal significant findings.  
Therefore, the research question was shortened to: 
3) How did Japanese Americans relate to the 3/11 disasters in Japan and to 




CHAPTER FOUR: METHODS 
The purpose of this dualistic interpretive and criti al study is to understand how 
members of the Japanese American community have conceptualized their identities as 
well as the 3/11 disasters. This methodological junct re allowed multiple ways to 
understand, interpret, and critique the experiences of Japanese Americans in this study.  
A qualitative research study was conducted, involving 10 Japanese Americans, 
because the method lends itself to avoiding gross generalizations as it focused attention 
on the specific narratives of people. Semi-structured interviews were selected as the 
research method to explore in-depth cultural insight  because narratives allowed 
individuals to offer their perspectives about their pe sonal experiences, thereby allowing 
their identities to emerge (Lindof & Taylor, 2010). Interviews were recorded as audio and 
were conducted over the course of two months. Participants were interviewed once for an 
approximate total of one to three hours per participant.  
Recorded interviews were stored in a secure location and were only used for 
research purposes by me as the primary investigator. In e views were then transcribed 
and individual participants were given the option t schedule a meeting to discuss what 
was found (in a summarized version) to confirm the validity of the findings. Interviews 
occurred in places preferred by the participants so as to ensure they were comfortable 






confidentiality, pseudonyms were given to participants to conceal their identities. 
Western first names and Japanese last names were chos n as they signify the nature of 
participants’ real names. 
Authorization to conduct this study and to use Japanese Americans as the subject 
population has been obtained through the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the 
University of Denver. Informed consent forms were us d to obtain voluntary 
participation, to provide a detailed description of my role and theirs in this research, and 
any potential psychological or emotional risks (albeit, minimal) that could have occurred 
as the result of their participation. Participants were told beforehand about the possible 
negative effects or experiences that engaging in this research could have brought, their 
right to withdraw from the study at any time for whatever reason, and were given 
additional resources (that is, a handout was distributed to participants detailing a few 
counseling resources in the Denver area).  
This study took place in the Denver, Colorado metropolitan area. Subject 
participation was solicited through personal connections made with Japanese Americans 
on the 2012 Camp Amache Pilgrimage in May 2012, through the personal connections of 
a professor at the University of Denver, and by attending services at the Buddhist Temple 
and the Simpson Methodist Church. Hence, I did not have any relationships with 
participants prior to this study.  
The sample was comprised of 10 Japanese Americans usi g a purposive sampling 
method. Two criteria were required for participation n this study: (1) being Japanese 






older who were more likely to have a more complex understanding of WWII, internment, 
and 3/11 disasters. No direct connection to internmt was required for participation in 
this study. Accordingly, participants were either former internees, descendants of 
survivors, and some had no direct relationship to internment.  
All participants currently live in Denver, but have some lived in parts of Japan 
and California. Participants’ ages ranged from the lat  20s to early 70s, but most were 
either middle-aged or elderly. Participants’ were mostly from lower- or middle-class 
backgrounds, but one had a middle- to upper-class bckground. Among the 10 
participants interviewed in this study, four of them were born during WWII or prior to 
internment whereas the other six were born and raised in the post-internment generation. 
Of the four born during WWII or before internment, two participants were interned as 
young children. 
Coding of Interviews 
The data was coded using a thematic analysis approach. Using this approach, 
interview transcripts were analyzed by identifying lo ical relationships between 
responses given and the theoretical concepts used in this study (i.e., CTI, identity gaps, 
and critical-cultural hybridity), recurring and emerging themes, contradictions, general 
observations, and by making comparisons between other participants’ responses during 
each interview (Halualani, 2008; McCracken, 1988; Urban & Orbe, 2010). After 
interview data was thematically categorized according to CTI, identity gaps, and critical-






brief review of these concepts is explored below as ell as which questions I asked 
during the interviews in order to gather my data. 
Identity is one’s comprehensive theory of self, consisting of multiple, complex, 
overlapping, and conflicting smaller identities or group memberships that define who one 
is. The subcategories of identity were taken from CTI’s four frames of identity—personal, 
enacted, relationship, and communal frames. 
The personal frame denotes how one perceives the self. To determine the nature 
of one’s personal identity, I asked questions during the interview pertaining to the 
neighborhood they grew up in, personal connections with their family, positive and 
negative experiences of being a Japanese American, what one could recall about WWII, 
and how one’s perception of being a Japanese American has changed since WWII. 
Additionally, I also asked questions regarding one’s r action to the 3/11 disasters, how 
the disasters have (or have not) changed one’s self-perceptions, and whether the disasters 
reignited memories from WWII. For a more in depth look at the interview questions that 
were asked in the interviews, see Appendix 6. For the analysis, I re-read each interview 
transcript numerous times and contemplated how participants were (or were not) defining 
themselves as well as what experiences have shaped their sense of self.  
The enactment frame considers how identities emerge and are represented within 
social interactions. To pinpoint enacted identity, I asked questions that related to how one 
interacted with other Japanese Americans or Japanese, as well as after the 3/11 disasters 
and what that consisted of. I also considered how participants presented and performed 






The relationship frame considers how one’s relationships have influenced one’s 
identity. In order to figure out one’s relational identity, I asked questions pertaining to the 
makeup of one’s family, if they knew someone affected by the 3/11 disasters, who they 
contacted in response to hearing about 3/11, and if they knew anyone who was in the 
internment camps. In addition, I considered how participants naturally discussed their 
family members, significant others, and friends in relation to the impact they have had on 
their lives. 
The communal frame pertains to how one has defined o self in terms of the 
groups or communities they belong to or are a member of. In determining the collective 
identity of Japanese Americans, I asked questions pertaining to what events (i.e., cultural 
festivals, parades, holidays, memorials, fundraisers, one-time events, etc.) one has 
participated in with other Japanese Americans and Jpanese to understand how one 
related to both communities. Additionally, I also asked (when it was appropriate for the 
participant) if collective memories of WWII have informed their sense of identity as a 
Japanese American. In sum, I considered how participants discussed their membership in 
both the Japanese and Japanese American communities. I  order to distinguish the 
communal frame from critical-cultural hybridity, I looked for the dominant collective 
identity conveyed for the communal frame and a simultaneously double (or multiple) 
identification for critical-cultural hybridity. 
Identity gaps refer to the dissonance present within one’s identity and is 
considered in relation to CTI’s identity frames (e.g., personal-communal). In order to 






communicated during the course of their interview. No direct questions were asked in the 
interview to determine when an identity gap was present. Instead, identity gaps were 
identified through the process of re-reading interview transcripts and by analyzing the 
data. 
Critical-cultural hybridity allows one to retain their seemingly conflicting and 
contradictory multiple identities as a both/and or a neither/nor existence. In order to 
identify notions of critical-cultural hybridity, I looked for the simultaneously complex 
and multiple ways that Japanese Americans discussed their ethnic identities without 
placing one ethnic identity over the other and the tension both identities posed to them at 
times. While all participants could be categorized as hybrids due to the nature of their 
cultural identities as Japanese and Americans, I specifically looked for how participants 
placed value into both of their cultural identities without choosing a dominant 
identification.  
Positionalities 
The process of conducting cultural research raises important issues of the 
relationship between the researcher and the cultural members in the study. How the 
researcher interacts with and represents cultural members in the study can be detrimental 
if not approached ethically or respectfully. 
In addressing the criticism of people speaking about or for others in which they 
are not a member of, Alcoff (1991) asserted that one’s social location can reinforce 
positions of privilege at the expense of marginalizing the “Other” in a crisis of 






are heard and which are excluded—a political issue concerning power because social 
locations do not assume equal vantage. However, speaking with or to others may be a 
better approach in guarding against misrepresenting and further colonizing the “Other,” 
but not without a constant and critical reflection of self-reflexivity.  
As the primary investigator for this research, it is necessary that I position myself 
in this research as a white, U.S. American graduate student. Although I am an outsider to 
both Japanese and Japanese American cultures, I am an interested outside observer of 
both cultures who can converse in Japanese at a beginner’s level and who has been to 
Japan for a brief visit. My interest in studying about Japanese Americans grew out my 
interest in Japanese culture and the relationships t at I have with the Japanese. Initially, 
my topic for my thesis intended to center on the 3/11 disasters in Japan because I, having 
friends who live in Japan, became very concerned about their safety as I watched these 
tragic events unfold on the news media. After refining my topic with some of my thesis 
committee members, however, I decided that it would be interesting to research how 
Japanese Americans have conceptualized their identities and how they have interpreted 
these disasters as they are ethnically Japanese. Giv n the fact that Japanese Americans 
have a unique history in the U.S. because of the exp rience of internment and racial 
discrimination, I thought it would be fascinating to explore the nature of their identities 
against the backdrop of this historical context. My intent in conducting this research is to 
promote a greater sense of cultural understanding about Japanese Americans so as to 
deconstruct stereotypes, to create an awareness of the tensions and racism they face as 






To negotiate the tension of being an outsider, self-reflexivity was a necessary 
component for interacting with, considering narratives and perspectives, and writing 
about Japanese Americans. Interviews were conducted as a means to try to understand the 
experiences of Japanese Americans, but with a relativ  mount of distance from them so 
as not to assume that my experiences and/or perceptions are the same as those of 
Japanese Americans. Furthermore, it was also important to verify the findings of this 
research with the participants involved in this study so as to get their reflections and to 
avoid stereotyping. As an outsider to the Japanese Am rican community, I conducted this 
research with the following question in mind: Does thi  research study bring value to 
Japanese Americans or does it contribute to the “Othering” effect? Miike (2010) stressed 
that how one theorizes ought to be more heavily weighed against what one theorizes, 
although both considerations are needed for a productive analysis. Thus, a conscious 
consideration of how Japanese Americans were “repres nt d” proved to be an essential 




CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS 
In order to examine the identities of the Japanese Am ricans interviewed for this 
study, data was thematically categorized according to CTI, identity gaps, and critical-
cultural hybridity. While CTI is useful in identifying some key dimensions of identity, 
identity gaps are particularly effective in drawing attention to the discrepancies that 
participants felt when communicating and interacting with others. Likewise, critical-
cultural hybridity was utilized in order to explicate how Japanese Americans negotiated 
their biracial and bicultural identities. 
Although the narratives of participants often reflected a number of identity frames 
and identity gaps, only those which were the most salient for selected individuals were 
analyzed and presented here (see Appendix 7 for a guide to participants in this study). 
The results are therefore presented in the following order: CTI’s identity frames (i.e., 
personal, enacted, relational, communal), identity gaps (e.g., personal-communal, 
enacted-relational-communal, personal-enacted-communal, personal-relational-
communal), critical-cultural hybridity, and lastly, the research questions (see Appendix 8 
for a guide to the categories and subcategories used in the analysis).  
Communication Theory of Identity (CTI) 
As previously described, CTI explores identity with respect to four frames—






participant’s narratives were then put into subcategori s of the four frames solely for 
analytical purposes. However, it is crucial to conceptualize identity frames as shaped 
through communication and as entities that are complexly interwoven with other identity 
frames. Similarly, Hecht (1993) maintained that identity frames are better understood as 
interpenetrated and juxtaposed entities whereby cohesi n, contradiction, and ambiguity 
coexist within oneself. For that reason, I applied the concept of intersectionality—which 
capitalizes on the intersecting identities (e.g., personal and relational) that impinge upon 
one’s identity as a whole—to illuminate the intricacies and fluidity of one’s identity. 
The personal frame. 
 The personal frame (or personal identity) encompasses an individual’s self-
definitions, self-concepts, or self-perceptions andis comprised of numerous fragments 
that can intersect, conflict, and contradict constituent parts of one’s identity. Self-
perceptions are constantly negotiated and influenced by one’s relationships, social 
context and interactions, past experiences, worldviews, and other related factors.  
Michelle Fujimoto. 
Michelle Fujimoto, a third generation Sansei in herea ly 70s, was born in the pre-
internment era and was interned as a child at Manzanar (in California). Internment was 
deeply traumatizing to Michelle as it has impacted h r tremendously, which has also led 
her to become politically active in the community.  
As one of the two participants in this study who was interned, Michelle was born 
in Los Angeles, California and was interned with the rest of her family from when she 






resettled in Denver, Colorado, but her memory of inter ment continues to endure. In fact, 
Michelle’s grandfather (an Issei) was arrested on December 7th, 1941 and her father was 
put on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) secondary list, but was not arrested. 
These details are particularly noteworthy as Michelle made numerous references to them, 
which serve to intimately personalize the experience for her. Internment, then, has had a 
significant impact on Michelle’s personal identity as it was the dominant topic that she 
communicated about herself during our interview, which has also shaped the nature of 
her relationships (relational frame) and inspired some of her community involvement 
(communal frame). Internment has arguably been the most defining part of her life during 
what she considered her formative years.  
The amount of detail that Michelle is able to rememb r about internment—
especially at such a young age and more than her old siblings—is astounding, which 
she attributed to the notion that “everything was firly traumatic.” From fantasizing about 
her (material) “dreamland” in the Sears Roebuck catalogue, to the ever present dust 
particles in her barrack, to feeling “mortified” that she was bathed in public, and being 
quarantined for contracting chicken pox when she was less than a year old were just a 
few stories that Michelle narrated about her childhood.  
Michelle’s family, however, do not have the same degre  of interest in internment 
that she has had (with the exception of her daughter’s r cent interest in the past decade). 
In effect, the nature of Michelle’s relationships have been affected since she is constantly 
engaged in and inquiring about internment whereas hr siblings and parents (her mother 






somewhat of a distance between them. Even in the local Japanese American community, 
Michelle is viewed as an outcast for politicizing internment: “Whatever place I’ve made 
for myself in the Japanese American community here is ally by sheer force of will 
because I wanted to get to the bottom of the truth of our internment and people did not 
like to hear about that.” 
The following example depicts the dialogue between Michelle and her mother 
(now deceased) as Michelle remembered fragments of contracting chicken pox in camp:  
I asked [my mother] specifically and said, “You know I remember lying in a bed 
and I’m crying really hard and I can’t move my arms. There’s somebody by the 
edge of the bed singing lullabies to me. Looking up I could see the dust particles 
and the sun light coming in from the window overhead.” She said, “Well, you 
can’t remember that!” And I said, “Why not?” And she said, “That had to be 
when you were quarantined for three weeks right after we got to camp, you 
contracted chicken pox.” They wouldn’t let my mother come to see me because I 
cried so much that it bothered all the other patients i  the barrack…I can only 
attribute that to the trauma of being taken away from my mother and so that’s 
why I remember being in that situation.  
Michelle’s mother addressed some of the skepticism that one might have at the ability of 
an infant (as Michelle would have been less than a year old) to remember such a situation. 
Nonetheless, Michelle asserted that this was indeed a “true memory” as she first 







That said, Michelle keeps her memories of internment alive by re-invoking her 
personal experiences—filtered through and sharpened by her political sense of being—
primarily through story-telling, everyday conversations, and through her activism with 
organizations in the Denver metro area (i.e., Japanese American Resource Center of 
Colorado, Japanese American Citizens League, Asian Round Table, etc.). Accordingly, 
one might argue that as Michelle sharpens her critique about internment, she may also be 
recalling (or filling in) memories about camp that she otherwise did not know or were 
triggered after reading literature about internment. Be that as it may, the experience of 
internment is inseparable from her sense of identity. What is more, the critical 
perspective suggests that broader, structural contexts contribute to shaping people’s 
identities and everyday lives even though people relate to their identities in varying ways. 
For Michelle, the broader sociopolitical and historical context of internment profoundly 
informs and shapes her personal identity, even to this day. 
Particularly significant for her self-concept (i.e., personal identity), Michelle 
recalled talking about camp with her mother only on an “interim basis,” in part, because 
her mother could not properly deal with or accept internment. The larger issue, however, 
was a broken relationship between Michelle and her mother (relational identity): “I think 
her imperialness led her to too much unhappiness in her life…She felt it [internment] was 
way beneath her perceived [class] status.” Regardless of an apparent broken relationship, 
Michelle’s past discussions with her mother about internment have informed how she has 






Consequently, the manner in which Michelle relates to her personal identity is 
unique because she has incorporated internment into the very essence of her being. 
Michelle’s outlook on internment is pit against her family’s and the local community’s 
general perspective on internment, which mirrors the dominant narrative about 
internment: It was not that bad. 
Charles Nishimura. 
Charles Nishimura, a third generation Sansei in his mid-70s, was born in the pre-
internment era and was interned as a child at both Tule Lake (in California) and Amache 
(in Colorado). Charles is the other participant who was interned, yet he was three years 
old when his imprisonment began. However, Charles did not perceive that internment had 
much of an impact on him as he maintained that he was “too young.”  
Following camp, Charles and his family moved to Denver, Colorado. Unlike 
Michelle, Charles does not recall much about camp besides the poor quality of food, 
being with other Japanese Americans, and a few other details. Charles’ parents also did 
not talk about the experience much with him or his brother, despite the fact that his father 
lost his business when they were forced to “evacuate.” The following excerpt details 
Charles’ perspective on internment:  
As a child, I guess you really don’t think about the discomforts at that time or 
how small of an area you have for a family…I think I was just too young to have 
that much of an opinion at that time. I think a lot of things go by hear-say or what 






take it at face value. I’d say that my thoughts of it r values really haven’t evolved 
to be that much different. 
Clearly distinct from Michelle’s interpretations, Charles insisted that he was too young to 
truly understand what it meant to be imprisoned along with its corresponding 
“discomforts” and disruptions to family life. Although Charles and Michelle were both 
young children when they were interned, Charles did not have as many strong 
recollections of the experience like Michelle did, which is evidence, from an interpretive 
perspective, of the fact that they connected to their experiences in vastly different ways.  
Furthermore, Charles suggested that many people have interpreted internment 
from the angle of “hear-say or what you read, not actu l facts,” which works to 
delegitimize certain perspectives and downplays the experience. His assertion essentially 
raises an epistemological debate between objectivity and subjectivity: how does one 
really know what is true? It is worth noting that the U.S. government collaborated with 
the War Relocation Authority (WRA) in publishing “official” and “credible” information 
(i.e., “actual facts”) about internment, yet these narratives often painted a better picture of 
the experience (Mizuno, 2003; Murray, 2000; Tong, 2004).  
Nonetheless, Charles agreed that internment was partially instituted as a means 
for the whites to take back the farm land that the Japanese had cultivated, and that 
reparations were insufficient given the hardships endured and how much people lost. 
Despite these few instances when he critiqued internm nt (and in spite of his pilgrimages 
to Amache), Charles’ opinions about internment have not “evolved to be that much 






general interpretations about camp, and little discus ion with his parents may be 
contributing factors as to why internment has had a lesser impact on his personal identity 
than Michelle. From a critical perspective, Charles’ depoliticization of internment makes 
sense given the socio-historical context at that time. The general climate immediately 
following internment—yet before the push for redress—was one in which encouraged the 
silencing of the topic as some internees were too young to remember, many suffered from 
deep psychological scars, guilt, and collective shame that often prevented discussions 
whereas some feared, at certain times, resisting in ways that might give the U.S. 
government “legitimate” reasons to intern them again or suffer from other form of 
oppression (Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Luther, 2003; Nagata, Trierweiler, & Talbot, 
1999; Takezawa, 1991).  
Some Japanese cultural values—e.g., the proverb, “The nail that sticks out gets 
hammered down”—may have also factored into a silencing of the topic by conforming to 
the status quo (Muller, 2001). This has been the cas for Kent, another participant: 
“When I was growing up... [you had] a placid face and were not too expressive…You 
don’t stand out and that’s still a part of it, at least for me anyway.” Taken together, these 
factors—i.e., age, few memories, psychological scars, guilt, collective shame, fear of 
resisting, possible cultural values, etc.—work to hegemonically silence internment, which 
essentially serves the interests of the U.S. governm nt in refraining from (adequately) 






Although internment has not had a significant impact on Charles’s personal 
identity, the critical approach sheds light on how his perspective correlated to the broader 
sociopolitical and historical context of the time. 
Kathryn Fujimoto. 
Kathryn Fujimoto, a fourth generation Yonsei in her50s, was born during the 
post-internment era. As the daughter of Michelle Fujimoto, Kathryn’s parents and 
extended family members were interned. In sum, Kathryn was raised without Japanese 
cultural traditions and has been marked by a profound sense of “Otherness” from the 
mainstream Japanese American community, yet she has confronted the historical memory 
of internment as a means to accept herself.    
The dominant theme that Kathryn communicated about herself related to being 
“different” in which she appears to have incorporated a sense of being “Othered” into her 
personal identity. For Kathryn, being “the Other” pertains not only to her racial and 
ethnic identity as a Japanese American, but also to extends to issues of class, gender, and 
her sexual identity.  
With respect to class, Kathryn claimed that she was “always aware” of the 
socioeconomic and sociocultural norms within the larger Japanese American community 
and the community group her family belonged to.11 For instance, Kathryn noted that her 
family was set apart as “black sheep” and was treated s such given that they were lower-
middle class in a predominately middle-class neighbor ood. Her parents’ divorce 
                                                           
11     Kathryn and her family were a part of the Tanomoshi group—a social group comprised of ethnic Japanese whose 
ancestors are typically from the same prefecture in Japan (albeit, not in the case of Kathryn’s family) that exists to 






exacerbated their “difference” as it was fairly taboo (e.g., “That was just not something 
you would do. You didn’t rock the boat”), which essntially strained ties with her familial 
community group thereby granting an “exemption” from further participation. By 
implication, Kathryn suggested that social and cultura  norms, as well as class, were 
factors in differentiating Kathryn’s family from a “normal” Japanese American family.  
Kathryn’s “distinctness” from the mainstream Japanese American community 
goes further by the virtue of her gender/sexual identity as a lesbian in which she has 
experienced arguably more socioeconomic, racial, and gender discrimination frm the 
LGBTQ community, perhaps on the basis of her appearance (more on this later). While 
Kathryn has felt pressure to conform to social and cultural norms, she questioned whether 
it was worth it to change her values—and therefore, her self-concept—in order to meet 
the expectations of others. Here, it should be noted that conforming to other’s 
expectations entails a performance (i.e., enacted id ntity) or perhaps an identity gap (i.e., 
personal-enacted identity gap). The dilemma of conformity, however, is quite personal to 
Kathryn considering her acute awareness that she is vi wed and treated like an outcast 
from “mainstream” Japanese Americans. While Kathryn regrets not knowing this sooner, 
she concluded that she will not change or conform to other’s expectations of whom she 
“should” become (e.g., “I don’t have to have any exp ctations from anyone except from 
me”). Considering the different layers and intersectional dimensions of Kathryn’s 
identity—i.e., race, ethnicity, class, family, gendr/sexual orientation, etc.—altering her 






Kathryn retains a strong sense of self despite the pulls on her identity to become someone 
else.  
In a similar vein, Kathryn recalled that it took her a long time to accept her 
identity as a Japanese American, which was matter of self-acceptance in her assessment. 
Although Kathryn’s parents were both interned, she did not know anyone else growing 
up who was also interned, in part, because she claimed nternment was not topic of public 
and/or social discussion. In Kathryn’s family, however, Michelle talked about internment 
frequently with her and her brother, and even took them to Manzanar (i.e., where 
Michelle and the rest of Kathryn’s family were intern d) when they were adolescents. As 
with Charles, Kathryn did not become interested in internment as her identity—from an 
interpretive perspective—was not based on being Japanese American at that time. At any 
rate, Kathryn has (within the past decade or so) confronted the issue of internment vis-à-
vis as a means of self-acceptance. The quotation bel w sheds light on how Kathryn came 
to terms with internment and her identity as a Japanese American:  
The unfortunate thing is that I will never know what would’ve been possible but 
for internment…Growing up in that post-internment generation—deliberately 
having been raised without the language, culture, the raditions, etc.—
consequently it took a very long time for me to be comfortable with identifying as 
a Japanese American. As a kid, I really avoided anythi g that was remotely 
related to being Japanese whether that meant learning martial arts or learning the 






I’ll bet I was probably in my early 40s before it finally started to sink in that it 
was okay to have that be part of my identity. 
Thematically, the tensions Kathryn encountered in identifying as a Japanese American 
could very well be analyzed as a personal-communal identity gap. Kathryn’s arrival at 
this juncture, however, was a matter of self-acceptance, which suggests more of an 
emphasis on her personal identity. Contrasted with Kathryn’s disinterest in internment 
until fairly recently, she insinuated that internment has been, in fact, a seminal experience 
(e.g., “The unfortunate thing is that I will never know what would’ve been possible but 
for internment”). Corresponding with a critical perspective, this suggests that the broader 
historical context of internment has (indirectly) shaped Kathryn’s sense of Japanese 
American identity in spite of her reluctance to identify as part of that group.  
Kathryn proposed that part of her discomfort in admitting to being Japanese 
American was largely due to being raised in the post-internment era “without the 
language, culture, [and] the traditions,” which sheassessed as a “dilution.” An 
interpretive perspective might question the role that Kathryn’s family played in practicing 
Japanese cultural values given that cultural values ar , in part, passed down through the 
family unit and local communities (among other avenues). Here, it is also worth noting 
that Denver’s Japanese American community is relatively small and more dispersed 
throughout the metro region than that of West Coast populations, which is a factor that 
might have influenced opportunities for more exposure to Japanese cultural values. On 
the other hand, the historical context of racism and discrimination was a key determinant 






After all, looking like the “enemy” was the primary eason that landed them in camp and 
caused many to be discriminated against in social settings. Consequently, Kathryn 
“avoided anything that was remotely related to being Japanese,” which corresponds to the 
collective shame of being associated with, feeling, or looking Japanese (American) in 
fear that “they” could be rounded up again. This essentially served the political purposes 
of the U.S. government and reinforced their power by instilling fear and collective shame, 
rather than pride, in many Japanese Americans on behalf of their Japanese heritage. 
Kathryn is now comfortable with personally identifying as a Japanese American (e.g., “It 
was okay to have that be a part of my identity”) in which her political and communal 
involvement in preserving the Amache internment camp is a testament to this.  
In summary, the narratives of Michelle, Charles, and Kathryn demonstrate the 
varying ways in which one’s personal experiences have impacted their personal identities. 
Michelle’s firsthand experience of internment has significantly impacted her personal 
identity, which is accentuated by her acute awareness of the sociopolitical and historical 
background. Although Charles was also interned, the experience has not impacted his 
personal identity much. Arising from an intriguing sense of “difference,” Kathryn’s 
personal identity has been largely constructed by her class, gender/sexual identity, and 
through a recent confrontation of her racial and ethnic identity as a Japanese American. 
From an interpretive perspective, it is evident thaere are myriads of factors that 
(continue to) inform one’s personal identity. The criti al perspective situated participants’ 
narratives in the broader, structural contexts to examine why, for instance, Charles was 






shame factored into Kathryn’s reluctance to identify as a Japanese American. Related to 
one’s personal identity, the next section addresses how one enacted their sense of self to 
others. 
The enactment frame.  
The enactment frame posits that “identities are communicatively manifested, 
either directly or indirectly through social roles, behaviors, and symbols” (Urban & Orbe, 
2010, p. 306). Through social interactions, identities dynamically emerge, are constructed, 
and negotiated as identity is necessarily a state of b coming. Enacted identity is said to be 
analogous to a performance of self in which one performs their identity to others. 
Accordingly, enactment is but a partial manifestation of identity as identities are 
hierarchically ordered depending on the situational context, social role(s), and the 
salience of constituent parts of one’s identity.   
Jerry Matsuoka. 
Jerry Matsuoka, a third generation Sansei in his mid-60s, was born in the post-
internment era in which one of his aunts was interned. Among the participants 
interviewed, Jerry has been arguably the most succesful both athletically and 
professionally as he has pursued an athletic career in judo. More than that, Jerry 
advocated for the preservation of the former internme t camp, Amache. 
The dominant theme that emerged from Jerry’s narrative traced how he became 
successful from his childhood to the present. From judo, to real estate management, to 






has been able to accomplish considerably more, on a professional level, than many other 
third generation Japanese Americans.  
However, something can be said for Jerry’s class as he grew up in a middle- to 
upper-middle class environment, he is highly educated, excelled athletically, 
professionally, and is socially accepted among his peers. The socioeconomic context 
following internment was not favorable to many Japanese Americans as numerous 
families struggled to rebuild their lives after losing nearly all of their possessions, 
property, livelihoods, and the like. Jerry was, in contrast, shielded from these hardships in 
primarily two ways: (1) He was not interned nor was his immediate family; and (2) he 
had access to more resources as a middle- to upper-class family. Jerry also indicated that 
he has always had a great support network of friends an  family who guided and taught 
him in his personal, academic, and professional endeavors—a privilege that, 
unfortunately, not everyone is able to benefit from.  
While Jerry participated in a variety of sports, he became highly esteemed 
through judo, a Japanese martial art. Following the footsteps of his father, Jerry competed 
in hundreds of judo tournaments, has been an Assistant Coach for the Olympics, and now 
instructs judo classes at the Tri-State Buddhist Templ  in Denver, Colorado. The 
following passage highlights a performance of self as Jerry made connections among his 
success in judo, his personal conduct, and being well received in the community: 
We’re kind of like a legend in our own minds [in] that we picture ourselves being 
samurais with the bushido code—excellence, integrity, persistence, loyalty. A lot 






this country 39 times or be in four hall of fames, the international hall of fame, if 
it wasn’t for the sport of judo. If I didn’t persist in trying to do the right thing with 
the right teaching and the right thought, the Buddhist religion says these things. 
You go through the seven precepts [sic] and it teach s you all of these things. If 
you do those things, good things happen to you. The church thinks that I’m a 
perfect example because of the fact that I put [in] a lot of passion and a lot of 
devotion ... [and] just simply because…I had the right approach, the right attitude, 
and not the animosity. 
Despite the fact that Jerry attributed some of his success in judo to be circumstantial, —
i.e., he was merely at “the right place at the right time”—he believed that much of his 
success came from self-imposition as he possessed the right attitude, and conducted 
himself accordingly with bushido code morals and Buddhist thought. While he seemed to 
make a connection between “doing the right thing” and why “good things happen[ed]” to 
him, Jerry understood that his judo accomplishments were hard-earned (e.g., “You don’t 
get promoted by doing nothing”). Interpretively, Jerry performed what seems to be 
central to his self-concept: commitment and dedication to his values has paved the road to 
success from martial arts to his occupational career.  
Extending beyond Jerry’s apparent influence in the Japanese American 
community, his success is indicative of a greater accomplishment: succeeding in 
dominant U.S. American culture. From a critical perspective, Jerry’s excessive drive to 
excel seems to correspond to the “model minority myth” as he is a person of Asian 






Nagasawa, 1987; Yu, 2006; Zhang, 2010). Teasing out this notion, it follows that 
mainstream U.S. American culture would likely esteem Jerry to be a perfect example for 
other racial and ethnic minorities to emulate because his strong work ethic, integrity, 
dedication, persistence, and positive attitude paved th  way for the American Dream to 
be actualized in Jerry’s life. Rather than harboring a  attitude of animosity—as a 
Japanese American—for internment, Jerry chose to focus n his career, perhaps as a 
means of acceptance into dominant U.S. American culture. In support of this, Jerry 
acknowledged that his athletic, martial arts, and academic ability helped him to become 
accepted among his high school peers in a time of racial prejudice following the end of 
WWII. Given the sociopolitical context at that time, Japanese Americans were perceived 
suspected to be “enemy aliens,” yet some served in the 44nd, 100th Infantry Battalion, 
and the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) as a means to dispel such notions and prove 
their patriotism as “good Americans” do (Kuramitsu, 1995). Likewise, Jerry may have 
also felt the need to prove himself as a minority—not simply to be a just good American, 
but to be better.  
Notwithstanding, Jerry’s accomplishments are particularly noteworthy 
considering the sociohistoric context of other Japanese Americans who were not afforded 
with the class status or opportunities to do so. Therefore, it is quite evident that Jerry is 








Kathryn, the daughter of Michelle who has felt “Othered” from the mainstream 
community, enacted her identity primarily through her reflections about difference, social 
expectations, and norms (see Appendix 7). Contrasted with Jerry’s narrative, Kathryn 
repeatedly acknowledged the fact that she has “never r ally fit in anywhere” due to the 
surmounting amount of social expectations that she and her family either failed to or 
refused to fulfill. Nevertheless, Kathryn asserted that she need not and will not please 
others (e.g., “Since I couldn’t please everybody, I would work toward pleasing no one”). 
In a performative rejection of mainstream constructs, the following account details 
Kathryn’s response to being profiled:  
I don’t fit the stereotypical appearance of an Asian American unless it’s the 
stereotype of let’s say a Vietnamese gang member. Because I don’t either fit the 
profile of an upper middle class of perhaps what I chose to wear that day. I know 
that it makes me stand out. What I love doing [laughs] is I’ll go into a store, any 
kind of store…and the security guards will start following me around. So I take 
them for several laps [laughs] around the store. They’re never going to see it my 
way…Rather than concentrating on those [constructs], which is not to demean 
[them], figure out for yourself how to turn them ontheir head and make them 
entertaining for you. The reason you do that is to do otherwise would mean trying 
to change an entire mindset, which you cannot control. But you can control how 






Partially a matter of social class, Kathryn understood that her appearance does not 
coincide with the “profile of an upper middle class” individual, which is the implied 
norm in this scenario (e.g., “I don’t fit the profile of an upper middle class…I know that it 
makes me stand out”). Yet her “difference” from dominant white U.S. American culture 
is further exacerbated by her deviation from heterono mativity. That is to say, Kathryn is 
not heterosexual nor does she comply with mainstream f mininity, such as socially 
accepted feminine roles, an outward feminine appearance, preferred methods of 
communication, and the like. 
In a clever act of performativity, Kathryn deliberately traipsed about the confines 
of such stores so as to create more stress for the security guards in order to turn 
unfounded constructs “on their head and make them entertaining.” Kathryn’s 
performance of self further solidifies her commitment to remain true to, and thereby enact 
her identity. While the interpretive approach is usef l in illustrating how Kathryn enacted 
her identity despite her apparent “distinctiveness,” the critical perspective is necessary to 
question why Kathryn, as an Asian American, was the victim of racial profiling. As 
perhaps the underlying factor, race or the perception of belonging to a “socially 
threatening” race—in this case, the Vietnamese who are stereotyped as gang members—
supposedly warranted extra security measures to be aken against Kathryn. Given that the 
security guards followed her around the stores, it follows that Kathryn was perceived to 
be a “dangerous” or “suspicious” person. The actions f the security guards serve the 
interests of white U.S. American culture in reifying stereotypes that certain racial groups 






According to Omi and Winant (1968), “we utilize race to provide clues about who 
a person is” and how they will behave, which are then formed into stereotypes (cited in 
Kibria, 2000, p. 78, emphasis in original). Indeed, I would be remiss to omit instances 
where I have (unfortunately) subscribed to similar racial stereotypes. I am reminded of 
my trip to Chicago when I attended a conference about the 3/11 disasters with my mother. 
I was responsible for arranging accommodations at a “safe” and cost efficient motel 
nearest to the location of the conference. As a young female, I cannot deny the necessity 
to take extra caution so as to avoid placing myself in harmful situations and while I was 
not alone on this trip, my mother and I (as well as my father) were concerned about our 
safety. Admittedly, I had notions of the crime rate in the city and as I inquired with 
receptionists on the phone to determine the safety of various neighborhoods, I was 
startled by my own subscription to the stereotype that perhaps blacks, other minority, or 
racial groups were somehow “intrinsically” dangerous. Hence, I have played a role in 
reifying these troubling stereotypes, yet I have not been racially profiled myself.  
Not only did Kathryn discuss her experiences of discrimination, but she also 
considered her role in perpetuating stereotypes, which t en made her “identity 
performance” notably distinctive due to her self-reflexivity. One of Kathryn’s most 
difficult and unsettling “self-discoveries” was tha she has her own set of prejudices that 
have been perpetuated by dominant, white U.S. American culture. For example, Kathryn 
indicated that she has caught herself (unconsciously) subscribing to the perpetual 
foreigner stereotype in which she saw someone who looked Asian, yet was shocked by 






whites are the norm whereas other racial or ethnic groups are supposedly not from 
“here,” are somehow inferior, or who are “Othered” on the basis of their racial 
appearance.  
She argued that while it may be natural to justify that “my prejudices aren’t as bad 
as yours,” she insisted that prejudice and racism is present within everyone, and ought to 
be acknowledged as such. At the same time, Kathryn is not advocating for a colorblind 
society as she certainly identifies as a person who has experienced a significant amount 
of discrimination, not just racially, but also on the basis of her gender and sexual identity. 
She went on to say that, 
I’ve invested a lot of time [in] not being, what I’ll call a sheep—whether it’s in 
the Japanese American community, whether it’s in the gay and lesbian 
community, whether it’s in the women’s community. It’s not enough to claim 
membership. What we should endeavor to claim is making a difference whether 
in how other people think or how other people perceive us or how we perceive 
them because claiming membership does nothing more than to admit laziness. 
Thus, Kathryn contended that one “should endeavor to…mak[e] a difference…in how 
other people perceive us or how we perceive them,” rather than acting like “sheep” who 
passively claim membership without working towards change. Moreover, Kathryn’s 
reflection about her experiences, her acknowledgment of her prejudices, and her 
endeavor to make a change in other’s perceptions serve as an enactment of her identity.  
Certainly, Jerry and Kathryn’s enactment of identity are in stark contrast to each 






accomplishments. In a considerably divergent tone, Kathryn enacted her identity through 
her differentiation from the dominant culture in which she has been the victim of racial 
profiling and discrimination. Jerry’s success and apparent acceptance has elevated him to 
a position within mainstream U.S. American culture whereas Kathryn continues to fight 
against and challenges mainstream norms.  
Thus far, the identities of Japanese Americans in this study have been considered 
in relation to their self-concepts and performances of self (i.e., personal and enacted 
frames, respectively). The next section addresses identity with respect to the role of 
others and one’s relationships. 
The relationship frame.   
 The third component of CTI is the relationship frame whereby identities are 
mutually constructed, dynamically emerge, and are jointly negotiated with relevant others 
(Hecht, 1993; Urban & Orbe, 2010). This frame assert  that one’s sense of self is co-
created with others and is partially defined in terms of others as well as their relationships.  
Kent Hisakawa. 
Kent Hisakawa, a third generation Sansei in his 70s, wa  born during internment 
in which some of his extended family members and wife ere interned. All in all, Kent 
endeavored to learn about internment as a means to figure out who he was, and he is very 
active in the local community as a result of his wife’s influence.  
Although Kent was not personally interned, he learnd that a few of his relatives 
on his mother’s side of the family bore the burden of living in camp. From the little bit of 






members evacuated from the West Coast and resided with Kent’s family in Colorado for 
some uncertain period of time. Kent also had a number of other relatives (i.e., his 
grandmother, aunt, uncle) living in Japan at the height of the atomic and fire bombings as 
his father’s side of the family were from Yamanashi Prefecture, Japan. Kent noted that 
“our families had two countries at war… not really animosity, but a lot of living separate 
lives because of time and circumstances… [and we] weren’t able to get together until 
after the war.”  
While Kent’s family and peers generally did not talk bout internment, Kent 
wanted to “find out about the situation” during a time when relatively few books were 
published about the topic. During college, Kent endeavored to learn about internment—
including U.S.-Japan relations—by reading through old newspapers as a means to figure 
out who he was as a Japanese American. Kent’s “identity search” was indeed a matter of 
grappling with his self-definitions on an individual or personal level (e.g., “I started 
trying to figure out who I was,” emphasis added). At the same time, his “identty search” 
also pertains on a communal level as Kent is a member of the larger Japanese American 
community as well as on a relational level because the people he knew (i.e., family and 
acquaintances) had been interned. But Kent is also suggesting that, to know who he is, he 
needs to examine the broader context of internment. He was even curious to know how 
his extended family in Japan managed to survive financially during WWII given the 







 After returning to the U.S. from his first trip toJapan, Kent met his wife who has 
significantly influenced and shaped Kent’s sense of self. Like Charles, Kent’s wife was 
also interned a small child, yet she was “pretty much shielded” because of her age and 
consequently did not discuss much about internment. Their greatest accomplishment, as 
Kent put it, is their daughter. Kent’s wife passed away nearly 10 years ago battling 
Parkinson’s disease, yet their relationship continues to shape Kent’s life and sense of 
identity. 
Kent’s wife nudged him to become increasingly active within the Japanese 
American community. Below, Kent reflects on the impact that his wife has had on him as 
well as her desire for community involvement:  
She [was] an amazing person…All of the things that she went through and there 
were a lot of things that we were able to go through together…She definitely had 
a great impact on my life and she still does. A lot of he things I’m involved with 
started out because of her. That includes my time with the Bonsai group because 
she wanted me to do that and it was something that we could do together. There’s 
a lot of things that I feel to some extent that, she basically had great foresight into 
it and this is the kind of individual you should be…Where I’m at now [is] I’m 
trying to have some impact on the community because of my wife and what she 
wanted, those are all interrelated factors. 
Kent’s current involvement in the Japanese American community—i.e., the Denver 
Bonsai Club, the Japanese American Association of Colorado (JAAC) that coordinates 






etc.—was indeed greatly shaped by his wife’s influence. Needless to say, Kent’s bond 
with his wife has and continues to inform who he is. This is evidence of the fact that he is 
co-creating his identity with his wife, as well as with his daughter, other family members, 
and friends. Moreover, Kent conveyed who he is by reflecting about the people he values.  
James Hashimoto. 
James Hashimoto, a third generation Sansei in his 50s, was born in Japan during 
the post-internment era. Neither James nor his family embers were interned, yet his 
wife’s parents were interned. As a journalist, James writes about both Japanese and 
Japanese American culture. However, James did not truly confront his ethnic identity as a 
Japanese American until his father was diagnosed with cancer and then passed away.   
James lived in Japan for the first eight years of his life before moving to the U.S. 
Although James had a “dual cultural upbringing” (more n this in the critical-cultural 
hybridity section), he—unlike his parents—did not know many Asians in part because of 
his socioeconomic environment in white, suburban neighborhoods. He even considered 
himself to be white then. It follows that James felt, at least to some degree then, that he 
was a “member” of the dominant group. However, thiscould have been fueled by the 
pressure to assimilate into mainstream white U.S. American culture. Indeed, James often 
“forgot that he was not white,” but his peers took notice of his race and labeled him as 
inferior by shouting a racial slur at him (e.g., “Hey Jap, go home!”). This blatantly racist 
comment, “Hey Jap, go home,” is unfortunately not surprising as it reflected the 
dominant hegemony that at the time. That is to say, racially Japanese individuals were 






especially after Pearl Harbor. These attitudes were promoted by the U.S. government and 
through mainstream media in order to generate support for war on Japan among the 
general U.S. public, which later provided a “rationale” for internment camps. 
Sometime after college, James wrote in a column for a Japanese American 
community newspaper in Denver (now out of business) about his experiences as a 
Japanese American because he felt he was “different.” In particular, James started to 
write about his experiences of discrimination and how they fit into the broader context of 
racism in the U.S. Around that time, James’ father was diagnosed with cancer, which 
made him more inquisitive of his father’s past. The following exchange explicates James’ 
shock when he finally learned more details about his father’s life: 
“Oh dad, what was it like being in Pearl Harbor on December 7th 1941?” He said, 
“Umm, I don’t know.” I’m like, “Well, what do you mean you don’t know? You 
were born and raised in Hawaii.” He said, “Yeah, we ere but your grandfather 
took us to Japan [in 1940] before the bombing.” …I said, “What?! You never told 
me this!” He never talked about it.  
Hence, James expected that his father would have som profound insight or memory 
about Pearl Harbor given that he was raised in Hawaii during WWII, which is a logical 
assumption at best. James’ father was in fact a Kibei; he born in the U.S., yet educated in 
Japan. His father lived in Japan during WWII just before the attack on Pearl Harbor that 
eventually triggered U.S. involvement in the war in the Pacific against Japan. Likewise, 
James’ father and siblings were discriminated against as they were “treated [like] 






time to become acculturated as Japanese. One of James’ uncles was even drafted into the 
Japanese army, captured as a prisoner of war by the Russian army, but later committed 
suicide after being released. Nonetheless, James learned stories of this nature from his 
aunts after his father passed away. Accordingly, James started to contemplate his identity 
as a Japanese American:  
For me, it took my dad getting cancer and dying before I realized that, holy shit, 
I’ve never even thought about my identity! I accept that I’m an artist, a music 
critic…music editor. I’m a media person, a journalist. I’m this and that, but being 
a Japanese American wasn’t a part of how I described myself. For many years 
when my dad died, it’s like oh shit; I’m really interested in Japan! I’m really 
interested in that era right after the war when my dad joined the [U.S.] army and 
worked…as an interrogator [during] the American Occupation of Japan…I’m 
fascinated in all of that, but it took my dad dying to get me thinking about who I 
am and how Japanese I really am without even thinking about it. 
From artist to music critic to journalist, James seem d to be comfortable and secure in his 
identity through these roles. However, it suddenly became clear to James that he did not 
consider himself to be Japanese American and Japanese until after his father passed away. 
From that point forward, James was finally able to accept his identity as a Japanese 
American and he is currently working to educate the general public about internment 
through his journalism and community involvement. 
Similar to Kent, James’ second wife (a Yonsei) also prompted James to become 






friends, James was introduced to the local Japanese American community in Denver, 
became active in numerous organizations, and started reading as well as writing more 
material (e.g., books, blogs, columns) about Japanese American culture. Thus, it is clear 
that James’ father and wife, in particular, have shaped a large part of his Japanese 
American identity.  
Angela Fukui. 
Angela Fukui, a third generation Sansei in her 40s or 50s, was born in the post-
internment era. Angela was not interned, but her parents and extended family members 
were imprisoned in camp. Angela is active in the Japanese martial art aikido and became 
increasingly interested in internment after her father passed away.  
While she grew up in a fairly diverse neighborhood in Bloomington, California, 
Angela did not know many Japanese Americans growing up except for those who 
attended Japanese language school. Once Angela (and her siblings) dropped out of 
Japanese language school, “much to [her] family’s shame,” her interactions with other 
Japanese and Japanese Americans became increasingly limited. Then in 1990, Angela 
moved to Colorado where she has lived in Boulder and Longmont relatively isolated 
from other Asians and Japanese Americans. Despite Ang la’s relational distance from 
Japanese Americans, she is fascinated by Japanese cultur  and tends to call her father 
when large-scale natural disasters happen in Japan—such as 3/11 and the Great Awaji 
Earthquake in Kobe—to learn if she has any family in the affected areas.  
Aikido, a Japanese martial art, has been an avenue for Angela to become 






For Angela, the presence of shrines and flower arrangements at the dojo (training center) 
extends to a Japanese cultural setting for her aikido activities. Through aikido, Angela 
has been able to “to do Japanese things” that are reminiscent of her childhood such as, 
run and do somersaults on the green training mats th  she used to do with her brother, 
bow, and speak a little Japanese. Angela’s father se med to be proud of her aikido 
involvement as they have developed a common interest in Japanese martial arts: 
My dad told me that he seemed…sort of pleased that I was doing something. I 
said, “Yeah, daddy. There’s a Japanese sensei [teacher, master] and he’s from 
Tokyo, Hira-sensei.” He was like, “Oh that’s kind of cool. That’s Japanesey, 
huh?” “Yeah, I wear a hakama” [traditional Japanese clothing]. He even showed 
me a little bit of his kendo [another Japanese martial art] stuff. We went out and 
got the sticks, and it’s very different from aikido. He was like, “Yeah, we used to 
do this combination and this.”  
This father-daughter exchange, as well as her retelling of the story during our interview, 
suggests that aikido was one way that Angela and her father could relate to one another. 
Given that Angela’s father used to practice kendo, their common interest in Japanese 
martial arts is not surprising. Angela’s involvement in aikido is also, in part, taken to be 
an interest in Japanese culture in which her father se med particularly impressed (e.g., 
“Oh that’s kind of cool. That’s Japanesey, huh?”). That is not to say, however, that 
Angela participates in aikido solely because of her father or on the account that it is 
something “Japanesey” to do. In fact, she has also enjoyed meeting hapas (half or mixed 






aikido has served as a common interest and connecting point with her father, yet has also 
led her to make friends among other people.  
While Angela is especially interested in aikido and other Japanese cultural 
traditions, she mentioned that nearly all of her family members (both on her mother’s and 
father’s side) were interned at Manzanar. Her father and grandfather, in particular, were 
among the most affected by internment in her family. Angela’s grandfather, an Issei, had 
a particularly rough time in camp because he was uprooted from his career as a fisherman, 
lost everything during the evacuation, and was forced to live in a desert with “nothing to 
do.” On the other hand, her father, a Nisei, struggled to adjust to camp life as he was in 
the midst of high school.  
It was not until a few years ago that Angela became more interested in gathering 
details from her father about camp (e.g., “I made my dad flesh this out”), though she 
“always knew” that her family was interned. In remebrance of her (now deceased) 
father, Angela went on the 2012 Pilgrimage to Amache—albeit, she has not yet visited 
Manzanar. On the bus ride to Amache (as I sat next to her both there and back), she 
became ecstatic when she saw a picture of her father in one of the videos that was played. 
It was therefore obvious to me that her interest in internment has been largely instigated 
by her family’s experiences of camp, and is thus, a personal connection. She also 
cherished the opportunities she had to talk with other Japanese Americans on the 
pilgrimage, which she claimed that she does not get o do very often. Nevertheless, 
Angela’s relational ties with other Japanese Americans seem to be, in general, limited to 






In summary, the relationship frame considered the rol  that other people have had 
in influencing the lives of Kent, James, and Angela. For both Kent and James, it was their 
wives who prompted them to become involved with numerous organizations in the local 
Japanese American community. Although Angela’s involvement in the community 
differs from James’ and Kent’s, Angela was able to bond with her father more and met 
other Asian Americans through her participation in aikido. While these participants came 
face-to-face with the historical memory of internment in varying ways—i.e., Kent as a 
means to accept who he was whereas for James and Angela, just before and after their 
fathers had passed away—they have all been influenced by the broader context of 
internment and their family member’s experiences of it. Hence, the relationship frame 
examines an important dimension of identity—namely, the notion that identity is co-
constructed with others and through one’s relationships. Turning now to the last frame in 
CTI, the next section examines the role of communal identity.  
The communal frame.  
 The communal frame can refer to a particular group r community, made up of 
individual members, who are bonded by some collectiv  memory, traditions, heritage, 
values, beliefs, and so on (Hecht, 1993; Urban & Orbe, 2010). Accordingly, the 
communal frame emphasizes group associations and social networks, and encompasses a 
broad spectrum of groups or collectivities (i.e., nationality, ethnicity, cultural, religious, 
social, political, and occupational, etc.) that indivi uals are a part of. However, for the 
purposes of this research, the communal frame is applied in relation to ethnic and cultural 







Evelyn Tsukino, a third generation Sansei in her 60s, was born in the post-
internment generation in which two uncles were interned. By and large, Evelyn claimed 
that internment was “ancient history” as she is more interested in Japanese cultural 
traditions and artifacts.   
For Evelyn, it is the richness of Japanese cultural traditions, values, and activities 
that she can take part in with other Japanese Americans that serve as the locus in 
identifying as part of the collective group of Japanese Americans. She is intrigued by the 
cultural traditions emanating from her Japanese ethnic eritage (e.g., New Year’s Day, 
obon, the Cherry Blossom Festival), yet not without generational shifts and American 
influences in some values. For instance, Evelyn noted that she does not speak Japanese 
(except for a few words and phrases), eats Japanese inspired cuisine with an “American” 
twist to it, and participates in a few organizations that she describes as “not necessarily 
Japanese” (e.g., ukuleles and mahjong club).  
Accordingly, Evelyn often interacts with other Japanese Americans around 
Sakura Square in Denver, which is the block-wide plaza of Japanese businesses, a 
grocery store, a restaurant, an apartment complex, and more. She maintained that the 
Buddhist Temple (located within Sakura Square) is the cultural center to Japanese and 
Japanese American culture—perhaps due to the fact th t lots of (but not all) cultural, 
religious, and organizational activities typically take place near the Buddhist Temple. 
Likewise, Evelyn is heavily involved in the local community in which she belongs to a 






(e.g., Japanese American Resource Center of Colorad), to entertainment (e.g., Kohaku 
Uta Gassen—a Japanese singing content), and to religious (e.g., Buddhist Temple). She 
has even visited Japan three times and is anticipating  fourth trip to visit her grandson 
who is in Japan for a study abroad experience, which is indicative of her strong interest in 
Japanese culture. 
While Evelyn’s fascination with Japanese cultural tditions, interest in Japan, and 
involvement within the local community is a manifestation of her collective identity, her 
identification with the Japanese American community is complicated as she continually 
distances herself from internment, racism, and discrimination. Given my interest in 
Japanese culture (e.g., the language, food, cultural values), Evelyn’s interview was still 
engaging for me. As a researcher, however, the views that Evelyn espouses are 
problematic, perplexing, and inconsistent. For insta ce, Evelyn repeatedly told me during 
our interview that internment and WWII had “no connection” to her life. Evelyn explains 
in greater detail below: 
During [the postwar] time[s]…it was just fun and games. That news about Japan 
is old history. It’s as far as saying that man is on the moon. It had no 
connection…Parents [had] more of a connection than us [children]. But me, I’m 
just trying to hold onto cultural things—the Japanese dance. Not even the 
language. I know I should learn Japanese, but I don’t. It’s the cultural things. It’s 
more important to me than World War II. 
Evelyn’s lack of connection—which is to say, the absence of personal experiences and 






which she collectively identifies as Japanese and Jpanese American. Even though two of 
Evelyn’s uncles were supposedly interned and one was eventually deported to Japan, she 
did not know this piece of information or much about internment while growing up. 
Rather, Evelyn’s childhood was marked by good memories, fun, and “no preconceptions 
of discrimination.” Added to that, Evelyn’s friends were mixed as her neighborhood, 
elementary school, and high school was well integrat d nd tight-knit.  
 A possible reason for why Evelyn could have asserted these things might be 
related to how she was raised. Evelyn told me that her mother was attending high school 
in a suburb of Denver in the midst of internment as her grandparents had already settled 
in Colorado before the voluntary evacuation (i.e., they did not have to evacuate or go to 
camp). However, Evelyn said that her mother was not bothered by the fact that a camp 
(i.e., Amache) was located in Colorado as she also fe t “no discrimination…no bitterness 
or hard feelings with the Caucasians.” Needless to say, it seems that Evelyn has 
internalized her mother’s opinions about internment and discrimination. In spite of 
however true this was for Evelyn, her discriminatory-free childhood supports the 
dominant hegemonic ideology that adjusting to life aft r camp did not pose many 
challenges to Japanese Americans or was not that difficult (e.g., “it was just fun and 
games”). While she acknowledged that parents had “more of a connection than us 
[children],” her assessment does not even apply to her (immediate) family—at least, from 
what she discussed about her parents in our interview and how they chose to raise her. 
More than that, her assessment does not engage with the sense of racial inferiority that 






elderly, and those in certain occupations and life stages faced after camp. Instead, she 
repeatedly told me during our interview that internment and WWII had “no connection” 
to her life as it was “ancient history for us teenagers.”   
At the same time, Evelyn maintained that it is important to “keep the memories 
[of internment] alive so that future generations know it happened.” However, it is 
contradictory and inconsistent for Evelyn to assert tha  internment is “ancient history” 
and that Japanese cultural traditions are “more important to [her] than WWII,” yet to also 
suggest that memories of internment need to be kept alive. Evelyn’s assertion becomes 
even more problematic when it is considered in relation to her views about the 
“historical” animosity between the Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans (in particular), as she 
believes that “everything’s changed now and [the U.S. is] a melting pot, so I don’t think 
anybody really cares.” Her statement is problematic be ause it supports the notion that 
the U.S. is a progressive, colorblind society in which racism and discrimination are 
events of the past (e.g., “everything’s changed now”).  
In turn, this raises several questions as to what exactly Evelyn believes future 
generations should know about internment. The first question that comes to mind is how 
would Evelyn, in general, define racism and discrimination? Second, how would she 
situate Japanese American history in a context of racism and discrimination, and how 
internment ultimately served the interests of mainstream, white U.S. culture at the 
expense of Japanese Americans? And third, how would Evelyn even begin to address the 
compounding, cross-generational effects of internment if it is viewed as “ancient 






today? Although there may be many more questions that come to mind, Evelyn is 
essentially reflecting mainstream U.S. values in that e U.S. is a race-free, integrated 
society. To be fair, Evelyn has visited the Amache internment camp, the Japanese 
American National Museum (JANM) in Los Angeles, and has been to a few conventions 
about the treatment of Japanese Americans, so it is apparent that she has some degree of 
interest in internment. But it is perplexing that Evelyn is choosing to present (i.e., enact) 
herself as not overtly political, and is choosing to view Japanese culture as something that 
is separate from what from what I suspect she views as the “baggage” associated with 
internment.   
Cynthia Yamada. 
Cynthia Yamada, a third generation Sansei in her lat  70s, was born in the pre-
internment era concurrent to WWII in which her immediate family evacuated the West 
Coast during the voluntary evacuation whereas two uncles were interned. As Evelyn’s 
friend (and interviewed together), Cynthia also maintained that she is more intrigued by 
Japanese cultural traditions and artifacts. 
 Accordingly, both Cynthia and Evelyn participate in a few of the same 
organizations (i.e., ukuleles club, mahjong club, the Buddhist Temple, etc.). They also 
share similar perspectives on how they connect to their communal identities as Japanese 
and Japanese Americans. That is to say, Cynthia and Evelyn both take pride in being 
(ethnically) Japanese and are fascinated by Japanese cultural traditions such as the 
festivals, eating Japanese food, and interacting with other Japanese Americans. Likewise, 






the U.S. government for internment (more on this later), which certainly echoes Evelyn’s 
thoughts and mainstream interpretations. Cynthia, in contrast to Evelyn, grew up 
speaking Japanese with her parents and can still converse with others in an “easy 
Japanese”—meaning, the language that her grandparents spoke when they immigrated, 
but not the Japanese spoken presently in Japan as the language has considerably evolved. 
Furthermore, Cynthia communally identifies, in part, with a few cultural values that are 
embedded within the Japanese language, which may seem rather confusing and 
contradictory to those who prioritize direct communication. Below, Cynthia illustrates 
how she has (previously) adopted a Japanese cultural value in responding to questions 
using ambiguity and contradiction: 
I understand the Japanese way. Do you find that… they’ll ask you a question—
yes or no—they mean yes, but they’ll say iie [no] or imimasu [to refrain/avoid] or 
something? They say, “No, I do want it.” Or, “Yes, I don’t want it—Hai, 
imimasen.”  They use opposites. They use yes and no in the sameent nce, which 
means the last part is what they mean or something like that. Well like me, Evelyn 
won’t do what I do, but in younger days they’ll say, “Do you mind?” I say, “Uh 
yes, I don’t mind.” “Do you mind?” They’ll ask me ag in because I’m using yes 
and no at the same time. But now, I’m not that way. 
Hence, Cynthia “understand[s] the Japanese way” as she has, in the past, replied to 
questions in a contradictory and incongruous manner of utilizing the yes-no response. 
However, Cynthia now understands that this method of response can unintentionally hurt 






“correct” or “desired.” Consequently, Cynthia asserted that she is “not that way” anymore. 
Although Cynthia may not presently enact this Japanese cultural value, she can partially 
identify or at least sympathize with those who are confused by the ambiguous ways to 
interpret the phrase as she has some linguistic and ultural insight into the matter.  
 However, Cynthia’s communal identity cannot merely be characterized as 
Japanese per se as she asserted she is “not that Japanese,” but is rather a product of the 
multiple generational influences ofIsseis, Niseis, Sanseis, and Yonseis as well as her 
“American ways.” However, the way in which Cynthia expressed herself—i.e., sharing 
her knowledge about Japanese culture, correcting Evelyn’s Japanese, commenting on the 
traditional Japanese food she likes, and the restaurant she used to own, etc.—suggests 
that being Japanese is a dominant, but not all encompassing, communal identity of hers. 
For example, Cynthia contended that her children ar more Americanized than she is and 
“they don’t speak Japanese or understand the feeling of [being] Japanese because their 
feeling is Americanized.” While she realized that her children (similar to herself) have 
both American and Japanese ways, Cynthia juxtaposed her “Japaneseness” with her 
children’s “Americanness.” Thus, it is evident that, to some degree, Cynthia communally 
identifies as Japanese despite her intergenerational influences, which can be traced back 
to Japanese culture. 
Jerry Matsuoka. 
As noted earlier, Jerry is a successful man who pursued an athletic career in judo 
and has advocated for the preservation of Amache (see Appendix 7). Extending beyond 






Japanese American community and has been a member of numerous other 
organizations—i.e., the Buddhist Temple, Amache Remembrance, Denver Central 
Optimist Club, the Japanese Community Scholarship Program, and several others—all of 
which take part in constructing Jerry’s communal identity as Japanese and Japanese 
American.  
Despite Jerry’s professional success and his acceptance from mainstream U.S. 
American culture, Jerry—like many other Japanese Amricans—is bonded to the 
collective memory of internment. Even though Jerry is lauded within the local Japanese 
American community for his “correct attitude”—as opp sed to the animosity or 
bitterness—towards internment, he is not indifferent or apolitical (like Evelyn and 
Cynthia) to the matter. 
 As the former president of the Denver Central Optimist Club, Jerry spearheaded 
the movement to preserve Amache, which was supposedly the last internment camp to be 
recognized: “It [was] the only one that was in weeds, in torment, in ruins, unrecognized. 
Nobody knew where it was.” The following excerpt demonstrates how Jerry rallied for 
community support to preserve the former internment camp: 
I talked to each member privately at their homes, at their businesses, and I simply 
asked him, “If your parents, brothers, sisters, aunts, or uncles died at Amache, 
would you vote affirmative in trying to do something about it?” “Oh, absolutely 
Jerry, absolutely.”  I said, “For those that died in WWII, the 442nd, the 100th 
Battalion, or the Military Intelligence Service, did they die in vain? They [the 






wherewithal to do something about Amache? Do you think that’s right or 
wrong?” “Oh, Jerry it’d be wrong!” “Well, can I count on you…when the vote 
comes to vote affirmative?” So when I talk[ed] to each individual in that 
perspective … [the vote] went unanimous. Prior to that … 70 to 75% said no. 
They didn’t want to preserve it because they felt tha would bring more animosity 
and make the American public feel bad for what they did, the incarceration...We 
got to proceed simply to educate the American public of what transpired so that 
this atrocity will never happen [again]. 
Jerry’s proactive method in garnering support for Amache’s preservation has proven to 
be fruitful as he persuaded other members that it was indeed the right thing to do. One 
objective in pushing for its preservation was to “educate the American public” about 
internment so as to prevent another such atrocity from happening again. In order to work 
towards this goal, Jerry had to prevail over status quo opinions and initial opposition to 
Amache’s preservation, which essentially served the interests of the U.S. government as 
it was believed that this would “bring more animosity and make the American public feel 
bad for” internment. Through the means of personalization (e.g., “If your parents, 
brothers, sisters, aunts, or uncles died at Amache…”), Jerry successfully persuaded other 
members of the Denver Central Optimist Club to vote “Y s” in the measure to preserve 
the camp. As Jerry mobilized his social networks, the issue received news exposure, and 
the organization was able to raise thousands of dollars to support the preservation (among 






with the Japanese American community, especially for th se who are bonded by the 
historical memory of internment.  
 In summary, the narratives of Evelyn, Cynthia, andJerry suggest that each relates 
to their communal identity in (slightly) different ways. Both Evelyn and Cynthia claim 
that Japanese cultural traditions and artifacts (e.g., Japanese food, festivals, and 
entertainment) take precedence for them in being Japanese American and Japanese, rather 
than the historical memory of internment. Due to their political and ideological decisions 
to distance themselves from internment, Evelyn and Cynthia’s relation to the Japanese 
American community is unique because they are suggestin  that internment has not 
impacted them nor is it relevant to their daily lives. However, their interpretations reflect 
mainstream U.S. culture in that they are metaphorically erasing the injustice and 
compounding effects of internment from Japanese American culture, but instead are 
suggesting that Japanese cultural traditions are far more intriguing and central to the 
community. On the other hand, Jerry has shown that being Japanese American for him is 
tied up in the historical memory of internment as he proactively fought to preserve the 
Amache internment camp so that the public could see with their eyes, envision the 
injustice, and continue to educate future generations as well as the greater U.S. 
community about internment. Although Evelyn, Cynthia, and Jerry do not seem to be 
drawn to the Japanese American community for the same reasons, internment has had an 
effect on the way in which they relate to their collective identities.   
 So far, participants’ experiences have been analyzed according to each of the four 






these narratives alluded to the dissonance one may experience in their identities from 
interacting with other people, identity gaps specifically address these tensions. 
Identity Gaps 
An identity gap refers to the discrepancies that are felt among or between constituent 
parts of one’s identity. Identity gaps are applied in relation to the four identity frames in 
CTI and have numerous analytical possibilities: such as, personal-enacted, personal-
relational, personal-communal, enacted-relational, enacted-communal, relational-
communal, personal-enacted-relational, personal-reltional-communal, personal-enacted-
communal, and enacted-relational-communal identity gaps. This research, however, 
focuses only on a few of the identity gaps (and is therefore not comprehensive) in order 
to extrapolate on some key examples. 
Personal-communal identity gap. 
 The personal-communal identity gap occurs when there is some discrepancy 
between one’s personal and communal identity. Two examples of this identity gap will be 
explored that includes: (1) The impact of Japanese cultural values on generational 
Japanese Americans, in general; and (2) the presumed value for individual Japanese 
Americans to speak Japanese, in specific.  
James Hashimoto. 
In what could be attributed to a disconnect between one’s self-concept and the 
(supposed) deep-rooted cultural values of one’s ethnic eritage, James—the journalist 







For Japanese Americans,—even if we think that we’re white or even if we’re not 
that connected or even if we don’t want to go to Japan—our cultural DNA, our 
values, intrinsic values, tend to be those Japanese valu s that our parents gave us, 
who got theirs from their grandparents and then from their grandparents who were 
immigrants at the time. 
Hence, James asserted that no matter how distant individual Japanese Americans may 
feel (or be) from Japanese culture, they remain tied to their ancestral Japanese cultural 
“DNA” and “intrinsic” values. With that said, one should exercise caution in the 
consideration of James’ opinion so as to avoid an over-generalization. His perspective is 
presented in order to consider the possible ways one might experience an identity gap.  
On an individual level, James addressed the notion that some Japanese Americans 
may feel white, disconnected, and/or lack the desire to go to Japan—which, by 
implication, can distinguish them collectively from the dominant (or perceived to be) 
group of ethnic Japanese. James insisted that Japanese Americans “are” connected to 
“their” Japanese cultural values precisely due to the generational transmission of values; 
however, the extent of their connection is not clear. One example of this is exemplified in 
Kent’s account as he noted that he sometimes felt “schizophrenic because there were 
values that [he] had that [he] didn’t totally understand.” Hence, Kent’s values were 
somewhat “innate” or “intrinsic” to him—i.e., they were passed down, taught, and 
internalized. In effect, individuals may feel the ned to examine, question, or even reject 
their supposed cultural values, thus creating a personal-communal identity gap. The 






generations is not unique to any one cultural group though. What is noteworthy, however, 
is the notion that Japanese Americans’ cultural values are filtered through the broader 
context of internment and WWII.  
To further elaborate what he meant, James noted that the Japanese cultural values 
of gaman and shikataganai—loosely translated as “patiently endure” and “it cannot be 
helped,” respectively—helped Japanese Americans survive during internment, yet has 
hurt them occupationally and in other contexts:12 
When we should be speaking out and complaining or just kicking butt, we’re 
going gaman—just bite the bullet, just work hard. You have a bd boss—
shikataganai—it can’t be helped, so just keep working through it. A white co-
worker wouldn’t do that. They have an innate sense of achievement and 
competition. They don’t have these deep rooted cultural values that are designed 
to hold them back, but those values really helped the community deal with what 
was happening to them during internment. It’s such a weird dynamic to have these 
[cultural values] that can help us in certain contexts, but hurt us in others. 
According to James, gaman and shikataganai are “deep rooted cultural values”—i.e., 
Japanese cultural values that have been passed down throughout generations—that seem 
to have a paradoxical effect as they “help us [Japanese Americans] in certain contexts, 
but hurt us in others.” Although gaman and shikataganai may have helped former 
                                                           
12     Gaman and shikataganai, however, are contested terms as to their meanings a d impact during internment. While 
many scholars claim that these cultural values worked to suppress speaking out against the U.S. government and are 
signified to mean a passive acceptance of injustice, others maintain that these cultural values helped internees to cope 
with the psychological damage they experienced, which then allowed many internees to form and/or verbalize their 







internees deal with internment by continually moving forward, not losing hope, and 
patiently enduring until justice was served, James contended that they have—at the same 
time—presented challenges for some Japanese Americans to succeed in the workplace 
and in the greater, U.S. community. Such obstacles ar  not easily overcome, according to 
James’ view, given that they are attributed to be “d ep rooted cultural values that are 
designed to hold [us] back.” While James’ assessment certainly can be debated in greater 
detail, it is important to note that individual Japanese Americans can experience a 
personal-communal identity gap on a cultural level.  
On another note, an archetypical example of the personal-communal identity gap 
pertains to how individual members of a collective can be ascribed with certain cultural 
values derived from their ethnic or cultural heritage, irrespective of those who may be 
generations removed. Given that the participants in his study are racially, ethnically, 
culturally, or nationally, etc. a part of the collective group of Japanese or Japanese 
Americans, many have been assumed to or they feel lik  they ought to speak Japanese. 
The assumption to speak Japanese, however, often rel cts common sense notions of 
what it means to be ethnically Japanese. That is to say, individuals may feel the need to 
learn the language of their ethnic heritage in order to become acculturated as Japanese—
which is often determined by the mainstream culture and norms, but can also be 
perpetuated by outsiders’ stereotypes and presumptions. In fact, half of the participants 
interviewed for this study (i.e., Michelle, Kathryn, Angela, Kent, Evelyn) contended that 
they either do not speak or only know minimal Japanese: “I know I should learn Japanese, 






(Kent). Thus, these participants have expressed dissonance at the fact that they personally 
do not speak Japanese. In effect, they have perceivd their collective identity as 
ethnically Japanese in a somewhat different or “unauthentic” manner due to their 
personal differentiation from the collective (more examples related to this later).  
As an aside, James (the journalist) noted during our interview that there are 
different expectations for whites compared with Japanese Americans to speak Japanese in 
Japan. For whites, James maintained that they are not xpected to speak the language due 
to their foreigner status, and if they can speak Japanese, they are tre t d like celebrities. 
On the other hand, Japanese Americans, in James’ view, are expected to speak Japanese 
because of their racially marked Japanese bodies even though they, too, are foreigners in 
Japan. As a white U.S. American, I was lauded by the Japanese for speaking the very few 
words I knew at the time when I travelled to Japan. They were patient with me when I 
mispronounced words and they even insisted that my Japanese was good even though it 
was not. My white privilege essentially exempted me from knowing how to speak the 
language correctly, and I was instead warmly received nto the culture. Unfortunately, 
this is not always the case for some Japanese Americans as their acceptance into Japanese 
culture can be contingent upon their ability to speak their “native” tongue, among other 
factors.  
Turning now to specific cases of participants’ capabilities to speak Japanese, the 
next identity gap addresses what happens when one enacts their sense of self, yet their 






Enacted-relational-communal identity gap. 
 An enacted-relational-communal identity gap can occur when one performs their 
sense of self in an interaction with other people, yet other’s presumptions about one’s 
communal identity may be different than one’s own (or dominant) communal 
identifications, thus creating dissonance.  
Sophia Akiyama. 
Sophia Akiyama, a fourth generation Yonsei, was born in Japan during the post-
internment era in which none of her family members were interned. Sophia is nationally 
Japanese, but culturally more American. Nevertheless, she “embraces the confusion” of 
her bicultural identity. 
Although Sophia was born in Okayama, Japan, she was raised in San Diego, 
California. Despite the fact that Sophia lived in Japan for just six weeks, she still claims 
her Japanese citizenship along with the rest of her amily and regularly visits her 
extended family in Japan every other year. Compared with other participants in this study, 
Japanese is Sophia’s first language as it is the main language she speaks with her family 
both in the U.S. and in Japan. Needless to say, Sophia is fairly comfortable speaking 
Japanese, and she culturally identifies in some ways as Japanese (e.g., nationally, some 
religious beliefs). However, she has spent the majority f her life living in the U.S. and 
insists that she is “culturally more American” (emphasis added).  
During one of her visits to Japan, Sophia (correctly) asked a question in Japanese 
to some strangers, yet the nature of the question coupled with her appearance as “native 






For me [Japanese is] my first language so I don’t have an accent, but my 
vocabulary is limited. I don’t know my geography in Japan. So we’re at a train 
station and to say, “Oh, what train do I need to get onto to go to…?” For them, 
they can’t imagine a 20-something year old having to ask how to get somewhere 
and if it’s in perfect Japanese it’s all the more confusing to them…People always 
ask me, “Why do you not know how to get somewhere?” Very few people will 
have the courage, but I’ve definitely had people ask or I’ll say it [that I’m 
American] because I can tell they’re questioning me, and they have all these 
questions for me running through their head. 
Although Sophia is a foreigner in Japan, she contended that “foreigner” is not what 
typically comes to mind in the eyes of native Japanese when they see her. Sophia is 
aware that she looks Japanese, and while she can spe k Japanese without an accent, she 
does not know her geography. It follows that, Sophia should know, as the reasoning goes, 
how to navigate though Japan without the help of an adult as she in her late 20s (e.g., 
“People always ask me, ‘Why do you not know how to get somewhere?’”). However, 
Sophia did not grow up in Japan nor does she live there.  
Sophia enacted her Japaneseness by conversing with others in Japanese fluently 
(for the most part), yet the stranger’s incorrect presumptions about her ethnic identity and 
linguistic ability as a “native Japanese” led her to experience an enacted-communal 
identity gap. She also experienced an identity gap relationally in this interaction given 
that people have questioned her and she is particularly conscious of what people might be 






questions for me running through their head”). Sophia t en felt the need to clarify that 
she is an American to the people who seem curious or who are perhaps judging her for 
not knowing her geography in Japan as one who looks Japanese (e.g., “I’ve definitely had 
people ask or I’ll say it”).13 Consequently, it is apparent that Sophia experienced an 
enacted-relational-communal identity gap during interactions like this while in Japan.  
In contextualizing why these strangers seemed to beconfused by Sophia’s 
inability to navigate through Japan, Sophia maintained that some Japanese do not know 
much about Japanese Americans and “assume that if you look Japanese and you can’t 
speak the language that you have some sort of disability.” More to the point, Sophia 
attributed this assumption to a lack of historical understanding—among not just Japanese 
culture, but also mainstream U.S. American culture—about the internment of Japanese 
Americans and the compounding effects it had on the generations. Thus, internment has 
impacted the extent to which individuals desire to or possess the ability to speak (native) 
Japanese.  
Shifting now to cases where participants have struggled to learn and speak 
Japanese, the following two identity gaps address the tensions that one may encounter 
among other aspects of their identities.   
                                                           
13     In Japan and in similar types of interactions, Sophia has found that it is easier to say that she is an American, yet 
identifies as Japanese when she is in the U.S., which is a testament to the context-dependent and fluid nature of 
identity: “When I go to Japan, I say I’m American… but in the U.S., I don’t say that I’m American because it just 






Personal-enacted-communal identity gap. 
 The personal-enacted-communal identity gap corresponds to a discrepancy among 
one’s self-concept, how one performs their sense of self, and their membership as part of 
a collective.  
Angela Fukui. 
Angela, who dropped out of Japanese language school yet enjoys being immersed 
in a Japanese cultural setting when participating in aikido, explained to me what 
happened when she has enacted her ability (or lack thereof) to speak Japanese. While she 
was shopping inside a Japanese marketplace in the U.S., Angela gathered that she won a 
prize from a raffle drawing, yet she could not understand what was said as it was all in 
Japanese: 
That was a problem because I realized that I won, but I didn’t know what they 
were saying. It was like [laughs], “Uhh, puraizu [prize]?” Finally, they got 
someone who spoke English, but it was tough because I won and they would all 
ring the bell. Ahhh! I don’t know what you say for congratulations, but… I was 
bowing a lot because I was just frantically nervous. I’m bowing to everyone 
saying, “Help me! Help me! I don’t speak Nihongo [Japanese]. Wakarimasen! 
Wakarimasen! [I don’t understand! I don’t understand!]” 
Although Angela performed “Japaneseness” by speaking the Japanese she knew and by 
“frantically” bowing, it is evident that Angela does not personally identify with the 
ascribed collective value of speaking Japanese—that is to say, fluently or proficiently. 






through her enactment; however, Angela experienced dissonance as she personally could 
not respond in ways that she desired to. Therefore, Angela experienced a gap among her 
personal-enacted-communal identities when she attemp ed to speak Japanese at a 
Japanese marketplace, which falls outside of Angela’s personal relation to the collective 
group of ethnically Japanese. This situation can become further problematic if one desires 
to speak the language(s) of their ethnic heritage as a means of identifying with a 
collective, yet has no one to speak the language with, thereby resulting in a personal-
relational-communal identity gap. 
Personal-relational-communal identity gap. 
 When there is some disparity among one’s personal, rel tional, and communal 
identities, it follows that a personal-relational-communal identity gap is experienced.  
Kathryn Fujimoto. 
Kathryn, who was raised without Japanese cultural traditions, told me about her 
experiences speaking Japanese. Kathryn’s explanation is detailed below: 
I tried to learn Japanese once. I think I got as far as telling time. Then I said, 
“Screw this!” There are times when I wish I knew and I always tell myself that 
this is a deficiency and I need to correct that. But I never quite get to it… Frankly, 
one of the reasons why I haven’t pursued that is, who ould I speak with? 
Especially the postwar Japanese Americans, most of them my age, they know 
about as much as I do about the culture. 
As a member of the collective group of ethnic Japanese, Kathryn felt—to some extent—






earlier in the results (i.e., the personal frame), Kathryn contended that she was raised in a 
“diluted set of circumstances” where she was “deliberately…raised without the language, 
culture, [and] the traditions.” Hence, growing up in the post-internment generation 
partially explains her inability to speak Japanese, to which she assessed as a “deficiency” 
that should be “corrected.”  Kathryn’s pursuit in learning Japanese could have also been 
halted due to the difficulty and frustration in learning another language (e.g., “I got as far 
as telling time. Then I said, ‘Screw this!’”). However, the greater issue appears to be a 
lack of relational connections with people—namely, thnic Japanese—who she can speak 
Japanese with. For Kathryn, learning Japanese seems to be no less than impractical given 
that she has no one to speak the language with. She also quickly eliminated the possibility 
of speaking Japanese with other postwar Japanese Americans (in the Denver community) 
because “they know about as much as I do about the culture.” Even if there were a few 
Japanese Americans who she could speak Japanese with, Kathryn does not really have 
friends who are Japanese Americans, but who are inst ad acquaintances. Moreover, 
learning Japanese may be of interest to individual members of the collective group of 
ethnic Japanese, yet a lack of relational connections with others who can also speak 
Japanese can lead one to experience a personal-relationa -communal identity gap.  
In a somewhat different vein, the personal-relational-communal identity gap can 
also depict interactions where other people make premature or incorrect judgments about 
one’s communal identity, of which one personally does not relate to or has become 
unaware of (e.g., racial appearance, ethnic identity). Therefore, a gap among one’s 






A frequent situation cited by participants (namely, Kathryn, James, and Sophia) 
reflected the nature of people (presumably strangers) making comments such as, “Where 
are you from?” and “Your English is really good.” Although these comments may appear 
to be innocent or merely inquisitive, they are problematic as they assume that people of 
color are not from here—that is, the U.S. In particular, the question, “Where are you 
from,” assumes that one should respond with an answer—not necessarily in relation to 
one’s geographic location of birth or hometown—but rather in relation to one’s race (or 
ethnicity) as the comment is likely to be racially motivated or involves some internalized 
probing of that nature (Kibria, 2000). Similarly, the comment, “Your English is really 
good,” is underscored with surprise and shock at the level of seemingly proficient English 
coming from a perceived “foreigner.” Consequently, this is a form of the perpetual 
foreigner stereotype that upholds white U.S. Americans as the dominant group 
simultaneously while “Othering” certain racial and ethnic groups who have, in fact, lived 
in the U.S. for generations. 
After expressing her frustration towards hearing the above comments on 
numerous occasions, Kathryn was taken aback as her rac  has become invisible to her, 
yet was (or is) quite apparent to other people: “Sometimes I really do forget that I’m 
Japanese. I can’t see what the hell I look like [to others].” In effect, Kathryn has 
experienced an identity gap on numerous levels. Firt, the notion of being Japanese is not 
a part of Kathryn’s self-concept as she was not raised with Japanese cultural traditions, 
does not know the language, and has never lived in Japan. Since she does not have these 






identify herself as “Japanese.” Second, which is related to the first, Kathryn does not 
communally identify with the collective group of Japanese as she does not know (many) 
native Japanese and does not participate in exclusive y Japanese organizations in the 
community. Third, Kathryn also experienced relational dissonance during the interaction 
itself as people’s comments have worked to “Other” r, perhaps unknowingly. In spite 
of looking Japanese (or just Asian) to others, Kathryn is not Japanese. She does not feel 
connected to the overall Japanese community and does not resonate with (many) 
Japanese cultural values on a personal level. Thus, a personal-relational-communal 
identity gap can be experienced as a result of others’ preconceived notions. 
As I contemplated about these stories, I could not overlook the same tendency in 
my own thought processes. I have noticed that I, all too often, make educated guesses as 
to what a person’s race, last name, or language spoken signifies about their (possible) 
ethnicity. While I have become more conscious of my own preconceived notions in the 
past few years, I cannot stress enough how problematic this is because people of color are 
frequently asked these types of questions, which can further exacerbate their “Otherness” 
from dominate white U.S. American culture. In my view, “Where are you from” and 
“Your English is really good” can also function as preconditions for racial discrimination 
because these comments (indirectly) affirm whites to be “the true” and “accepted” racial 
group in the U.S., which can render other minority and racial groups into the margins of 
inferiority.   
Notwithstanding, another example of the personal-rel tional-communal identity 






link with internment solely on the basis that they are a member of the culture—in which 
one might arrive at such a conclusion through a racial or ethnic categorization.  
Angela Fukui. 
In the quotation below, Angela—whose family was inter ed and became more 
interested in internment after her father’s death—elaborated what went through her mind 
when people have apologized to her on behalf of the U.S. government’s imprisonment of 
Japanese Americans: 
Now lately, people come up and apologize, which I don’t know if that’s better or 
worse [laughs]. I wasn’t there! I usually just say, “Thank you.” But sometimes 
I’m tempted to say, “Well you know, let’s see whose left: my mom. Okay, you 
can fly to LA and apologize to my mom because she was in the camp. Basically, 
they’re the ones who were there. I wasn’t there!” 
While people may be guided by an honest intent (or whatever the motivation) to 
acknowledge the injustices of their government’s wrongdoings, the apology—on behalf 
one people group to another—did not register with Angela because she “wasn’t there.”  
Even though Angela politely says “thank you” when peo le apologize to her—as a 
Japanese American—for internment, the apology was out of place given that Angela was 
not interned. Angela’s mother, on the other hand, was interned and is still alive. Thus, the 
better person to be on the receiving end of the apology is Angela’s mother or other people 
who have actually been interned, not Angela. That is not to suggest, however, that former 
internees will be receptive to the apology either as the experiences and interpretations 






 For the above reasons, it seems that Angela has experi nced an identity gap 
among her personal, relational, and communal identiti s. In particular, there is a 
disconnect between Angela’s personal and communal identity given that she has not been 
interned, yet she is part of the collective group of Japanese Americans who are typically 
thought of in relation to this historical memory. To further complicate the situation, 
people have offered apologies to Angela for an injustice that Angela has no direct 
experiences with, which seems to have created some (perceived) relational dissonance 
during other such interactions. Hence, a personal-rel tional-communal identity gap 
transpired. 
 In brief, identity gaps have sought to explore the dissonance or gaps one may feel 
among constituent parts of their identities in social interactions. For participants in this 
study, many have experienced identity gaps in relation to their ability to speak Japanese 
and simply because they look Japanese. A huge contributor to the gaps experienced oft n 
arose from stereotypes as well as ascribed and presumed cultural values. While the above 
examples only presented a glimpse into some of the tensions individuals regularly 
encounter among different aspects of their identities, the concept is useful in 
conceptualizing identity as an entity that involves conflict and contradiction.  
Related to identity gaps, the concept of critical-cultural hybridity also addresses 
the tensions individuals feel among their identities, yet focuses more on dissonance as it 







Critical-cultural hybridity is a theoretical concept utilized in this research that 
combines interpretive and critical perspectives of hybridity. In its interpretive usage, 
cultural hybridity captures the multiplicity, overlapping, conflicting, and/or contradictory 
nature of one’s racial, ethnic, and cultural identities, which are commonly associated with 
(though not necessarily exclusive to) the experiences of generational immigrants who 
have mixed ethnic heritages. Cultural hybridity canbe applied in contexts where 
individuals collectively identify as “both/and” as well as “neither/nor”—i.e., both 
Japanese and American, neither Japanese nor American, respectively (Moreman, 2005; 
Young, 2009). From a critical perspective, critical hybridity is employed in order to 
situate narratives of cultural hybridity within their respective sociopolitical and historical 
contexts. Likewise, critical hybridity is attuned to issues of dominance, power, ideology, 
and hegemony. 
James Hashimoto. 
In a “dual cultural upbringing” of Japanese and American influences, James—
who lived in Japan for eight years and is now a journalist who writes about Japanese and 
Japanese American culture—found himself (in retrospect) to be intrigued, yet conflicted 
by his cultural values. James insisted that his upbringing was significantly more Japanese 
than the typical Japanese American family in Denver because he lived in Japan, ate 
Japanese food on a regular basis, and observed Japanese cultural traditions (e.g., taking 
off shoes inside the house). Outside of his house and as a teenager, James mainly 






and knew no other Asians when he moved to the U.S. and on throughout high school. 
While one may postulate how James’ dual cultural upbringing might have clashed at 
times, James did not perceive any tension among his cultural identities then (e.g., “My 
identity was never in question”). As previously indicated, James’ Japanese American 
identity became pertinent to him after his father passed away (see this analysis in the 
relationship frame section for a more detailed elabor tion).  
James is now, in general, comfortable expressing himself as a cultural (hybrid) 
mix between being Japanese, American, and Japanese American—thus, a multicultural 
identification. Even when he visits Japan, James confidently enacts his identity:  
In like two or three days I can at least have a conversation [in Japanese]… and do 
okay even though they can tell I’m not really Japanese because of my accent or 
because I walk like an American. I dress like an American. I’m too loud, too loose. 
I still like it. 
While James may feel relatively comfortable in Japan, he acknowledged that other 
Japanese Americans may be more hesitant and self-conscious in similar situations (see 
identity gaps for illustrations of this). James is well aware that he walks, dresses, and 
carries himself as an American, yet he still visits Japan and converses with people in 
Japanese. Unlike the majority of the participants i th s study, James was raised in Japan 
and can speak Japanese better than most (but not all) participants, which may be 
contributing factors as to why he is relatively comf rtable expressing himself in Japan.  
On another note, James pursued a journalism career nd has written extensively 






and…I was a little big mouth, I became the voice…I hope that it projects to other 
Japanese Americans”), which he thought was a rare move for the typical Japanese 
American in relation to the public visibility and the possible consequences for doing so. 
James appreciates the “two-way street of culture,” the trading and mixing of Japanese and 
U.S. American culture as he claims it makes Japanese Americans “cooler.”14 It is 
therefore apparent that James identifies with both Japanese and U.S. American culture as 
well as Japanese American culture. Hence, James embraces a multiplicity of cultural 
identities, as maintained in cultural hybridity.  
That is not to suggest, however, that James has attined a sense of belonging in 
either U.S. American or Japanese culture. On the contrary, James empathizes with the 
struggles, tension, and energy it takes to juggle confli ting cultural values. Below, James 
articulates his feelings of non-belongingness that can also be characteristic of other 
bicultural and multicultural individuals as well: 
The sad part of feeling like you don’t belong in Japan when you’re Japanese 
American is that you’re often reminded that you don’t belong in the U.S. because 
of racism, because of this sense of being “the Other,” because of not seeing 
people like us in politics, unless you’re from California or Hawaii. Not seeing 
people like us on TV… To me, American means white. That’s the crux of Asian 
American identity issues is that we are not quite accepted as Americans, and yet 
we’re too American to be Japanese. 
                                                           
14     As an aside, Japanese American culture could be read as a “third space,” that is, a new or different culture that 







The historical context of racism, being “Othered,” little exposure in media and politics, 
and “not being Japanese enough” are just a few reasons why, according to James, many 
Japanese Americans may not feel like they belong in Japan or in the U.S. Alternatively, 
James begs the question: If America means “white” and Japan means “Japanese,” where 
do Japanese Americans belong? In the absence of a perceived sense of belngingness 
with either culture, Japanese Americans may be render d into a “third space”—an in-
between space, a space that presents more challenges than it solves. Despite previous 
literature that esteems third cultures (or the “third space”) to be unique, opportunistic, 
cooperative, border-crossing, and a “harmonization” of cultures into a cohesive whole 
(Sunman Lee, 2006; McEwan & Sobre-Denton, 2011; Patel, 2004), this research takes on 
the view that third cultures are not absent of struggle and conflict, nor are they to be 
conflated with some assimilative phenomena as that would erase the realities that many 
bicultural individuals face (Halualani, 2008). Implicitly, James presents a critique about 
the dominant group in the U.S. (i.e., “To me, America means white”), and “authenticity” 
(i.e., “we’re too American to be Japanese”). In sum, James’ profound sense of pride in 
being Japanese American is contrasted with the struggle to become integrated within both 
U.S. American and Japanese culture.  
Sophia Akiyama. 
Sophia, who “embraces the confusion” of her bicultural identity, was born in 
Japan yet raised in the U.S. Again, Japanese is Sophia’s first language and is the only 
language she speaks with her family. During her childhood in San Diego, Sophia and her 






Saturdays because returning to Japan was still a possibility then. However, Sophia did not 
adjust well to her Japanese school from about fourth grade on partially because the school 
was designed for Japanese immigrants who were in the U.S. on a temporary basis (i.e., 
two or three years). At her American school, she was sometimes bullied and teased 
because of the food she ate and the language she spok . Below, Sophia describes some of 
the tensions she experienced: 
Culturally growing up, I was really torn between figuring out what my identity 
was and I didn’t get along very well with the kids who were at my Japanese 
school. So the majority of the people, my friends, people who I considered to be 
my friends were from my American school and they were of mixed 
backgrounds… I was very Americanized in [the] eyes of my [Japanese school 
peers], the outlier of the class. I was never Japanese enough for my Japanese 
school peers and not American enough for my American school peers.  
Sophia’s struggle to “discover” her identity could perhaps be analyzed as a typical 
adolescent phase; yet, her identity struggle was excerbated by the demands of her 
bicultural education, competing cultural values, and her peer’s expectations. As a result, 
Sophia did not fit into the normative molds of being “Japanese” or “American”—i.e., 
cultural hybridity’s “neither/nor” dynamic—as she was considered to be “very 
Americanized, “never Japanese enough,” “the outlier of the class,” and “not American 
enough” by her peers (respectively). On the contrary, Sophia felt that she fit in better with 






Sophia’s predicament corresponds with the tensions, n-between spaces, and the “third 
space” that bicultural individuals can be situated in or forced into.  
 As an added dimension in her identity struggle, Sophia recalled learning about 
Pearl Harbor in her American school while she was taught about the atomic bombs at her 
Japanese school. She noted that “it was just confusing for me to know what actually 
happened and why one [was] emphasized more than the other depending on which 
history book I [was] reading.” Certainly, the ways in which history is written can often 
reflect the power of dominant group as they attempt to determine “official” narratives 
while silencing others. Wartime animosity between the U.S. and Japan not only affected 
Sophia intellectually as she struggled to learn what ex ctly happened during WWII, but 
also extended to a personal level as her grandparents lived in Hiroshima and Tokyo 
during the atomic and fire bombings. In particular, her maternal grandparents suffered the 
loss of their home at it was burned to the ground due to the fire bombings in Tokyo. 
Needless to say, her grandparents still harbor some bitterness—albeit, decreasing over the 
years—towards her parents who moved to the U.S. (e.g., “To think, how can you go to 
the country that bombed us?”). All of this contributed to Sophia’s confusion and struggle 
to figure out who she was. Consequently, Sophia equt d her childhood and adolescence 
with “WWII and internment [where she] didn’t want to be Japanese.”  
In retrospect, Sophia is thankful that she went to Japanese language school in 
order to learn about her language and culture as she is “proud to be Japanese” and “loves 
Japan.” When she moved to Denver in 2008, she became more involved in Japanese 






League (JACL), Asian Round Table, Asian Pacific Development Center, National 
Association of Asian American Professionals, Buddhist Temple, etc.) where she started 
to realize “how Japanese [she] actually” is and contemplated her core values. Yet still to 
this day, Sophia claims that “culturally, I’m just not someone who would do well in the 
Japanese community [in Japan]” which is juxtaposed with her love for Japan. Hence, 
Sophia does not entirely identify as Japanese, but insists that she is culturally more 
American and is “more of a global citizen.” For instance, Sophia is drawn to diversity 
and the “more progressive mindsets…in the U.S.” (e.g., the disability community, 
multiracial families, and the LGBTQ community), whic  she maintains, Japan is slow in 
accepting.  
At the same time, Sophia does not consider herself “Japanese American” per se as 
the term suggests to her—at least within the Denver Japanese American community—
that one was born in the U.S. and is therefore a U.S. citizen, which Sophia is not. Even 
though Sophia does not identify as a Japanese American, she has enjoyed interacting with 
the local community, particularly through the JACL, as she desires to bridge the gap 
between the Japanese and Japanese American community.  
Nevertheless, Sophia “embraces the confusion” of her bicultural identity in that 
she does not “have to choose whether [she is] Japanese or American.” In other words, 
Sophia partially identifies with both cultures and thus, embraces a multiplicity of 
conflicting identities. 
 In summary, James and Sophia both exemplify the pride, struggles, and tensions 






relative ease in expressing his hybrid identity as well as his struggle to attain a sense of 
belonging in both U.S. and Japanese cultures. On the other hand, Sophia’s narrative 
directed more attention towards her conflicting cultural identities as she is not entirely 
Japanese, Japanese American, or U.S. American, yet she identifies with and/or values 
these cultures in varying ways. Although critical-cu tural hybridity and CTI along with 
identity gaps are thematically similar in a number of ways (e.g., partial, overlapping, 
conflicting identifications that causes tension in one’s identity and that one has to 
negotiate), critical-cultural hybridity, in my view, is more explicit towards one’s 
simultaneously multiple identifications with cultural and ethnic communities. 
Thus far, the theoretical concepts of CTI, identity gaps, and critical-cultural 
hybridity have been employed in order to understand he nature of Japanese American 
identity for participants in this study. Each theortical concept illuminates different 
(albeit, overlapping) elements and layers of participants’ identities in consideration of 
identity as a dynamic and complex entity, and not to mention, the vast amount of 
diversity within Japanese American culture. As a recap, CTI conceptualized identity by 
examining four distinct, albeit overlapping dimensions of oneself: the personal frame, 
enacted frame, relationship frame, and the communal frame. Identity gaps were then 
utilized to explicate the dissonance one experiences and negotiates through 
communication when interacting with others. Lastly, critical-cultural hybridity 
specifically addressed how one makes sense out of their multiple, intersecting, and/or 
conflicting racial, ethnic, national, and cultural identities. In order to present these 






Research Question 1: How has internment and the personal experiences of Japanese 
Americans shaped their identities? 
Eight out of 10 Japanese Americans in this study were either interned or had 
family members who were interned. Of the eight, twowere interned as young children 
(i.e., Michelle and Charles). All participants condemned internment and insisted that it 
must not be forgotten lest another racial or ethnic group be imprisoned again, but some 
were more critical than others (i.e., Michelle, James, Kathryn, and Sophia).  
Although internment has had a continual and profound impact on Michelle’s 
identity (e.g., “the most defining part of my life”) that extends to nearly all other facets of 
her identity, the experience has had little resonance with Charles. Indeed, Michelle was 
the most critical as she claimed that internment was deeply “traumatizing” to her whereas 
Charles maintained that he was “too young” and did not perceive that camp greatly 
impacted his sense of self. Consequently, Charles has not become overly critical toward 
the U.S. government for internment. 
For James and Angela, the deaths of their fathers have made them curious about 
their family’s history during WWII and internment in particular, yet have also led them to 
become more interested in these historical events in general. However, James was led to a 
deeper introspection of his Japanese American identity: “It took my dad getting cancer 
and dying before I realized that, holy shit, I’ve nver even thought about my identity! … 
I’m this and that, but being a Japanese American wasn’t  part of how I described 
myself.” One reason for this was that James was, as a journalist, already thinking and 






wife and as he heard more stories from the local community, James started to and 
continues to write about internment. Angela, on the other hand, does not have many 
relationships with ethnic Japanese except for her family (e.g., “I don’t know any…Maybe 
there are some… [But] I just don’t know any”) and is not as active in the local 
community compared with James. Notwithstanding, Angela participates in the Japanese 
martial art aikido in which she was able to establish a closer relationship with her (now 
deceased) father, meet other Asian Americans, and immerse herself in Japanese cultural 
traditions.  
Similar to James, both Kent and Kathryn confronted internment as a means to 
accept their identities as Japanese Americans: “I started trying to figure out who I was 
and what happened” (Kent) and “I think [confronting internment] had more to do with 
this concept of accepting who I was” (Kathryn). Not long after his identity search, Kent 
met his wife (now deceased) who had a tremendous impact on him, and she even 
encouraged him to become active in the local community (e.g., “She said ‘it’s a duty of 
anybody to try to help the community as best as you can and I think you should join up’”). 
However, it took Kathryn much longer to accept her Japanese American identity given 
that she was not raised with Japanese cultural traditions, but also because she has had to 
grapple with her difference from the mainstream Japanese American community with 
respect to her family’s reputation, class, as well as her gender and sexual identity. For the 
previous reasons, Kathryn is not as involved in the local community, but she is active in 
one organization (i.e., Friends of Amache) that works to preserve the former internment 






Following a similar sense of difference yet experienced in other ways, Sophia’s 
family and history, bicultural education, and conflicting cultural values posed numerous 
challenges for her to: (1) know what actually happened during WWII; (2) fit in with her 
peers at her schools; and (3) determine her identity. Sophia has learned, however, through 
her involvement in the Denver Japanese American community to embrace both her 
Japanese and American identities in spite of the contradictions see feels between her 
identities (e.g., “I sort of embraced the confusion. I don’t have to choose whether I’m 
Japanese or American.… [I] can be both”). Consequently, Sophia has taken leadership 
positions in numerous organizations (in particular, the JACL) in which she aims to 
educate and bridge the gap between Japanese and Japanese American culture.  
Unlike Sophia, Jerry was accepted among his peers and h s even been accepted 
into mainstream U.S. American culture. More than that, Jerry has experienced a greater 
degree of upward mobility due to his class and through his numerous professional 
accomplishments, which has clearly impacted how he relates to his identity (e.g., 
“Among the third generation of Japanese Americans, I’ve accomplished more than most 
of them. … [And I was] able to succeed in the American mainstream”). Similar to Sophia 
in relation to his leadership in the local community, Jerry was instrumental in advocating 
for the preservation of Amache, though he was shielded from internment: “Most people 
were [initially] against [preserving Amache]… I talked to each member privately at their 
homes, at their businesses…When it came [time] to vo e, it went unanimous.”  
In contrast, Evelyn and Cynthia are primarily drawn to the local community in 






Japanese cultural traditions: “I’m just trying to hld onto cultural things” (Evelyn) and “I 
like to keep the Japanese tradition” (Cynthia). Accordingly, they posited that internment 
and WWII has had little to no impact on their self-concepts: “I wasn’t [interned]…so I 
don’t know or have that bitterness because we never xperienced it….We were free to do 
whatever we wanted” (Cynthia) and “[Internment] was just ancient history for us 
teenagers growing up…It ha[d] no bearing on who we are today” (Evelyn). Precisely due 
of their dissociations from internment, however, Evelyn and Cynthia are reinforcing 
mainstream interpretations and the power of dominant culture in viewing the impact of 
the internment (i.e., with respect to it creating compounding effects on the generations, 
even for those who did not directly experience it) as over-exaggerated and not as harsh as 
some may claim. In doing so, Evelyn and Cynthia seem to have internalized how the U.S. 
government might prefer Japanese Americans to relate to their identities. 
In sum, the data revealed that Japanese Americans in this study were, in some 
way or another, impacted by the structural context of internment. However, participants 
related to their experiences and expressed their identities in markedly different ways.  
Research Question 2: How has historical racism and discrimination shaped Japanese 
Americans’ identities?   
 While a couple of participants asserted that they have not been discriminated 
against (i.e., Evelyn and Cynthia), the majority attested that they have been victims of 
discrimination (i.e., James, Jerry, Angela, Charles, Kathryn, Sophia). For participants 
who recalled experiences of racism and discriminatio , their answers came, for the most 






when you felt proud to be Japanese American; and (2) Can you recall a time when you 
felt uncomfortable being Japanese American? For instance, James—the journalist who 
writes about Japanese and Japanese American culture—responded with the following 
explanation: 
It’s easier for me to tell you about times when I felt bad to be Japanese American. 
That would be on December 7th—any year—growing up and even into my teen 
years and even afterwards, but not so much in recent years. I would cringe every 
December 7th walking out the door and thinking, who’s going to tell me to “go 
back home” or who’s going to yell, “remember Pearl Harbor!” because that’s 
what I heard every year on December 7th. I got to hate December 7th and think, 
“Shit, why do I have to be Japanese American? Why do I have to be Japanese?” 
Then I go, “Wait, I’m not Japanese! I didn’t do that! I didn’t bomb Pearl Harbor! 
My dad was in the U.S. army for God’s sake!” So you get all of these conflicting 
things. 
Due to the repeated accusations that James was somehow “responsible” for Pearl Harbor, 
he “hate[d] December 7th” as he anticipated that people were going to make some racist 
remark towards him. While these offensive comments were provoked relationally—i.e., 
they were made by other people—they have wider implications for the communal and 
personal identity gaps. That is to say, discrimination materialized through a reduction and 
stereotype of the “collective” group of Japanese who attacked Pearl Harbor (i.e., the 
Japanese imperial military) to James, in particular. Hence, James was personally accused 






Americans are perceived to be “Japanese because of [their] ancestry, because of the way 
[they] look”—meaning, because of their race. In effect, James internally struggled with 
his communal identity as he inadvertently believed h  “was Japanese” even though he 
knew he was not Japanese, had no part in Pearl Harbor, and in spite of his father’s U.S. 
military service. For these reasons, the discriminatio  James encountered corresponds 
with a personal- communal identity gap.  
However, these discriminatory remarks were predicated on the political and 
hegemonic ideology of the U.S. government that essentially framed all racially Japanese 
individuals to be responsible for Pearl Harbor and/or threats to national security. 
Accordingly, James concluded that Japanese Americans may share a sense of collective 
guilt for the atrocities committed by the Japanese imperial military during WWII, which 
was cultivated by the U.S. government in “justifying” their incarceration. In turn, this has 
implications for present and future societies to question how we might be perpetuating 
racism and discrimination—not merely toward Japanese Americans, but also toward 
other racial, ethnic, and cultural groups—by consenting to similar hegemonic ideologies. 
Moreover, James’ experiences demonstrate that racism and discrimination has impacted 
his identity, and he continues to challenge these problematic constructs through his 
journalism.  
 Similarly, Jerry—the successful man who launched his athletic career in judo—
was racially discriminated against for being Japanese American, or perhaps on the basis 






extended to his religious identification as a Buddhist, which some people equated with 
“extremism.” Jerry explained that,   
Back then we had dog tags that ha[d] your name, address, phone number, the 
blood type, and then in another corner it had your religion. I had “B” that stood 
for Buddhist…Later on they see Buddhists because of the Vietnam War and they 
would torch themselves in protest of the war…Then in WWII with the kamikaze 
pilots…killing [themselves]. People said, “Man, you’re real radical” [and] “You 
guys are a crazy lot of people.” At that time, I wished I was…[not] Japanese 
American because everybody sa[id], “You know why you’ve got slanted eyes? 
Oh my God, rice again?” A can of toothpaste was supposed to be the whitening 
agent. “I wonder where the yellow went.” Then everybody turned right at you, 
and kind of ridiculed you. So that was the low point. 
Despite the fact that Jerry was fairly popular among his peers during his childhood, he 
was not exempt from racism given his Buddhist religion, “yellow” race, “slanted” eyes, 
and his atypical diet of eating rice. Consequently, these derogatory and extremely racist 
comments have impacted Jerry’s identity to the extent that he did not want to be Japanese 
American (e.g., “At that time, I wished I was…[not] Japanese American”), which can 
also be paralleled with the personal-communal identty gap.  
Angela, whose family was interned and became more interested in internment 
after her father passed away, has also been racially d scriminated against. For example, 
Angela recalled instances where she has received “funny looks…a ‘go home’…some 






here before your family was!’” While Angela somewhat downplayed these situations to 
insist that racism “happens everywhere” (i.e., racism s not unusual), she has 
contemplated her difference. Angela grew up in a diverse environment and contended 
that she is more comfortable in mixed cultural settings, but she “always check[s] first” to 
see if people are okay with her, especially in more conservative and homogenous areas. 
That is to say, Angela gauges the situation and observe  people before expressing herself: 
“I started to be more careful about how I presented myself…I spend more time looking at 
them thinking, ‘Are they okay with me?’ If they’re not okay with me…I just sort of back 
away, but I just want to make sure it’s okay.” Henc, Angela is aware of her race and 
given her previous experiences of racism, she enacts her identity carefully. Insofar as this 
process seems to be quite stressful for Angela, she could be negotiating a personal-
communal identity gap through her conscious enactment. Another interpretation of this is 
that Angela could have enacted her identity in this way during our interview so as to 
communicate a message to a larger audience. As a person of color, Angela may be 
suggesting that members of minority groups may not necessarily view racism and 
discrimination merely as “historical” or “distant” events. Rather, they are actual, lived 
experiences that presently inform how she and others may perform their sense of self to 
others (e.g., “I started to be more careful about hw I presented myself”). Moreover, 
Angela carefully and consciously chooses how to present herself when she suspects that, 
by inference, someone may view her as racially inferior (e.g., “‘Are they okay with 
me?’”), but she is also suspicious of dominant white U.S. American culture as this group 






historical memory of internment in the back of her mind as she remains somewhat 
“cautious of the general American community because you [don’t] know if they [will] 
put you in a camp again,” which is a statement that is rooted in fear.  
On another note, both Charles and Cynthia were refused restaurant service during 
the post-WWII era, yet they had differing interpretations as to whether the experience 
qualified as racial discrimination. Charles—a forme internee who did not perceive that 
internment impacted him given his young age—knew why he and his military friends 
were refused restaurant service: Charles was “the only Japanese” in a whites-only bar. 
Consequently, Charles “felt bad about being Japanese” because he was refused service 
not merely because of his race, but also “because it kind of affected the other guys [as] 
they couldn’t get service either,” which seems to coin ide with a personal-relational-
communal identity gap. While it is understandable for Charles to have felt an additional 
layer of shame because his friends were also refused service, he appeared to be more 
concerned about how others were affected as opposed to why his race engendered 
discrimination, which works to depoliticize the situa ion. It follows that Charles may 
have negotiated his experiences of discrimination by attenuating the role of his race—and 
therefore, his communal identity as ethnically Japanese—from the situation to instead 
focus more on the personal-relational dynamic.   
On the other hand, Cynthia—who is more interested in Japanese cultural artifacts 
despite her family’s conscious decision to evacuate the West Coast so as not to be 
interned—seemed to entirely dismiss overtones of racial discrimination when she was 






she did not categorize the experience as “discriminatio ,” but rather as an unintentional 
mistake (e.g., “They never said we don’t want to help you or anything. They just ignored 
us”). Accordingly, Cynthia did not perceive that this experience affected her as she was 
unsure if she was “ignored” because the restaurant w s too busy, if that was the way 
people were, if it was because she was “Japanese,” or for some other reason. Cynthia’s 
interpretation, however, corresponds with the hegemonic ideology of white U.S. 
American culture in eliminating race as a determining factor in the situation, and instead 
focuses on more “convenient” interpretations (i.e., the restaurant workers “accidently” 
forgot about her because they were too busy). Neverthel ss, Cynthia could have 
downplayed this situation due to the relational dynamic of being interviewed with her 
friend, Evelyn, who claimed earlier in the interview that she had “no preconceptions of 
discrimination” and who also chooses to prioritize Japanese cultural artifacts rather than 
being overly political. Hence, Cynthia could have side tepped a more critical 
interpretation of her experience as a means to maintain relational harmony and/or 
minimize possible relational conflict. Regardless of the reason for Cynthia’s 
interpretation, it is clear that she wanted to make it nown to me that she did not perceive 
this experience impacted her.  
In summary, these narratives demonstrate that participants have experienced some 
degree of historical racism and discrimination. Again, participants related to their 
experiences in different ways in which some (i.e., James, Jerry, Angela) have been more 






Research Question 3: How did Japanese Americans relate to the 3/11 disasters in Japan 
and to others who were affected by it? 
On March 11, 2011, an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident devastated the 
Tohoku region of Japan (i.e., the northeastern coast).15 In order to answer the above 
research question, participants were asked to comment on the following during each of 
their interviews: how did you learn about the 3/11 disasters, what were your reactions to 
it, did you know anyone in the region, how much did you follow the news media for 
updates, did you participate in any fundraising or volunteer campaigns, have the disasters 
changed your self-perceptions, and other related qustions. All participants remembered 
learning about and/or watching the 3/11 disasters unfold (via news media, social media, 
social networks, etc.) as they recounted their shock of its magnitude, and could mention 
some basic facts of what happened—most notably, from the first couple of months.  
Common reactions to 3/11 included feelings of sorrow and helplessness, 
evaluations of its unprecedented nature as a triple disaster, concern and/or curiosity about 
their (distant) relatives living in Japan, and admiration for Japanese culture for no 
apparent cases of looting or rioting reported in the news media. While many participants 
were suspicious of the radioactive contamination frm the Fukushima nuclear power 
plant, the majority was not overly critical of the Japanese government and TEPCO’s 
handling of the disasters. However, some participants expressed their skepticism: “My 
                                                           
15     The aftermath of 3/11 left an approximate combined total of 28,000 people dead, missing, and injured, between 
150,000 to 330,000 (or more) people displaced from their homes, thousands of buildings and infrastructure destroyed 
or damaged, a contaminated area around the Fukushima nuclear power plant, and an uncertain (albeit, controversial) 
future for nuclear power in Japan (Hasegawa, 2012; Herod, 2011; Hommerich, 2012; Ishii, 2012; Matanle, 2011; 







mind kept going back to safe levels of plutonium [laughs], which okay what exactly is 
that?!” (Kathryn), “There are people that have to be in suicide battalions going into the 
area [the Fukushima nuclear power plant] to work like 15 seconds at a time” (Michelle), 
and “Politicians are saying that everything is safe. You just wonder about that. Is it 
publicity or is it really true? You know that the ground is contaminated for life” (Evelyn). 
As a journalist who wrote about and followed the 3/11 disasters relatively more 
than most participants, James offered a possible explanation (albeit, somewhat 
speculative) for ways that Japanese Americans might have connected to 3/11 in its 
immediate aftermath. However, a caveat warning against n over-generalization must not 
be taken lightly as this study has only considered th  personal experiences of 10 Japanese 
Americans, which is clearly not meant to be a representative sample. Nevertheless, 
James’ interpretation is detailed below: 
I think it can be safe to say that Japanese Americans felt…as an entire community 
…a connection that they hadn’t felt before to Japan. Because...the scope of the 
tragedy was so huge, it made them think about [it] even if they didn’t know 
anything about their family, their distant family… [Or] it made them think, “Oh, I 
wonder if I have any family in that part of Japan,”…because all of a sudden we 
were connected to this 20,000 people who were affected by this horrible tragedy. 
Given that “the scope of the tragedy was so huge,” James postulated that Japanese 
Americans thought and/or wondered about Japan, the 3/11 disasters, or possible family 
members of theirs and their approximate distance from the affected region. Alternatively, 






connected to Japan or might not regularly think about their (distant) family in Japan, the 
3/11 disasters sparked or rekindled some contemplation bout their family’s heritage 
(relational identity), and subsequently triggered thoughts about their ethnic identities as 
Japanese (communal identity). While James’ assertion al ne seems to be somewhat 
intuitive yet unsubstantiated, several participants did in fact express curiosity and/or 
concern towards their extended family in Japan. For instance, Angela—who was able to 
connect with her father through the Japanese martial , aikido—asked her father if she 
had any family in the affected parts of Japan, thereby indicating her own uncertainty in 
knowing. Michelle—who was deeply traumatized by herexperience of internment—
discussed how her father (also Kathryn’s grandfather) was from the Tohoku region, and 
that both Michelle and Kathryn have an interest in visiting the region. Sophia,—who was 
born in Japan and has extended family who still live in Japan—was initially scared 
because “it was just nerve wracking knowing that we have some family…in Tokyo.”  
However, upon learning that participants’ relatives lived relatively far from the 
affected Tohoku region—i.e., the closest region with familial relations was Tokyo 
(approximately 150-200+ miles away) whereas most were concentrated on the 
southwestern coast of Japan near Hiroshima (several hundreds of miles away)—their 
feelings of concern consequently dissipated given that their families were safe.16 It seems 
that participants were primarily interested in gathering information about the 3/11 
                                                           
16      But it is worth mentioning that the first wave of Japanese immigrants to the U.S. were primarily from Southern 
Japan as they were in search of work because of a severe drought that jeopardized the agricultural livelihoods of many 
(Asakawa, 2004). Thus, it is not too surprising that e Japanese who have settled in the U.S. are morcommonly from 







disasters as it related to their families and relation l identities. That is not to suggest, 
however, that participants did not connect to their ethnic and cultural identities as 
Japanese in response to the 3/11 disasters (more on this later). Rather, the overwhelming 
response that participants in this study had to 3/11 was that the lack of personal 
connections—that is, with people in the Tohoku region—influenced why they, more or 
less, did not feel a significant shift in their identity perceptions.  
A few participants (e.g., Kathryn, Evelyn, Cynthia, Angela) even noted that they 
were more active in relief efforts and/or felt a stronger connection to Hurricane Katrina 
because it was geographically closer to them as opposed to Japan. A few examples 
illustrate this: “I didn’t know anyone specifically out there” (Kent), “Not really having 
personal ties… I don’t think there’s a strong enough connection to Japan to have created 
any major shift in my own perception” (Kathryn), and “The prefecture that my family is 
from is a lot south of there … so I wasn’t worried. I id feel bad for those people, but…I 
don’t have a direct [contact]” (Evelyn). This findig is consistent with previous literature, 
which suggests that there is corresponding relationship between identity salience and the 
location of the disaster in predicting people’s like hood of intervening or volunteering in 
the aftermath of a natural disaster (Levine & Thompson, 2004). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that participants perceived, in a general sense, that the 3/11 disasters were not 
salient or pertinent enough for their identities given their lack of personal connections 
with people in the affected regions and their physical distance from Japan.  
In light of my previous findings, it is necessary to give due consideration to how 






order to understand why they did not have a stronger connection to 3/11. For instance, 
even though Kathryn expressed interest in visiting the Tohoku region in Japan, one must 
not forget that she has a conflicted sense of Japanese identity—most notably, because of 
internment. As it was previously discussed, Kathryn was raised in the post-internment 
generation without Japanese cultural traditions, she cannot speak Japanese, does not have 
many friendships with Japanese or Japanese Americans, and was not able to accept her 
Japaneseness until fairly recently. Certainly, thisdoes not negate Kathryn’s interest in 
going to Japan, but it provides more insight into her overall assessment about 3/11 in that 
she does not have a “strong enough connection to Japan [for 3/11] to have created any 
major shift[s] in [her identity] perception[s].”  
Nevertheless, nearly all participants were actively involved in fundraisers, 
concerts, and events hosted by Japanese American org izations (among others) in 
Denver as they assisted in volunteer booths, donated money, bought t-shirts, and/or 
spread the word about how people could offer aid to Japan. Thus, active involvement in 
Japan’s relief efforts seems to be a plausible indicator, at the very least, of some degree of 
concern for the people affected by disasters, some interest in Japan, and/or as a means to 
express their Japanese ethnic identities.  
In support of James’s assertion, Angela—who participates in the Japanese martial 
art aikido—noted that she had “some connection” to 3/11 as she followed a number of 
blogs and news media coverage in its aftermath: “You s rt of go, ‘Oh, that’s Japan.’ I 
mean I sort of related to that even though my family wasn’t there.” In a similar vein, 






efforts as she stated that she identified with the Japanese. However, Kathryn eventually 
decided that it was “probably not such a good idea,” which is a likely reference to the 
possible exposure of radioactivity present in various areas of Japan following the 
aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident. But again, Kathryn’s decision 
not to help with the relief efforts in Japan could have also been informed by her 
discomfort in identifying as or interacting with other Japanese. Also consistent with 
previous literature, this finding confirms the notion that people may favor the idea of 
volunteering to help with relief efforts after a natural disaster because the disaster or its 
location is relevant to their identity to some degree even though their thoughts may not 
translate into action (Levine & Thompson, 2004).  
Therefore, although participants may not have had any personal connections or 
strong shifts in their identity perceptions, as Japanese Americans, they felt some 




CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION 
Accused of being “enemy combatants,” nearly 120,000 Japanese Americans were 
systematically rounded-up by the U.S. government and were “relocated” to internment 
camps for over three and a half years during WWII (Hayashi, 2004; Kashima, 2003; 
Miksch & Ghere, 2004; Robinson, 2001). Insofar as the lives of Japanese Americans 
were disrupted, altered, and/or ruptured by internme t, this experience has left a lasting 
imprint on generations of Japanese Americans—both for former internees and non-
internees, directly and indirectly (Asakawa, 2004). Indeed, internment is often 
conceptualized as a collective, historical memory among Japanese Americans that has 
impacted their lives in markedly different ways (Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Kuramitsu, 
1995).  
Previous literature on Japanese Americans has extensively analyzed internment 
from numerous angles, including (but not limited to): he importance of the experience, 
the varying impacts it had on certain generations and demographics, the historical and 
political context leading up to internment, the loyalt  questionnaires, conditions in camp, 
daily activities of internees, Supreme Court cases, the redress movement, and so on 
(Asakawa, 2004; Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Hayashi, 2004; Kuramitsu, 1995; Mizuno, 






This study, however, sought to understand how Japanese Americans have 
conceptualized their identities by examining how their experiences have been shaped by 
the broader, historical contexts of internment, racism, and discrimination. In addition, this 
study also explored how Japanese Americans have interpre ed the 3/11 disasters in Japan 
so as to understand how they connect to the Japanese side of their identity as they are 
generations removed. Hence, this discussion will exp ore the various ways that Japanese 
Americans perceived their identities, the numerous ways they were impacted by the 
historical contexts of internment, racism, and discrimination, as well as how they 
interpreted the 3/11 disasters. Lastly, I will discu s the theoretical implications and 
present my critique of CTI’s communal frame. 
Japanese Americans’ Identity Perceptions 
In order to understand how Japanese Americans in this study (both for internees 
and non-internees) have constructed, enacted, and related to their identities in different 
ways, this research utilized the CTI framework. The CTI framework was chosen because 
it broadly explores multiple dimensions of identity as it relates to individuals, 
relationships, communities, and is enacted through communication (Hecht, 1993; Hecht 
et al., 2003; Martin & Nakayama, 2010).  
While the former internees in this study were both young children at the time of 
their imprisonment, their relation to this experienc  could not be more different. For 
instance, Michelle viewed internment to be the “most defining” part of her life whereas 
Charles hardly perceived that camp influenced his identity perceptions given his young 






amount of traumatic memories that Michelle had about camp compared with Charles, but 
also because of Michelle’s unique fusion of the political into her personal identity, her 
desire to establish many relationships with her family and friends around the subject of 
internment (relational identity), and through her political activism in the local Japanese 
American community (communal identity). Hence, Michelle’s experience of internment 
continues to permeate through several facets of her identity. Somewhat antithetical to 
Michelle, Charles is not overly political and he has not altered his self-concept (personal 
identity) or general opinions about internment in the ways that Michelle has despite the 
pilgrimages he has taken to former internment camps and learning more about camp in 
recent years. In effect, these findings suggest that identity construction influences how 
former internees may perceive their past experiences of camp as well as the degree of 
salience it has (or does not have) for their sense of lf. These findings are consistent with 
previous literature in that while some Japanese Americans may have been interned, they 
have not been equally affected by internment in part because of demographics (e.g., age, 
generation, gender, occupational and educational status, life experiences), the collective 
role of shame, and other such factors (Fugita & Fernandez, 2004).  
Similarly, this study has also suggested that non-iternees do not necessarily base 
their communal involvement with the Japanese American community around the 
experience of internment simply because they are members of this group. Although some 
non-internees (e.g., James, Sophia, Kent, Jerry) are active in the local community as a 
means to educate the public and other Japanese Americans about internment, others (e.g., 






Japanese cultural traditions, participate in martial arts and other activities, as well as 
interact with other Japanese Americans and/or Asian Americans. It is therefore 
problematic to assume that Japanese Americans relate to the experience of internment on 
the basis of their common ethnicity or “shared” history as their personal experiences, 
self-concepts, relational connections, and communal identifications are also factors that 
inform how individuals might relate to their identities.  
That is not to suggest, however, that participants were not impacted by the 
historical context of internment. In order to provide a commentary about why participants 
might have expressed their identities in the ways they did, I employed the critical 
perspective to establish relationships between their narratives and the broader, historical 
context of internment.   
Impact of the Historical Contexts of Internment, Racism, and Discrimination 
Given that several participants (e.g., Charles, James, Angela, Kent, Evelyn, 
Cynthia) did not know many details about their family’s experiences in camp because 
their parents and other family members rarely or never discussed it with them, this 
finding is consistent with previous literature in tha  collective shame seemed to have 
played a key role in how Japanese Americans have com  t  learn (or not learn much) 
about internment (Nagata & Cheng, 2003; Shimabukuro, 2011; Takezawa, 1991). The 
exception was Michelle as she repeatedly talked about internment with her daughter, 
Kathryn, because of her traumatic memories and politicization of the experience. 
However, these discussions did not prompt Kathryn to become interested in internment 






Kathryn noted that she avoided nearly anything that was “remotely related to being 
Japanese” and admitting to being Japanese. While Kathryn indicated that growing up 
without many Japanese cultural traditions played a role in why this might have been the 
case, the primary culprit for her denial and avoidance of being Japanese should be 
attributed to the U.S. government for instilling collective shame in Japanese Americans 
for their racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds.  
Nevertheless, it is significant that the majority of participants in this study (i.e., 
Kathryn, Kent, James, Angela, Jerry, Sophia) have confronted internment at different life 
stages despite a lack of direct experiences, littleknowledge about their family’s history in 
camp, and their varying interest levels in the experience. In effect, these participants 
addressed internment in one or more of the following ways: As a means to determine 
who they are, accept their sense of self, express their sense of self to others, learn more 
about their family members, connect with others in the local Japanese American 
community, and to educate the general public about internment.  
For instance, even though James wrote about his experi nces of difference and 
discrimination in community newspapers as a journalist, he did not truly begin inquiring 
about the details of his father’s life vis-à-vis WWII until his father was diagnosed with 
cancer. Granted, James’ father did not willingly tak about his life with James either. It is 
possible that James’ father may have felt ashamed to discuss WWII with James as he 
may have been forced to grapple with his supposed racial and cultural inferiority as a 
Japanese American. Notwithstanding, James began to con emplate his Japanese 






which then led him on a journey to learn about his family’s history, establish 
relationships with other Japanese Americans (largely b cause of his wife), and to become 
what he referred to himself as “the voice” about inter ment and Japanese American 
culture.  
Another, albeit different, example of how participants have confronted internment 
relates to Jerry’s fight to preserve the former inter ment camp, Amache. Despite his 
professional success and acceptance in dominant U.S. culture, Jerry’s actions attest to the 
notion that internment is important to his sense of self as well as to the greater Japanese 
American community. Likewise, Jerry’s leadership in preserving Amache demonstrates 
that the general public should also remember the horrific experience of internment so as 
to never imprison another racial or cultural group again.   
While James and Jerry express their identities in different ways, both individuals 
contend that internment is immensely significant for the Japanese American community. 
Therefore, my findings suggest that internment is not merely a “historical memory” nor is 
it an experience that has only affected former interne s. Rather, internment still affects, 
shapes, and informs how Japanese Americans make sens of their identities, which is a 
testament to the compounding effects the experience has had on the generations.  
Be that as it may, some Japanese Americans in this study (i.e., Charles, Evelyn, 
and Cynthia) maintained that they were seemingly “unaffected” by internment as it holds 
little relevance for their daily lives and identities. For instance, Evelyn repeatedly claimed 
that internment is “ancient history” to her as she is more intrigued by the richness of 






and has been “impacted by” internment that I have argued for throughout this study. It is 
clear that Evelyn did perceive that internment impacted her sense of identity, but one 
must not overlook her conscious decision to distance herself from internment, which is 
indeed a bold, political stance. Essentially, Evelyn is suggesting that internment is not (or 
perhaps, should not be) as central to the Japanese American community as opposed to the 
cultural traditions, the food, language, and cultural values. In doing so, Evelyn minimizes 
the injustice and long term effects of internment, which works to metaphorically erase 
memories of internment and releases accountability from the U.S. government.  
Accordingly, Evelyn’s dissociation from internment is contrasted with Jerry’s 
actions in preserving a former internment camp so that people can continually remember 
what happened. It was Jerry’s “right approach” in preserving Amache and his “correct 
attitude” about internment—which is to say, he did not have animosity, bitterness, or 
indifference toward the experience—that has lead the Denver Japanese American 
community to uphold him as the “perfect example.” Likewise, it can be inferred that the 
local Japanese American would not benefit from Evelyn’s declaration that internment is 
merely “ancient history,” lest Jerry’s efforts become in vain.  
However, another interpretation to Evelyn’s dissociation from internment could 
be a strategy for survival. While Evelyn was not personally interned, it is possible that 
she was socialized into an environment of survival in which many Japanese Americans 
avoided talking about internment because it was too painful. For many Japanese 
Americans, the cultural values of gaman (Japanese for “patiently endure”) and 






discuss internment with their children, painting, drawing, sculpting, and doing other such 
activities helped some of them cope with the psychological trauma suffered from 
internment (Kuramitsu, 1995; Nagata & Chen, 2003; Shimabukuro, 2011). As such, other 
Japanese Americans distanced themselves from and/or completely turned their backs on 
their “Japaneseness,” and chose to instead perceive themselves as any other American 
(Asakawa, 2004; Harada, 1998; Hayashi, 2004; Takezawa, 1991; Uchida, 1982). Whether 
these participants have distanced themselves from internment due to their personal, 
ideological, and political preferences, as a strategy for survival, or perhaps as a form of 
collective resistance, it is clear that internment has impacted Japanese Americans even if 
they do not claim to relate to the experience.  
Similar to the notion that people construct and relate to their identities in different 
ways, CTI’s theoretical concept of identity gaps was useful to explore the dissonance that 
one negotiates among constituent parts of their identiti s when socially interacting with 
others (Drummond & Orbe, 2009; Jung & Hecht, 2004; Maeda & Hecht, 2012; Urban & 
Orbe, 2012; Wadsworth et al., 2008). In interpreting he identity gaps that participants 
encountered, it useful to come back to the concepts of a cribed and avowed identities. 
Identity ascription refers to the characteristics, assumptions, and possibly stereotypes that 
other people assign to members of a collective (Chen & Collier, 2012; Hecht et al., 2003; 
Moss & Faux, 2006). Several Japanese Americans in this s udy have encountered 
bewilderment, tension, and conflict when others have scribed to them an identity that 
they personally did not relate to—such as assuming they speak Japanese, that they are 






about it. It can be logically concluded that many of these identity ascriptions were the 
result of others’ racial categorizations and assumptions. However, members of the 
Japanese American community may also assign (or avow) similar cultural values of 
speaking Japanese, visiting Japan, and relating to the experience of internment to 
individual members. Likewise, identity ascription ad avowal can sometimes be 
problematic as they can contribute to discrepancies w thin one’s identity. Furthermore, 
these processes can exacerbate Japanese Americans’ difference from the dominant U.S. 
American culture in addition to distinguishing them from the mainstream Japanese 
American community who insists upon attaining these cultural values. These findings, 
however, are not new within intercultural communication or in CTI research (Drummond 
& Orbe, 2009; Halualani, 2000; Urban & Orbe, 2010; Witteborn, 2004; Yep, 2002).  
Although the concept of identity ascription can explain these identity gaps to 
some degree, the historical context has greatly impacted the extent to which generations 
of Japanese Americans might, in particular, speak Japanese. In light of the U.S. 
government’s demonization of all racially Japanese individuals during WWII, Japanese 
Americans are members of this supposed “enemy race.” As such, their cultural traditions 
were regarded as “threatening” to white, U.S. American culture. Considering the 
psychological trauma, racism, discrimination, and colle tive shame that Japanese 
Americans felt because of internment and for simply being ethnically Japanese, it makes 
sense that Japanese Americans might not want to speak Japanese or teach it to their 
children as some (e.g., Angela) even fear the possibility of internment happening again. 






identity gaps of not being able to speak Japanese fluently and/or proficiently, as well as 
not wanting to speak the language due to their personal preferences or due to a lack of 
relational connections with other Japanese Americans. Indeed, my findings suggest that 
no matter how distant Japanese Americans may feel from the historical context of 
internment, the experience continues to shape their sense of identity.  
Unfortunately, Japanese Americans in this study have also been the victims of 
historical racism and discrimination—most notably, due to their ascribed identity as an 
“inferior race,” as well as their presumed connections with Pearl Harbor because they 
resemble the “enemy.” While some Japanese Americans may not always think about their 
race when interacting with others (as was the case with Kathryn), Japanese Americans 
seem to have an inescapable minority identity in which other people have ascribed them 
to be Japanese because of their racial appearance. Likewise, many participants have been 
called “Japs,” have been told to “go home” and to “remember Pearl Harbor,” and have 
been denied restaurant service because of their rac. These slurs, comments, and actions 
are profoundly racist, but my findings necessitate a deeper examination of Japanese 
Americans’ bicultural identities in order to understand how such comments can 
continually “Other” Japanese Americans and pose numerous identity struggles for them 
to juggle.  
In particular, critical-cultural hybridity is relevant for understanding how 
bicultural and multicultural individuals often straddle several cultures as they “operate 
within contrasts trying to hold these differences together” (Moreman, 2005, p. 74). 






identifications and pride that participants had in identifying as both Japanese and 
Americans, but the concept was also useful in explicating their struggle to find a true 
sense of belonging with either culture. For instance, both James and Sophia contended 
that they are “too American to be Japanese, yet are too Japanese to be American.” 
Although Japanese Americans may not all attest to the same struggles that these 
participants have encountered, my findings suggest that it is worth considering how 
Japanese Americans’ bicultural identities have posed numerous challenges for them to 
attain a sense of belongingness and acceptance in th face of being “Othered” and 
discriminated against. 
The next portion discusses how Japanese Americans in the Denver community 
have interpreted the 3/11 disasters. 
Interpretations of the 3/11 Disasters 
Despite participants’ initial concern about the 3/11 disasters, no one had family 
who lived in the affected regions where the disasters struck. My findings suggest that a 
lack of personal connections to 3/11 explains why participants did not, more or less, 
continue to follow-up with news media coverage about the disasters (with the exceptions 
of James and Michelle). Consequently, this suggests tha  they did not feel strongly 
connected to the 3/11 disasters nor did it greatly impact their identity perceptions. 
Nevertheless, many wondered about where their ancestors were from in relation to where 
the disasters were located, which somewhat substantiates James’ conjecture in that 
Japanese Americans were tenuously “connected to this 20,000 people who were affected 






my findings suggest that the 3/11 disasters at leasprompted them to contemplate where 
their ancestors were from.  
Furthermore, all participants noted that they were active in fundraising efforts for 
3/11. While it is not clear if participants joined the fundraising efforts because the 
disasters affected Japan, if it was because they are civically minded people, if they felt 
some sense of obligation to participate given their membership within the Japanese 
American and/or Asian American communities, or for other such reasons, this finding 
demonstrates that participants did in fact feel somewhat connected to the 3/11 disasters.  
One explanation for Japanese Americans’ slight connection to 3/11 can be 
explained by the ways in which they related to their communal identities as Japanese and 
Japanese Americans. Notably, the majority of participants contended that they cannot 
speak Japanese, do not have the desire to put forth the effort to learn the language, and 
that they have no one to speak Japanese with. As my findings have already indicated, 
many participants encountered identity gaps when other people have assumed that they 
can speak Japanese simply because they look Japanese. In turn, this may lead to a 
fractured sense of Japanese identity when they are reminded of this and it is possible that 
they could perceive themselves to be “inauthentic Japanese” for not knowing how to 
speak the language. Needless to say, speaking and le rning the language of one’s ethnic 
and cultural heritage is one way that members of a community express their identities. 
Even though some participants (e.g., Kathryn) expressed a desire to volunteer in Japan 
after the 3/11 disasters, Kathryn’s inability to speak Japanese somewhat inhibited 






cases, this rupture in not speaking Japanese may be relat d to internment because of the 
profound effect it had on generations of Japanese Am ricans. Consequently, it would be 
worth investigating the extent to which Japanese Americans were taught Japanese by 
their parents and what kind of effect related to identity that might have created within 
families.  
At the same time, another reason for participants’ tenuous connection to 3/11 may 
be the result of whom I interviewed. Without a larger sample or comparative data, it is 
difficult to definitively suggest why they did not have a stronger connection to the 3/11
disasters or to Japan.   
As previously mentioned, my initial interest in purs ing the topic of 3/11 arose 
from the concern I felt for my friends in Japan, which then became the entry point that 
allowed me to start a conversation with Japanese Amricans. While my findings were not 
as strong as what I expected, there was a connectio that I could not dismiss. Initially, I 
expected that participants would have been more critical of the Fukushima nuclear power 
accident because of the historical context during WWII when the U.S. dropped atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, most participants did not see a strong 
relationship between these events as they repeatedly tol  me that these events happened 
on completely different scales (i.e., one was to end a war, the other was a natural-human 
made disaster) and were not fitting to compare. In ffect, many participants were not that 
critical (though a few were, e.g., Michelle and Kathryn) of the Japanese government’s 
handling of the 3/11 disasters with the exception of a few statements (e.g., Evelyn: 






contaminated for life”). But then again, some participants were not that critical of 
internment either. It could be the case that participants side-stepped a critical 
interpretation to 3/11 as any other American would. This essentially works to reinforce 
power relations as people can place too much confidence in their government’s ability to 
act in the “best” interests of civilians.  
Theoretical Implications 
Certainly, the openness of the CTI framework is beneficial as it allows for 
narratives about culture and identity to creatively emerge; however, its vagueness raises 
more questions than it answers. In particular, I am arguing that CTI’s communal frame 
should be further developed as it currently defines collective identity to be “something 
[that is] held by a group of people” (Hecht, 1993, p. 80). One flaw of the communal 
frame is that it is conceptualized as a unified whole in which a given community is said 
to be bonded by some collective memory, shares visions together, transcends individuals, 
and is a group-based identification (Drummond & Orbe, 2009; Faulker & Hecht, 2011; 
Hecht, 1993; Hecht et al., 2005, 2002, 1993; Jung & Hecht, 2004; Maeda & Hecht, 2012; 
Urban & Orbe, 2010).  
It may be that groups form an identity of their own as certain beliefs and values 
are held by (or are imposed upon) the collective. However, what is problematic about the 
communal frame is that collective identity is assumed to be shared among its members as 
the community “define[s] a repertoire of identities that are jointly held/remembered and 
taught to new members” (Hecht, 1993, p. 80). My findings, however, suggest that 






memory of internment nor do they perceive the experience in the same way as what the 
communal frame posits. It is worth noting that the Japanese American community is 
unique because the experience of internment has creted so many reverberations 
throughout the community, which has, in turn, led many to relate to their ethnic and 
cultural identities in varying ways. Nevertheless, it cannot be assumed that members of 
any collective will be bonded to the same memory, cultural values, and political beliefs, 
etc. as this denies heterogeneity within the group. Even though Hecht et al. (1993, 2003) 
claimed that cultural groups are complex and heterogeneous, the communal frame 
articulated in the theory centers around the idea that the group shares some memory or 
bond together, which mimics traditional conceptualizations of culture. To be fair, Hecht 
et al. (2002) made a disclaimer in their work to suggest that when collective images “are 
assumed to be characteristics of individual group members and are applied to them in 
fixed or rigid ways, they are stereotypes” (p. 853).  
However, some scholars (Jung & Hecht, 2004; Kam & Hecht, 2009; Kim & 
Hecht, 2009; Wadsworth et al., 2008) have even excluded analyzing the communal frame 
in their research because it is taken to be a macro level of analysis, thus implying the 
“consensus” of a collective whereas other scholars (Hecht et al., 2002; Urban & Orbe, 
2010; Witteborn, 2004) have included it in their studies. Questions then arise as to who 
determines the collective beliefs, values, and histories held by a given group? Is it not the 
mainstream group? How can the communal frame account f r contested meaning within 
a given collective for individuals who do not conform to the normative values or beliefs 






refused to conform to mainstream, Japanese American norms. However, CTI’s 
communal frame does not comment on what happens when conflict arises among and/or 
between one’s collective identities other than suggesting that an identity gap emerges.  
Indeed, I invoked identity gaps to account for the dissonance that participants 
have felt through identity ascriptions and being “Othered,” which the concept of critical-
cultural hybridity can also address. However, the concept of critical-cultural hybridity is 
more explicit in elaborating how tension arises among ne’s collective identities—i.e., 
race, ethnicity, nationality, culture, etc. Accordingly, such individuals can also be 
rendered into “third spaces”—i.e., in-between spaces—in which they may have a 
“neither/nor” type of identification and may feel marginalized, even within their own 
cultural communities. I do not dispute the notion that both theories are useful in 
elaborating the tensions and discrepancies that individuals must negotiate. However, the 
communal frame alone does not adequately address contention that is present within a 
given cultural group. 
Nevertheless, Kam and Hecht’s (2009) contribution to the study of identity gaps 
has suggested that dissonance can also occur within one particular identity frame (e.g., 
communal), which could potentially address the issue I am raising. However, I am 
arguing for a revision at the base of the communal frame to incorporate a critical 
perspective in the conceptualization of communal identity. That is to say, the communal 
frame should be re-conceptualized so as to pertain to a group of individuals who may 
share some commonality together, but is also contested. My proposed revision to the 






my dualistic interpretive and critical study, yet it is also consistent with my findings that 
suggests Japanese Americans do not all relate to or share the historical memory of 
internment together.  
Conclusion 
As this study sought to explore Japanese American cultural identity, my findings 
necessitate a continued consideration of how internm nt has profoundly shaped the 
cultural identities of generations of Japanese Americans as they are situated within this 
complex history. One example of this concerns languge. Due to the fact that many 
participants cannot speak Japanese, yet they are expect d to know it, many have 
encountered identity gaps. This is suggestive of a fractured sense of Japanese identity 
given that it was a common theme in several of my participants’ narratives, but the 
rupture in language is more fully understood when it is considered in the context of 
internment. During and after internment, many Japanese Americans decided to stop 
speaking Japanese, did not teach it to their children, and/or did not learn it themselves, in 
part, because of the collective shame that the U.S. government instilled in them for being 
ethnically Japanese (Asakawa, 2004; Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Kuramitsu, 1995; 
Murray, 2000; Takezawa, 1991). In effect, further research can continue to explore the 
impact that internment had on Japanese Americans’ cultural identities—such as not 
learning Japanese or practicing other Japanese cultural traditions, as well as presenting 
oneself like any other American, and the like. In particular, it would be worth exploring 






might provide more of a context to analyze the effects that internment had on Japanese 
Americans.  
As my findings have indicated, Japanese Americans hve been impacted by the 
historical context of internment even if they do not claim to relate to the experience. In 
turn, this illustrates the critical importance of U.S. school curricula including in depth 
material on Japanese American history. Unfortunately, a ot of U.S. school curricula is 
dominated by master narratives about internment that essentially serve the interests of the 
dominant white, U.S. American culture. In doing so, the “need” to intern thousands of 
Japanese Americans was supposedly “justified” given th  worldwide context of 
warfare—most notably, because of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. As such, ethnically 
Japanese individuals were accused of being “threats” to U.S. national security as they 
were supposedly “enemy combatants.” It then became common sense for the U.S. to 
declare war on Japan and to mass intern Japanese Americans under the guise of 
“protection.” However, this rationale not only undermines the injustice of internment and 
the cross-generational effects it had on Japanese Americans, but it also maintains the 
power and hegemony of white, U.S. American culture.  
Indeed, racial prejudice against Japanese Americans w s one of the main reasons 
why the U.S. government interned Japanese Americans as the times were marked with 
anti-Japanese and anti-Asian sentiments. Likewise, several participants in this study 
recalled that they have been racially discriminated against and “Othered” because of their 
race and due to their presumed connections with Pearl Harbor. This suggests that we 






discrimination against Japanese Americans—as well as for other racial and ethnic 
groups—as our actions can exacerbate their “differences” and may contribute to identity 
struggles for them. One should give due consideration to the notion that Japanese 
Americans—including former internees and non-interne s—may experience everyday 
racism as more traumatic because it can trigger their collective memory of internment, 
invoke collective shame for being ethnically Japanese, and it may bring up (or intensify) 
fears that internment could happen again (e.g., Angela: “You [don’t] know if they [will] 
put you in a camp again”). Accordingly, future research could conduct a comparative 
study between Japanese Americans and their experienc  of internment with Jewish 
Americans and the Holocaust in order to explore the impact that everyday racism might 
have on groups of people who have traumatic and/or opp essive historical experiences.  
Limitations.  
Using a qualitative design, the sample size of Japanese Americans used in this 
study was small in order to explore their identity conceptions in depth. It was not the 
intent of this research to generalize the findings to the Japanese American community 
writ large or to assume that all Japanese Americans relate to their identities in the same 
way. Likewise, other Japanese Americans may express th ir identities in completely 
different ways than those who participated in this study. Hence, a larger sample of 
participants may be beneficial so as to examine a wider breadth of data. The location of 
this study in the Denver metropolitan area may have also impacted the data in that the 
Japanese American community is relatively smaller and more dispersed in Denver than in 






feel as connected to other Japanese Americans or the local community compared with 
Japanese Americans who live on the West Coast. Also, the subject population mainly 
consisted of middle-aged and elderly third generation Japanese Americans, but included 
one young adult and a couple of fourth generation Japanese Americans.  
 Another limitation in this study is related to the research method. Data was 
collected over the course of two months through face-to-face interviews ranging from one 
to three hours per participant. While this approach was useful to explore in-depth 
narratives about participants’ lives, data was collected over a fairly short period of time 
(Cruickshank, 2012; Rakow, 2011). Hence, there is only a limited amount of information 
that a person can or is willing to reveal about oneself during this time period and it would 
be an oversimplification to assume that one interview could expand on all the intricacies 
that have informed one’s sense of identity. Data colle ted over longer time periods might 
reveal different findings as the interviewer and interviewees might be able to establish 
more rapport and develop closer relationships (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). That is to say, 
more identity frames might emerge as participants are interviewed over a longer time 
period.  
 In light of research on identity that suggests that identity is contextual, it is also 
necessary to keep in mind that people express their sense of self depending on the nature 
of the situation, their role, their relationships, the dynamics of who they are interacting 






As the interviewer and researcher, I did not have prior relationships with participants 
before this study. As such, participants may not have disclosed intimate details about 
their lives because of our limited relationship.  
 Be that as it may, it is likely that my participants also had expectations for what 
they thought I, as a researcher, wanted to know about them. Here, it is worth noting that 
the method of conducting research interviews may be a form of enacted identity because 
participants could have been narrating stories about themselves in relation to what they 
assumed I want to know or what they wanted me to know about them, which may (or 
may not be) how they personally think of themselves and their experiences. Furthermore, 
my role as the researcher—a white, female graduate student—could have influenced how 
participants, as Japanese Americans, interacted with me. The stories they narrated could 
have been impacted by the power dynamics of my whiteness as I am a member of the 
dominant group in U.S. American culture.  
 Lastly, the research objectives for this study impacted the kind of data that was 
obtained. Through a semi-structured interview format, I directed participants to think 
about themselves in relation to their ethnic and cultural identities, internment, WWII, 
racial discrimination, and the 3/11 disasters even though they may not regularly think 
about these topics in their day-to-day lives (Cruickshank, 2012; Rakow, 2011). 
Participants’ narratives were also impacted by the act of the interview itself as well as the 
interviewer-interviewee dynamic as I interacted with them, listened to their stories, asked 
follow-up questions, commented, made gestures, and so on (Cruickshank, 2012; De Fina 






Suggestions for Further Research. 
 While very thorough, this study raised a number of issues and questions for future 
research. In order to address one of the limitations n this study related to the size of the 
Japanese American population in Denver, future research could conduct a comparative 
study between the community in Denver and one on the West Coast in order to explore 
how Japanese Americans in different communities contruct their identities. Additionally, 
future studies could be more systematic in choosing participants from a more diverse 
range of generations, ages, and socioeconomic classes.  
The findings in this study suggested that while Japanese Americans related to 
their identities in different ways, internment has impacted their lives in some way, and 
perhaps more than some may admit or realize. Thus, future research could extend the 
analysis of how Japanese American identities have been shaped by internment, but could 
analyze specific historical events and/or documents in greater detail. For instance, future 
research could examine the decision-making process and implications of signing (or not 
signing) the loyalty oath questionnaires within thefamily unit, if and how it later 
impacted what parents taught to their children about what it means to be Japanese 
American, and how (or to what extent) the questionnaires might have contributed to the 
general lack of discussion afterwards about internmt among Japanese Americans. 
Could the loyalty oath questionnaires provide insight nto an evolving sense of Japanese 
American cultural identity?   
Although my study did not reveal significant findings for how some Japanese 






suggestion would be to explore why exactly participants got involved in fundraising 
efforts for 3/11. Did Japanese Americans get involved with 3/11 fundraising efforts 
because they felt connected to Japan, because they felt that it related to their Asian 
American identity, or perhaps because they were civically minded people who joined in 
with others? It is possible that the above question cannot be adequately addressed 
without expanding the length of data collection.  
Rather than examining the relation between Japanese American cultural identity 
and the 3/11 disasters in Japan (or natural disaster literature in general), future research 
could alternatively pursue a comparative study of the impact on certain groups of people 
of being aggressively oppressed by those in power. For instance, one could analyze 
Japanese Americans’ experience of internment in comparison to Jewish Americans and 
the Holocaust. While one may argue that the Holocaust lead to more widespread death, 
devastation, and trauma than internment, it is worth exploring how collective memory of 
these events may lead a Jewish American or a Japanese American to interpret everyday 
racism at much deeper levels or perhaps as more traumatic in fear that the Holocaust or 
internment could happen again.  
In closing, I leave you with Kent’s words as he imparted his reasons for 
addressing internment in order to figure out who he was, which alternatively leads us in 
the same direction: “I think it’s [internment and WWII was] something that I need to 
know because that’s all part of what impacted myself whether I liked it or 
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Appendix 3: Map of Nuclear Power Plants in Japan 
 
 



























Appendix 6: Interview Guide Questions 
Note: Questions may be altered, changed, added, or eleted depending on the flow of the 
conversation.  
 
1. What is your name? 
2. Can you tell me a little bit about yourself? 
3. Where did you grow up? 
a. Tell me more about that. Who lived with you then? Did you/do you have any 
brothers/sisters, parents, grandparents, other relatives? What was the 
neighborhood like where you grew up? Were there othr Japanese and/or 
Japanese Americans living there? Any friendships with them?  
4. When was the first time you heard about the 3/11 disasters? Where were you? What 
was your reaction? What did you do in response (e.g., did you call someone right 
away- if yes, who did you call, did you get online for news, etc.)?  
5. How did you hear about the disasters (i.e., from new sources, (social) media, friends, 
family, social networks, etc.)? To what extent do you still follow the developments of 
the disasters? How often do you follow the disasters over time?  
6. Do you know someone (such as friends, family, acquaintances, etc.) who has been 
affected by the disasters? What was their reaction? How did this affect you? 
7. How did you relate to the Japanese American community in response to 3/11?  
a. Did you participate with other Japanese Americans to raise awareness/concern 
about 3/11? Were there a lot of Japanese Americans nvolved? 
b. Did you participate or advocate for fundraising or v lunteer campaigns for 
Japan following 3/11? 
8. How do you think the 3/11 disaster has changed ideas of yourself as a Japanese 
American? When did you first realize that your self-perception changed? 
9. What does it mean to you to be Japanese American?  
10. What do you think about the Japanese American community in Colorado?  
11. Tell me about a time when you felt proud to be Japanese American. Can you recall a 
time when you felt uncomfortable being Japanese American? 
12. Have you participated in Japanese and/or Japanese American organizations or 
activities? If so, how? 
a. Did you have any leadership roles? 
13. Tell me about a time when you participated in an event with other Japanese and/or 
Japanese American organizations? (e.g., organizing cultural events, membership in an 
organization, holidays, visiting Japan, making Japanese food) 
14. You said earlier that you felt pride in Japan when ____ (participants answer to 
question 10). Do you think that you saw the same kind of character/compassion/etc. 
in 3/11? Tell me about that. 
15. Now I’d like to talk about Japanese history in relation to the U.S. How important do 
you think internment during WWII was to the Japanese American community? 






Did you know anyone who was sent to an internment camp in the 1940s (e.g., 
any family members or friends)? Can you tell me about that?  
16. What can you recall about WWII (e.g., internment camps, atomic bombs)? How have 
your ideas about WWII changed over time?  
17. When 3/11 happened, do you think it made some Japanese Americans/or you (if 
willing to discuss) think about their/your WWII experiences? The Japanese 
government’s response? Peoples’ suffering without reason? 
18. Has Japan suffered other catastrophes besides 3/11? If yes, then what? How are these 
catastrophes similar or different from 3/11? 
19. As you can tell, what I’m really interested in is how what it means to be Japanese 
American might have changed over time and how those changes can be understood in 
relation to the experiences of disasters and in the way that people think about the role 
of the state in responding to disasters. It seems to be that you do/don’t see a great deal 
of difference between how you thought of yourself as J panese American in relation 
to WWII and now. Do you think you’ve changed in your views?  
a. What do you think your children’s sense of Japanese Am rican identity is 
like? 
20. Is there anything else you think I need to know to understand Japanese American 




















     
Michelle Fujimoto 3rd (Sansei) Early-70s Born in pre-internment era;  
Interned as a child at Manzanar 
Internment was traumatizing and profoundly impacted 
her, Politically active in community 
 
Charles Nishimura 3rd (Sansei) Mid-70s Born in pre-internment era;  
Interned as a child at Tule Lake and Amache 
 
Did not perceive that internment had much of an impact 
on him, He was “too young” 
Kathryn Fujimoto 4th (Yonsei) 50s Born in post-internment era, daughter of 
Michelle; Parents and extended family interned 
 
Raised without Japanese cultural traditions, “Othered,”  
Confronted internment to accept self 
 
Jerry Matsuoka 3rd (Sansei) Mid-60s Born in post-internment era;  
Aunt interned 
Successful, pursued athletic career in judo,   
Advocated for preservation of Amache 
 
Kent Hisakawa 3rd ( Sansei) 70s Born during internment;  
Some extended family and wife interned  
 
Addressed internment to figure out who he was,  
Wife influenced his community involvement 
James Hashimoto 3rd (Sansei) 50s Born in Japan during post internment era; 
Family not interned, wife’s parents interned  
 
Journalist, writes about Japanese/Japanese American 
culture, Contemplated ethnic identity before father’s 
death 
 
Angela Fukui 3rd (Sansei) 40s or 50s Born in post-internment era;  
Parents and extended family interned 
Participates in Japanese martial art aikido,  
Became more interested in internment once father died 
 
Evelyn Tsukino 3rd (Sansei) 60s Born in post-internment era;  
Two uncles interned  
Deemed internment to be “ancient history,”  
More interested in Japanese cultural traditions/artifacts 
 
Cynthia Yamada 3rd (Sansei) Late 70s Born in pre-internment era; Immediat  family 
evacuated West Coast; Two uncles interned 
 
More interested in Japanese cultural traditions/artifacts,  
Evelyn’s friend  
 
Sophia Akiyama 4th (Yonsei) Late 20s Born in Japan during post-internme t era; 
Family not interned  
Japanese is her first language,  


















Communication Theory of Identity  
Personal Frame Michelle, Charles, Kathryn 
Enacted Frame Jerry, Kathryn 
Relationship Frame Kent, James, Angela 
Communal Frame Evelyn, Cynthia, Jerry 
 
 
Identity Gaps  
Personal-Communal Identity Gap James 
Enacted-Relational-Communal Identity Gap Sophia 
Personal-Enacted-Communal Identity Gap Angela 





Critical-Cultural Hybridity  James, Sophia 
 
